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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(CNN)—U.S. mass transit systems were put on higher alert after Thursday’s bombings in
London, with officials in major cities urging Americans to go about their business but be on
the lookout for anything suspicious… New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly told CNN
his officers were “doing everything that’s prudent, everything that we reasonably can do to
protect the city.” But he said it was impossible to put a police officer “on every train all the
time, or one on every station all the time.”
(http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/07/07/us.response/; Posted: Thursday, July 7, 2005,
11:41 pm EDT (03:41 GMT))
While the most significant terrorist attacks—such as the sarin attack in Tokyo or the bombing
of the Paris Metro—garnered worldwide public attention during the 1990s, popular and
political response in the United States was generally muted. Perhaps this was because attacks
on U.S. transit systems were still quite rare; perhaps this was due to Americans’ legendary
parochialism; or perhaps it simply reflected wishful thinking. Whatever the reasons for this
indifference, it was not justified.
During the mid-1990s, four separate acts of terrorism and extreme violence on U.S. transit
and rail systems killed fourteen and injured more than one thousand.* While police and
intelligence officials who oversee transit properties grew much more vigilant and vocal in the
late-1990s in calling for increased attention to the vulnerability of public transit systems to
terrorist acts, the issue still had not caught the attention of most transit passengers, voters,
members of the media, or elected officials.
This all changed, of course, on September 11, 2001. While the focus of the 9/11 attacks was
on a different part of the transportation system, the effects on the affected public transit
systems were dramatic and, in the case of New York, long-lasting. The vulnerability of open,
accessible public transit systems and their passengers to terrorist acts was cast in the sharpest
possible relief. Concern over the vulnerability of transit systems has been heightened further
by the more recent, deadly, March 11, 2004, attacks on commuter rail trains in Madrid, Spain,
and the July 2005 attacks on the London Underground and bus systems. The London attacks,
in particular, dominated news coverage for at least a week and raised popular concern over
*

Annabelle Boyd and John P. Sullivan, “Emergency Preparedness for Transit Terrorism,” in TCRP Synthesis
27. Washington, D.C.: National Research Council, 1997.
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transit terrorism in the United States such that transit security in the United States is now
widely viewed as an important public policy issue.
The attention and subsequent fear generated by these attacks have clearly motivated
policymakers into action. Indeed, one of the more sobering lessons from the research reported
here is that significant system- or industry-wide changes in security planning have often
required either prolonged exposure to lower-scale attacks (such as those perpetrated by the
Irish Republican Army (IRA) against transit systems in greater London) or a mass casualty
event (such as in Tokyo, Madrid, or most recently, London). Absent such events, concerns—
even repeated, dire warnings by vigilant police and intelligence officials—have too often gone
unheeded by many elected officials.

Research Approach
Research on transit security in the United States has mushroomed since 9/11; this study is part
of that new wave of research. This study contributes to our understanding of transit security in
several ways. Perhaps most important, we employ a wide array of approaches and methods to
examine a complicated issue: How are transit managers around the United States and around
the world working to better protect their systems and passengers from terrorist attacks? To
address this question, we have pursued a multipronged research approach.
1. We reviewed and synthesized nearly all previously published research on transit terrorism
and updated previous efforts to systematically chronicle previous terrorist attacks on
transit systems around the globe.
2. We complemented these detailed case studies and interviews with a comprehensive survey
of 113 of the largest transit operators in the United States regarding prior threats and
attacks, past and current security planning and policing efforts, and approaches to four
security strategies: policing, technology/hardware, public education/outreach, and crime
prevention through environmental design (CPTED).
3. We conducted detailed interviews with federal officials here in the United States
responsible for overseeing transit security, and with transit industry representatives both
here and abroad, to learn about efforts to coordinate and finance transit security planning.
4. We conducted detailed case studies of terrorist attacks on transit systems in London (prior
to July 2005), Madrid, New York, Paris, Tokyo, and Washington, D.C. These case studies
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involved reviews of documentary evidence and other written materials, and in-depth
interviews with transit officials and other key stakeholders.
Thus, our multipronged research approach is both domestic and international, as well as
qualitative and quantitative, all in an effort to increase the reliability of our findings on this
complex issue.
A second distinguishing feature of this research reflects the experience and expertise of the
research team. We are scholars of architecture and urban design, civil and transportation
engineering, and transportation and urban planning, and not intelligence, policing, or
security. We have, therefore, approached this research from the perspective of the people who
finance, design, build, operate, and use public transit systems, rather than from the
perspective of those who police them.
For example, the role of system design in transit security has received far less attention in most
previous research on transit security than policing or surveillance. A specific focus of this work
is on system design. We conducted inspections of transit stations in each of the systems
studied, and we collected detailed information on attitudes toward and applications of CPTED
strategies in our survey of U.S. transit operators.
A third and final distinguishing feature of this research is that it updates the findings and
conclusions of many previous studies in this fast moving and rapidly evolving literature. We
found from our survey, for example, that security planning efforts have progressed
significantly at U.S. transit systems since a 2002 U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) survey of transit operators was published in 2003.
Layout of the Study
The study is composed of six sections. Following the introduction, the second section presents
a comprehensive look at “Securing Urban Rail Transit Systems against Terrorism: A Review of
the Literature.” This research-literature review gives particular emphasis to design strategies.
Building on two earlier Mineta Transportation Institute reports, the section includes a history
and chronology of terrorist attacks on railway systems, extending the inventory of terrorist
attacks to 2004,† and providing basic information about the medium of attack, the type of
†

But not including the July 2005 terrorist attacks in London, which occurred too close to the publication
date of this report to be analyzed as part of this research.
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transit system attacked (heavy rail, commuter rail, light rail), and the impact of the attack
(number of casualties).
The next section, “Securing Transit Systems in the Post-9/11 Era: A Survey of U.S. Transit
Operators,” presents the results of a Web-based survey administered to 120 transit agencies in
108 cities in the United States. The survey assesses (1) how the threat of terrorism affects the
transportation security decisions of agencies; (2) how such decisions have changed after the
events of September 11, 2001; (3) how agencies effectively identify and assess vulnerabilities
in their transportation systems; (4) what measures they are taking to increase transit security;
and (5) the relative importance they place on different security strategies such as CPTED,
public education and user outreach, policing, and security hardware and technology.
Transit agencies do not operate in a policy vacuum. Their planning efforts against terrorism
are determined largely by policies and funding allocations at the state and federal levels. The
fourth section, “Institutional Responses to Increasing Transit Security Threats: Interviews
with Key U.S. Stakeholders,” assesses the federal government’s role in the security of urban rail
transit in the United States. Drawing from interviews with officials in a number of federal
agencies, this section discusses and analyzes initiatives taken by the Department of Homeland
Security, the Federal Transit Administration, and the Federal Railroad Administration. The
section also reports on interviews with officials from the American Public Transportation
Association (APTA) and security personnel from Amtrak, the New York Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (MTA), and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
“Case Studies of Contemporary Terrorist Incidents,” the next section, draws from the literature
and first-hand interviews with transit officials in five cities—London, New York, Tokyo, Paris,
and Madrid—to present five case studies of contemporary terrorist incidents: (1) the terrorist
attacks waged by the Irish Republican Army against the London Underground, (2) the Fulton
Street Station fire bombing in New York, (3) the sarin chemical agent release by members of
the Aum Shinrikyo cult on the Tokyo subway system, (4) the bombings on the Paris rail
system by Algerian terrorists, and (5) the Al Qaeda attack on the Madrid rail line. The case
studies detail the incidents and discuss the emergency and long-term design and policy
responses to them.
The last section, “Transit Security Strategies of International Agencies,” reports on interviews
with transit officials from Paris, Tokyo, London, Madrid, and Brussels to better assess the role
of transit system design and operation in both exacerbating and minimizing terrorist attacks.
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This section also compares transit security policies in different countries and elaborates the
goals of the different international transit agencies, their security measures and strategies, and
the challenges they face in securing their systems.
From the hundreds of pages of interview transcripts, survey results, and fieldwork notes, we
distill the analyses in these six sections into what we see as twelve important lessons from the
recent experience of efforts to prepare for, discourage, mitigate, and respond to terrorist attacks
on urban public transit systems around the world.

Findings: A Dozen Lessons Learned
1. Public transit systems are open, dynamic, and inherently vulnerable to terrorist
attacks; they simply cannot be closed and secured like other parts of the
transportation system.
Public transit systems are a central part of urban life. They assemble strangers from diverse
economic, social, ethnic, and religious backgrounds and convey them though a wide array of
neighborhoods and districts. They are, by definition, open, dynamic systems that cannot be
closed and regulated like the air transport system.‡ Such sentiments were expressed repeatedly
by the hundreds of people interviewed and surveyed for this research. Not surprisingly, most
of the transit managers and security officials who responded to our survey viewed their transit
systems as “very vulnerable” to terrorist attacks.
While public officials understandably call for efforts to make transit systems 100 percent safe,
it is simply impossible to secure the thousands of bus stops, hundreds of miles of bus routes,
many dozens of miles of rail rights-of-way, and the hundreds of stations used daily by millions
of passengers in most large metropolitan areas. The challenge is especially daunting given a
growing wave of suicide bombers who are willing to risk capture or death to execute an attack.
According to an official interviewed in Madrid,
I have to say that security does not exist. What does exist are methods to lessen
insecurity. You never know what is going to happen. I am telling you this because

‡

While some intercity and commuter rail systems, because they handle fewer, longer-distance passengers,
have instituted airport-like screening of passengers and their baggage, such efforts could not be extended to
local transit operations serving dozens, hundreds, and even thousands of stops.
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when the politicians tell you that these methods will guarantee our security, it is all
false.
Said another Madrid official,
You should accept that there is an inherent vulnerability to the system, and if you
want to run an open mass transit system you live with the vulnerabilities and try to
tackle them through intelligence and stopping these people before they actually get
in.
Such sentiments raise legitimate, and perhaps troubling, questions about whether transit
security planning efforts are perceived by transit officials as more symbolically effective (at
creating a sense of safety among the public) than substantively effective (in reducing the
likelihood and/or magnitude of a terrorist attack). At the very least, they reflect the daunting
challenges to security planning for open, accessible transit systems.
2. The threat of transit terrorism is probably not universal; most attacks in the
developed world have been on the largest systems in the largest cities.
While the chronology of terrorist attacks on transit systems reviewed in the section “Securing
Urban Rail Transit Systems against Terrorism: A Review of the Literature” documents
hundreds of incidents occurring over many decades, the deadliest and most politically
influential of these have occurred on the largest transit systems in the most politically and
economically powerful world cities, such as London, Madrid, Moscow, New York, Paris, and
Tokyo. This suggests that efforts to combat transit terrorism should be focused on cities and
transit systems where the likelihood and potential effects of terrorism are greatest.
This observed asymmetry of risk likely reflects both the symbolic importance of particular
world cities, and the fact that transit use tends to be concentrated in the largest and most
densely developed metropolitan areas. As noted in the third section, “Securing Transit Systems
in the Post-9/11 Era: A Survey of U.S. Transit Operators,” the ten largest U.S. transit systems
(operating in nine metropolitan areas) carried 65 percent of all transit trips reported to the
Federal Transit Administration for 2002, while the hundreds of remaining transit systems
carry the remaining 35 percent. Of all 2002 U.S. transit trips, 39 percent occurred in one
metropolitan area, New York, and 31 percent of all U.S. transit trips were carried by just one
system, the New York MTA.**
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While the most dramatic attacks have occurred mostly on major systems in world cities, this
does not mean, of course, that local bus service or smaller cities are safe from attack. In the
developing world, terrorist attacks on transit are more likely to occur on buses than on trains.
Further, as noted in the sections “Securing Urban Rail Transit Systems against Terrorism: A
Review of the Literature,” and “Institutional Responses to Increasing Transit Security Threats:
Interviews with Key U.S. Stakeholders,” security experts report that some terrorists have on
occasion chosen to attack unexpected targets in order to elevate fear and anxiety among the
general population. But while smaller U.S. cities—like Oklahoma City—are clearly not safe
from terrorist attacks, the very small role played by public transit in these cities (where the
mode share of trips can dip below 1 percent) suggests that they are a far less likely venue for an
attack than larger cities where the role and visibility of public transit are proportionally much
greater.
3. The asymmetry of transit terrorism risk is at odds with a political system of public
finance that favors distributing funding somewhat equally across jurisdictions.
Given the observed asymmetry of risk, how should security resources be deployed? If strategic
transit security policies start from the premise that attacks will inevitably occur, then
“success” is not elimination of all attacks, but preventing and/or minimizing the most
damaging attacks, which are most likely and most deadly on the largest transit systems. While
focusing security efforts on large transit systems in New York, Washington, D.C., and Los
Angeles, for example, may motivate terrorists to shift their focus to smaller systems and
smaller cities, such a shift could be viewed as evidence of success in securing the most
symbolically significant and attractive targets.
However, there is a strong tendency in the public finance of transportation, and indeed in most
realms of public finance, to distribute funding widely among political districts and
jurisdictions. This helps to explain why federal per-rider transit subsidies tend to be far higher
in places like Chapel Hill, North Carolina, than in places like New York City. This natural
tendency to spread out money evenly does not square with the asymmetry of transit systems’
risk of terrorist attack, and may undermine the effectiveness of federal and state transit
security policies and programs. Thus, despite New York’s domination of U.S. public transit
patronage, it is unlikely that the U.S. Congress—comprising entirely geographically based
**

American Public Transportation Association, “Transit Agency Data,” http://www.apta.com/research/stats.
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representatives concerned with the distribution of resources among their competing
jurisdictions—will see fit to devote a third or more of all federal transit security resources to
the New York metropolitan area.
4. Transit managers are struggling to balance the costs and (uncertain) benefits of
increased security against the costs and (certain) benefits of attracting passengers.
Transit managers are in the business of attracting and conveying paying customers. They
endeavor to provide safe, fast, and reliable service at a reasonable price, but transit systems
worldwide have struggled in a losing, century-long battle with private vehicles for market
share in urban travel—especially in most U.S. cities. Thus, from the perspective of transit
system planners and managers, safety and security are important, albeit intermediate, means
to the end goal of carrying passengers. As one transit industry official put it, “What’s
important to remember is that public transport companies are responsible for satisfying the
mobility needs of citizens. They are not security agencies.”
With respect to the sometimes competing objectives of maximizing security versus
maximizing ridership, one London interviewee noted,
Our primary function is to get loads of people to use trains. Security, I would
suggest, is still seen as a secondary but integral function. So you won’t have the
world’s most secure station built, but you’ll have the world’s most cost-effective
station built with security enhancements.
Calls for increased attention to security have come in recent years from passengers, the media,
local officials, and state and federal governments. With respect to the latter, mandates for
regular and comprehensive security planning, more formalized safety and emergency response
procedures, increased policing and surveillance, and so on were criticized by many of the
transit officials we interviewed (both domestic and international) as unfunded mandates that
strain already depleted transit system budgets. Indeed, the need for increased security funding
was the central finding of the 2003 GAO study of transit security in the United States, and
such calls for increased funding were echoed in this research.
According to one transit official interviewed, transit terrorism is a tremendous burden for
agencies because they “have to be lucky all the time, while the terrorists only have to be lucky
once.” Regarding the need for public subsidies to support security expenditures, another
interviewee noted, “In the end, public transport is a business…There comes a point at which
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the businessman will say that the security measures will cost him more than the revenues. The
key issue for addressing risk is to get things down to ‘ALARP’ as we call it, ‘as low as
reasonably practical.’”
In addition to concerns over the costs of security programs, many of the transit officials also
expressed concerns over the uncertain nature of the risks and the uncertain effectiveness of
increased security expenditures. “How,” several of those interviewed asked, “should systems
evaluate costs and benefits in such uncertain environments?” Further, what techniques or
approaches offer systems the most security bang for the buck? In response to such questions,
the transit systems examined for this study have pursued an array of ways to prioritize
expenditures on security:
• customizing security measures based on a detailed evaluation of risk for each site (Paris).
• assessing risks based on station location, socio-demographics of the region, and
delinquency rates of surrounding population (Madrid).††
• focusing efforts on terminal stations, the most heavily patronized stations, and stations near
government buildings (Tokyo).
• giving top priority to securing sites with concentrations of hazardous materials (Paris).
• conducting public surveys of riders’ perceptions and concerns to help prioritize needs
(Madrid).
5. Given the varying roles and mandates of agencies of the central government
(ministries, federal agencies, and so on), intelligence services, police agencies, and
transit operators on matters of security, close coordination and cooperation are
critical to effective transit security planning.
Many of our interviewees spoke of the need for a multilayered and multipronged system of
security in which various agencies play very different roles. Many transit officials with whom
we spoke suggested that interagency cooperation is common to the industry, which bodes well
for increased coordination with police and security agencies in the years ahead. One U.S.
transit industry representative put it this way:

††

Said one Spanish official we interviewed: “…a station in the Basque country is not the same as a station in
Andalusia in South Spain.”

Mineta Transportation Institute

10

Executive Summary

The transit industry, because it’s public, is very mutually supportive. Transit
agencies aren’t in competition with each other. In fact, we have a long history of
aiding one another with training programs. Even if you’ve hired a consultant to
help you with a program, we’ve seen people really sharing that program or that
information. One of the roles that [the American Public Transportation Association
plays is that] we’re a conduit for the sharing of a lot of that information.
Many of those interviewed emphasized the importance of clearly defining roles and
responsibilities among actors. Several also stressed the need for frequent and regular
interaction among agencies to share information and agree on common strategies and tactics.
Concluded one London interviewee,
Partnership is not easy. You have to invest time, and emergencies are not the time
to meet your counterpart in different agencies.... Resilience is about coordinating
and facilitating efforts of all the disparate, separate agencies to ensure better quality
of performance, aiding and leading to a more effective prevention or recovery than
might otherwise be the case.
Finally, several of the transit officials interviewed noted that APTA, the leading U.S. transit
industry organization, has come to play an increasingly central security coordinating and
information-brokering role, and, in doing so, has come to more closely resemble the activities
of the International Union of Public Transport (UITP) outside of the United States.
6. An important benefit of improved coordination is standardization of emergency
training, security audits, and disaster preparedness procedures, and the issuance of
common guidelines about security.
While the airline industry has adopted common international security standards and
procedures, many other modes—and in particular public transit—have not done so. For
example, several of our European interviewees noted that while many European Union (EU)
member countries have developed highly integrated international passenger rail service,
similarly integrated systems of rail security have been slow in coming.
Likewise, while the many transit agencies typically operating in larger metropolitan areas have
developed reciprocal integrated fare and passenger information protocols, efforts to integrate
and standardize security practices and procedures among transit systems within metropolitan
areas and between them are relatively new.
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Such standardization can be particularly helpful to smaller transit operators that do not have
the resources to independently develop security standards and procedures. For example,
standardizing safety guidelines and signage, the structure and content of security
announcements, and the marking of emergency exits on trains and in stations can all help
passengers avoid confusion in times of emergency. Likewise, standardizing security training of
personnel—drivers, supervisors, and managers—can improve coordination with police, fire,
and intelligence officials in times of emergency. Many of the respondents from U.S. transit
agencies surveyed for this research noted that, under the guidance of the federal government,
standardized security plans and training programs were being integrated into already
established emergency response training programs traditionally aimed at responding to
personal and property crime and smaller-scale emergencies.
7. Despite significant progress in increasing coordination between transit and police/
intelligence agencies, much work remains.
Despite significant and ongoing efforts to improve the coordination and cooperation between
the many, largely independent transit agencies operating in large U.S. metropolitan areas,
seamless integration of routes, schedules, and fares has long proven elusive. Given the widely
divergent goals and objectives of public transit and police/intelligence agencies, the challenges
to increased coordination and cooperation are even greater.
Perhaps the greatest challenge to improved coordination identified in this study concerns
ambiguity and uncertainty over lines of authority and responsibility. Put simply, it is not
always clear who is responsible for what. Said one European transit industry representative we
interviewed,
The public authorities are responsible for security. If there is a terrorist incident or
attack, the transit authorities are responsible for restoring traffic as soon as possible.
They [the transit agencies] should also help the public authorities to organize first
aid and emergency response, but they are not responsible to follow up the threat or
to investigate the threat.
Despite the many challenges, nearly everyone queried agreed that increased coordination was
needed. Such coordination can take many forms: (1) coordination between neighboring
transit agencies; (2) coordination among local, state, and federal law enforcement officials; (3)
information sharing with the media and the public; (4) the improved dissemination of best
practices in security planning; (5) consistent emergency response procedures and protocols;
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(6) improved integration of different security-related technologies; and (7) increased
international cooperation in sharing information and best practices. With regard to the
latter, one official interviewed noted, “The threat is international and the way you need to
deal with it is an international effort,” although several other interviewees cautioned that
while international threats call for international collaboration, security measures should not
be applied equally in all places; they should be customized according to local
organizational/governmental structures, transit system size, age, and characteristics, and the
specifics of local cultures and norms.
8. Passenger education and outreach is a challenge; informed passengers can increase
surveillance and safety, but fearful passengers may stop using public transit.
Although most of the officials surveyed and interviewed agreed that public education and
outreach had become an important part of transit security planning, respondents were in
general more ambivalent about education and outreach than about policing, technologies, or
CPTED. In particular, many cited the challenge of raising awareness without raising fear. One
of the officials we interviewed in Madrid said that their goal following the March 11, 2004,
attacks was to augment feelings of security and diminish feelings of insecurity: “The methods
we chose and implemented after the March attack were not so much about combating
terrorism; rather they were used to help riders recover a feeling of security.”
While our interviews suggest that passenger outreach efforts on security have been more
common outside the United States, nearly all those to whom we spoke agreed that it is a
delicate balance between creating a perception of excessive, pervasive security (which is both
costly and can incite fear among passengers) and too little security (which can promote a sense
of danger and unchecked lawlessness). Said one transit industry official, “You have to reassure
but not scare off passengers, because if you exceed a certain level [of police activity] it might
be considered that you are in a very insecure place.”
Enlisting the public’s help in security surveillance can be effective, but entails risks. Excessive
marketing of vigilance can create an environment of paranoia, where everything and everyone
can be viewed as potential threats. Such paranoia can suppress ridership while overwhelming
transit officials with security tips, and panicked passengers can compound damage after an
attack.
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Further, a strong emphasis on police and public surveillance can lead to social profiling, and
with it losses of privacy and civil rights. Said one interviewee,
Here [in Spain] there would be a lot of problems and it wouldn’t be convenient to
start screening passengers. People will not accept being identified, profiled, and
searched, even if it is a random manner, because when you select, you elect and you
have to do this with a certain objective and clear parameters. You will be accused of
discrimination because this is labeling, marking people with certain physical
features.
9. The role of crime prevention through environmental design in security planning is
waxing.
Most of our survey and interview respondents were familiar with the concept of CPTED, and
most viewed CPTED—which considers how the physical design of spaces can affect both the
likelihood and impact of criminal or terrorist activity—as an important longer-term strategy
to address both crime and terrorism on transit systems. According to the respondents to our
survey, CPTED was given much less weight in security planning prior to 9/11. Since 9/11,
however, over 80 percent of the respondents now believe that CPTED is a somewhat or very
effective strategy in preventing terrorist attacks. This ranking of effectiveness is similar to
both policing and security hardware and technology strategies, and well ahead of public
education and outreach.
According to one of our interviewees in Madrid, “Security is based on prevention, and
prevention begins with design. A station designed without security criteria would be much
more insecure and expensive to protect.”
While the potential effectiveness of CPTED was widely touted by those queried, many also
noted that design is a longer-term strategy. CPTED strategies can be cost-effectively
incorporated into new stations and terminals, such as in the new Météor and Eole Lines in
Paris, the new Line 11 in Madrid, and the new Bilbao subway in Spain. On the other hand,
most interviewees thought retrofitting old stations to be extremely costly for the most part.
Concluded one interviewee regarding the retrofit of older stations, “The best you can do is to
use some passive methods such as mirrors, cameras, and increased lighting.”
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Even among officials interviewed who work primarily in policing and security, knowledge of
and enthusiasm for CPTED principles was widespread. For example, one London transit police
official said,
If you take a station like Baker Street, it’s very dark [and listed as a historically
significant] building so there are limitations on what can be done to change the
appearance and structure. Not very much can be done at all. We’d like better
lighting, more CCTV [closed-circuit television]. We’d like cleaner lines. Any
vending machines that are brought in, we’d like them to have sloping tops so
nothing can be put on top of them. We’d like them to be totally accessible or
totally enclosed so they’re easy to search or impossible to put something in. We
look at tamper-evident seals [on entryways to areas closed to the public], which
can’t be physically locked. When it comes to new stations, bigger, brighter areas,
clear sight lines, certainly those are the kinds of things that we would seek to
influence.
10. Since 9/11, transit agencies are more likely to adopt comprehensive, multipronged
approaches to security planning than in years past.
Our survey and interviews focused in detail on four types of security strategies—policing,
technology, education and outreach, and CPTED. We found that attention to all these
strategies has increased since 9/11, and over half of the respondents now view all four
strategies as central or significant parts of security planning efforts.
Prior to 9/11, most of the respondents to our national survey of large transit operators said
they had emphasized policing and hardware/technology in security planning, and placed far
less stock in either public education or CPTED. While the survey respondents believed that
the importance of policing and hardware/technology increased after 9/11, their assessments of
the importance of public education and, especially, CPTED increased even more.
This broad support for all four security strategies reflects a consensus among those surveyed
and interviewed regarding the need for a comprehensive, multipronged approach to transit
security planning. Several interviewees cautioned against becoming too reliant on just one or
two strategies. As one of our London interviewees noted,
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Each one (strategy) on its own can’t work in isolation. I don’t think that one of
them sits out on its own. You’ve got to do each one. And you’ve got to have an
element of each one in terms of being able to combat terrorism or crime in general.
11. The public transit industry is vulnerable to security policies or programs that
reduce the speed, comfort, or convenience of transit, and may benefit significantly
from policies that increase the attractiveness of transit.
Despite significant public investments over the past three decades, public transit systems
around the United States continue to lose market share to private vehicles. Many transit
systems have made important strides in increasing the comfort, safety, and convenience of
using transit, but matching the speed and flexibility of private autos remains a challenge.
Transit security policies and programs that increase the hassle of, or delays in, riding buses and
trains may significantly undermine an already vulnerable and distressed industry. For example,
the random bag and parcel inspections instituted on the New York transit system following
the July 2005 attacks on the London public transit systems will add stress and delays on the
United States’ most heavily patronized transit system—stress and delays that inevitably make
traveling by other modes relatively more attractive.
Many transit system managers said that new security measures should enhance the perceived
safety and attractiveness of their systems, and not add to delays, inconvenience, or perceptions
of heightened risk. The importance of creating safe, attractive systems for passengers, report
some transit officials, is sometimes lost on security officials; as one interviewee from London
said prior to the July 2005 attacks,
It’s trying to balance providing maximum security while still providing the kind of
service people expect. People still want to go from point A to point B as fast as
possible. They don’t want to be delayed, even for security reasons. So that’s the
balance…it’s still a struggle… I think that is something that in the future has to
evolve, to where you have that perfect balance where you can say, “I think we’re
providing as much security as we can,” but it’s also seamless to the customer so you
don’t have an operational slowdown.
12. Given the uncertain effectiveness of antitransit terrorism efforts, the most tangible
benefits of increased attention to and spending on transit security may be a
reduction in transit-related personal and property crimes.
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Terrorist attacks on transit systems in the United States and abroad have increased in recent
years in both frequency and severity. Likewise, public and political concern over the issue has
skyrocketed since 9/11. The fact remains, however, that transit patrons remain far more likely
to be victimized by personal crime than a terrorist act.
According to Federal Transit Administration data, an average of 279 people have been killed
on or by public transit each year over the past decade. In addition, an annual average of 18,748
people have been injured on or by public transit over the same period. Crimes ostensibly
unrelated to transit use—such as being robbed or killed while waiting at a bus stop—would
push these figures far higher. This means that, between September 11, 2001, and August 11,
2005, more than 1,100 people have been killed on or by public transit, and more than 75,000
have been injured on or by transit in the United States‡‡
Further, studies have repeatedly shown that fear of crime is a significant deterrent to transit
use for many people.*** So while political attention and public resources are currently focused
on transit terrorism, reductions of personal and property crimes on public transit systems
could prove to be a significant collateral benefit of safer, more secure public transit systems.
In both our review of the research literature and in several of our interviews were repeated
suggestions for a “dual-use strategy,” whereby antiterrorism measures may be effective in
reducing transit crime. Coincident with new security measures on the Tokyo Metro, both
robberies and thefts are down substantially. Likewise, fewer crimes were reported in the period
following the implementation of random parcel inspections in Madrid.
Such complementary benefits, however, are not assured without careful attention to
congruency between anticrime and antiterrorism measures. Some of those interviewed
suggested that anticrime and antiterrorism efforts are not always reciprocal and
complementary. “By preparing your system to react to terrorist attacks, you also prepare it to
react to different types of crime…But the other way around is not always true” (Madrid transit
official).
‡‡
***

Federal Transit Administration, “Transit Safety and Security Statistics,” accessed http://transitsafety.volpe.dot.gov/Data/Samis.asp.
David Hartgen, Gerald Ingalls and Timothy Owens, Public Fear of Crime and Its Role in Public Transit Use,
Raleigh, NC: University of North Carolina, Center for Interdisciplinary Transportation Studies, 1993; and
G. Lynch and S. Atkins, “The Influence of Personal Security Fears on Women’s Travel Patterns,”
Transportation 15, 2001.
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However, others argued that anticrime and antiterrorism efforts worked very much hand in
hand. Said one London transit official:
It’s easier for a terrorist to operate in an environment that is disorderly, that does
not give the appearance that someone is in charge; the area does not look secure.
Actually taking care of the little things, and insuring that there is order and
maintenance, sends a signal that it’s hard to operate illegally or carry out an attack
in this environment. There’s a deterrent effect.
Postscript
Whether these findings are discouraging or heartening depends on one’s perspective. The
stakes are high, the risks uncertain, and the solutions unclear. The July 7 and 21, 2005,
subway and bus attacks in London offer a sobering reminder that transit systems remain
inherently vulnerable to terrorist actions, even on systems where security and vigilance have
been the modus operandi for decades. While public transit systems are likely to remain
attractive and vulnerable targets for terrorists, U.S. transit systems are today better
coordinated, policed, monitored, and designed, and staff and passengers are better informed
and prepared than just a few years ago. How effective these efforts will be (or have already
been) in deterring or minimizing a terrorist attack is unclear. What is clear, however, is that
crimes of all types—political, personal, and property—drive riders away from transit systems.
So if the recent rise in transit security planning deters a major terrorist attack, or simply the
activities of a lone pickpocket, the transit industry will be better off as a result.
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INTRODUCTION
For those determined to kill in quantity and willing to kill indiscriminately, public
transportation offers an ideal target.
—Jenkins and Gerston, 2001
The events of September 11, 2001, brought the issue of transportation security and terrorism
to the forefront of civil society. While transportation security officials had been aware of the
possible threat of terrorist attacks on transportation networks for some time, these tragic
events revealed both vulnerabilities in security systems and the previously unimaginable
consequences of such breaches. Public surface transportation systems are especially attractive
targets for would-be terrorists wanting to cause the maximum amount of disruption and
harm.1 Such systems serve very large numbers of people over extensive networks of stations,
stops, and facilities. In the United States, 74 rail transit systems operate 18,000 vehicles in 38
cities; collectively, these systems carry 3.4 billion passenger trips annually. The wide use of rail
transit systems by many segments of the public makes them especially attractive targets for
terrorists wanting to maximize disruption and harm. Accordingly, concerns about transit
security rank high among transportation officials and transit riders.
The vulnerability of railway systems lies in the fact that they are very open and accessible, with
fixed, predictable routes and access points. Their openness and anonymity make it easy for
potential terrorists to hide in crowds without arousing suspicion. Securing such open and
public systems presents a series of problems. The volume of passengers makes it impossible for
transit operators to employ many of the security tactics used by commercial aviation.2
Preventive security measures on public transit, such as the screening of passengers and luggage
with X-ray machines and metal detectors, hand searches, passenger profiling, chemical- and
bomb-sniffing dogs, and armed guards, would lead to intolerable delays and costs. The need
for transit agencies to offer transit systems that are accessible, convenient, and affordable for
daily users thus conflicts with many security goals. In cities around the globe, people choose
between public transit and private automobiles for many trips. Private vehicle use is growing
in most cities, resulting in worsening congestion and air pollution. Attractive, convenient
public transit systems help to mitigate many of the problems of widespread auto use, and
provide mobility for those who do not have access to automobiles, including the young,
elderly, disabled, and poor. Security measures that cause inconvenience, delay, or added cost to
travel by public transit are likely to shift travelers and cities toward greater dependence on
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private vehicles. Therefore, balancing transit riders’ desire for convenience, accessibility, and
affordability with security measures presents a challenge to transit operators.3
A 1997 survey sponsored by the Transportation Research Board assessed both the perceptions
of transit system managers regarding terrorism and security as well as the status of agencies’
existing emergency preparedness, planning, and response procedures. Over 40 U.S.
transportation agencies participated in the survey, including agencies that provide rail service
and coordinate bus systems. Urban and commuter rail systems ranked the highest in terms of
the perceived risk as targets of terrorism. Detonation of explosive devices was perceived to pose
the greatest threat to transit systems. A majority of the agencies surveyed had actually dealt
with bomb threats in addition to a variety of other security threats.4

Transit Security in an International Context
Security on mass transit is a global issue. Indeed, many transit systems around the world have
been victimized by terrorists, including the railway systems of New York, London, Paris,
Tokyo, Madrid, and Moscow. An analysis of terrorist attack trends indicates that their lethality
has increased over time. In addition, the number of attacks against transportation systems
increased in the 1990s. In 1991, transportation systems were the target of 20 percent of all
violent attacks. This rose to almost 40 percent by 1998. Jenkins’ (1997, 2001) comprehensive
chronology of 900 terrorist attacks involving surface transportation from 1920 to 2000
provides an analytical model useful in identifying the most salient patterns and trends. He
finds that about two-thirds of the attacks were intended to kill people (as opposed to simply
disrupting transit operations), while 37 percent of the attacks actually resulted in fatalities. Of
the incidents with fatalities, about three-fourths caused more than one death, and 23 percent
caused 10 or more deaths.
International case studies of surface transportation systems that have suffered terrorist attacks
can offer examples of both vulnerabilities to terrorist threats, and effective measures for their
prevention, mitigation, and response. Such case studies offer lessons on preparedness, response,
and recovery that may apply to other transportation systems with similar physical and
organizational characteristics, including those in the United States. While some case studies of
transit terrorist attacks exist, such as Jenkins (1997) or Jenkins and Gerston (2001), they are
almost exclusively descriptive narratives of the events or assessments of the police and
emergency responses that followed them. The existing literature on transit terrorism does not
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identify and compare the social and environmental characteristics of the transit systems that
have been hit by terrorism, or the strategies that transit agencies around the world are
adopting to offer protection to their riders. While intelligence systems have globalized rapidly
in response to recent terrorist attacks, planning to prevent and mitigate terrorist attacks on
transit systems is far more insular. Additionally, most research on transit terrorism has
centered on the role of policing and technology in mitigating terrorist attacks.5 There has
been far less investigation of how system design and public education may be employed to
both reduce the likelihood of attacks and minimize the impact of attacks when they occur.
Resources such as the public outreach tool kit for “Transit Watch” and the Volpe Center’s
“Security Design Considerations for Transit Vehicles and Facilities” have more recently been
funded by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA).

Conceptual Model of Transit Terrorist Events
Following the July 2005 bombings in London, concerns with transit security rank very high
among transportation officials and transit riders. Deterring and minimizing terrorist attacks
involves assessments of vulnerabilities, the mitigation of weaknesses in the system, and the
development of effective response and emergency plans. Yet planning for transit security to
date has largely been ad hoc and often ambiguous. For example, surface transportation security
tends to focus less on deterrence and more on mitigation, quick response, and the rapid
restoration of services after an incident.
In contrast, the study that follows examines and compares responses to transit terrorist
incidents, conceptualizing a process that extends over a very long time frame, approximating
the life of the transit system. The analysis of international terrorist incidents that follows has
gathered information relevant to each of the four stages described below:
Stage One—Planning, Designing, and Building: It is important to incorporate into the
planning and physical design of a transit system the best current knowledge of terrorist
threats, thereby minimizing through system design the potential damage of incidents that
could occur at any time, even decades later. The choice of materials for the construction of
stations and vehicles, for example, should be made on the basis of full consideration of terrorist
attacks; the provision of ventilation systems should include considerations of fire suppression,
anthrax, and possible chemical attacks; the selection of computerized communications and
control systems should be informed by their potential vulnerabilities; and the architecture of
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stops, stations, and vehicles should incorporate design principles that minimize their
vulnerabilities, maximize their ability to continue functioning under difficult circumstances,
and facilitate responses by emergency personnel.
Stage Two—Planning for Incident Response: The vulnerability of transit systems to
terrorist attacks should be reviewed periodically throughout the operational life of a transit
system so security officials can refine planning in response to evolving threats. For example,
interagency cooperation should be encouraged and staff training should be updated. Sufficient
information also must be provided to passengers so, in the event of an incident, they will know
how to respond. In addition to the actions of transit operators and their funding agencies, law
enforcement and intelligence efforts by agencies charged with counterterrorism should be
ongoing.
Stage Three—Immediate Response to Incidents: If and when an incident occurs, the
immediate response—including clearance, search, rescue, recovery, and the restoration of
service—constitutes a critical stage. While the actions in this stage may last only a few weeks,
they provide invaluable information for security planners as terrorist incidents are such
infrequent events. With respect to this research, deconstructing the role of system design and
operations in exacerbating or minimizing the effects of the attack can be used to help plan and
operate safer public transit systems in the future and provide for continuity of operations in
emergency situations.
Stage Four—Long-Term Recovery: The final stage in responding to a terrorist incident may
last for years, and constitutes the redesign, reconstruction, and operation of the system under
new rules and procedures that are influenced by the incident and what has been learned during
the planning and rebuilding process. This stage also involves restoring public trust in the
security of the transit system.

Scope of the Problem, This Research, and Policy Responses
The goal of this study, which uses transit authorities and transportation agencies as units of
analysis, is to research global responses to the threat of transit terrorism by:
• comparing policies and strategies employed by transit agencies in the United States and
around the world.
• contrasting the larger policy framework of transit security funding as exercised by different
transit authorities and ministries of transport.
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• evaluating the importance of transit station design for transit security.
• assessing the lessons learned from the different contexts for a more effective future response
and prevention of terrorist attacks.
Implicit in our research design—and indeed in nearly all policy discussions surrounding the
issue of transit security—is that public transit systems, or transportation and infrastructure
systems more broadly, are the right way to think about the problem, the appropriate unit of
analysis for study, and the correct venue for policymaking. At the very least, such assumptions
warrant reflection.
We can think about three ways that acts of terrorism intersect with transportation systems:
• when transportation is the means by which a terrorist attack is executed.
• when transportation is the end, or target, of a terrorist attack.
• when the crowds that many transportation modes generate are the focus of a terrorist attack.
Examples of transportation as the means of a terrorist attack include the use of cars, buses, or
trains to convey explosives, or when cars, buses, or planes are used as weapons. Examples of
transportation as the end of a terrorist attack include attacks on bridges or tunnels to disrupt
transit, railroad, or highway operations, exact economic costs, and attract attention. In each of
these cases, the unique characteristics of transportation (and other infrastructure) networks
define many aspects of the attacks, emergency response, and system protection. As such, the
logic of defining both the problem and proposed policy solutions in terms of transportation, or
in our case public transit, is clear.
But when crowds are the target, which is the case in many recent suicide bomb attacks, the
logic of defining the problem and its solutions in terms of transportation is less clear. Airports,
rail stations, and bus and ferry terminals all congregate large numbers of people in small, often
enclosed, spaces. But such crowding is in no way unique to transportation stations and
terminals. Skyscrapers, shopping malls, and major shows, concerts, and sporting events
likewise congregate large numbers of people in small spaces—as do major celebrations (such as
the 4th of July on the Mall in Washington, D.C.) and parades (such as the Tournament of
Roses on New Year’s Day). In such cases, even if it were possible to completely close and secure
public transit systems, the potential venues for tragic and devastating attacks on large crowds
of people would hardly be dented. Thus, while public transit systems may currently be a
favored venue of terrorists in search of crowds to attack, one cannot assume that securing or
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eliminating crowds on public transit would in any way end or mitigate such attacks. Public
assembly is a defining characteristic of free and open civil societies, and the consequences of
closing, securing, or eliminating large gatherings of people reach well beyond the scope of this
study or of the transportation sector.

Methodology
The study has gathered research data from numerous sources, including the following:
• primary and secondary documents and archival information relating to terrorist incidents.
• visits to sites of terrorist attacks in New York, London, Paris, Tokyo, and Madrid.
• interviews with officials of transit agencies in these same cities.
• interviews with officials from ministries of transport and federal transportation authorities
in five countries (United States, England, France, Japan, Spain).
• interviews with officials from two nongovernmental public interest groups, the American
Public Transportation Association (APTA), based in Washington, D.C., and the
International Union of Public Transport (UITP), based in Brussels.
• a survey of 120 transit agencies in cities throughout the United States.

Layout of the Study
The study is composed of six sections. Following the introduction, the second section presents
a comprehensive look at “Securing Urban Rail Transit Systems against Terrorism: A Review of
the Literature.” This research-literature review gives particular emphasis to design strategies.
Drawing from two Mineta Transportation Institute reports, this section includes an overview
of the history and chronology of terrorist attacks on railway systems, extending the inventory
of terrorist attacks to 2004, and providing basic information about the medium of attack, the
type of transit system attacked (heavy rail, commuter rail, light rail), and the impact of the
attack (number of casualties).
The next section, “Securing Transit Systems in the Post-9/11 Era: A Survey of U.S. Transit
Operators,” presents the results of a Web-based survey administered to 120 transit agencies in
108 cities in the United States. The survey assesses (1) how the threat of terrorism affects the
transportation security decisions of agencies; (2) how such decisions have changed after the
events of September 11, 2001; (3) how agencies effectively identify and assess vulnerabilities
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in their transportation systems; (4) what measures they are taking to increase transit security;
and (5) the relative importance they place on different security strategies such as crime
prevention through environmental design (CPTED), public education and user outreach,
policing, and security hardware and technology.
Transit agencies do not operate in a policy vacuum. Their planning efforts against terrorism
are determined largely by policies and funding allocations at the state and federal levels. The
fourth section, “Institutional Responses to Increasing Transit Security Threats: Interviews
with Key U.S. Stakeholders,” assesses the federal government’s role in the security of urban rail
transit in the United States. Drawing from interviews with officials in a number of federal
agencies, this section discusses and analyzes initiatives taken by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), and the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA). The section also reports on interviews with officials from the American
Public Transportation Association (APTA) and security personnel from Amtrak, the New York
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), and the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey (PATH).
“Case Studies of Contemporary Terrorist Incidents,” the next section, draws from the literature
and first-hand interviews with transit officials in five cities—London, New York, Tokyo, Paris,
and Madrid—to present five case studies of contemporary terrorist incidents: (1) the terrorist
attacks waged by the Irish Republican Army against the London Underground; (2) the Fulton
Street Station fire bombing in New York; (3) the sarin chemical agent release by members of
the Aum Shinrikyo cult on the Tokyo subway system; (4) the bombings on the Paris rail
system by Algerian terrorists, and (5) the Al Qaeda attack on the Madrid subway. The case
studies detail the incidents and discuss the emergency and long-term design and policy
responses to them.
The last section, “Transit Security Strategies of International Agencies,” reports on interviews
with transit officials from Paris, Tokyo, London, Madrid, and Brussels to better assess the role
of transit system design and operation in both exacerbating and minimizing terrorist attacks.
This section also compares transit security policies in different countries and elaborates the
goals of the different international transit agencies, their security measures and strategies, and
the challenges they face in securing their systems.
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From the hundreds of pages of interview transcripts, survey results, and fieldwork notes, we
distill twelve important lessons, which are summarized in the concluding section of this
report.
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SECURING URBAN RAIL TRANSIT SYSTEMS AGAINST
TERRORISM: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This section examines the current research literature on design and planning for terrorist
attacks on urban rail systems. There is little dispute that urban rail transportation systems are
uniquely attractive to those seeking to cause maximum disruption and harm. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issues regular threat assessments that place transit, particularly
rail transit, at the top of their list of likely targets.6 These systems are made vulnerable by the
very qualities that make them invaluable to the functioning of our most populous and
economically critical metropolitan cores: their ability to move large volumes of people
predictably and reliably to a large number of locations in the heart of the metropolitan region.
Efficient transit systems require an openness that prevents agencies and governments from
adopting many of the terrorism prevention strategies used in aviation.7 Additionally, those
charged with protecting transit systems from terrorist attack are often challenged by the scale
and interdependency of many of these systems, which can include miles and miles of track in
addition to stations and rolling stock. Finally, while the threat of terror has loomed large in the
public mind since the 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., attacks on transit
occur rather rarely. This makes it difficult to justify cost or gauge the effectiveness of any
particular strategy.8 Nevertheless, some very recent major terrorist attacks on railways in
Madrid, Moscow, and London have raised major concerns about the vulnerability of mass
transit systems.
In light of these complicating factors, it is not surprising that strategies to protect transit from
terrorist attack historically have been reactive and ad hoc. Research in this area, consequently,
has focused on policing, response, and rapid restoration of service. Only recently have
researchers and transit systems turned their attention to long-range security planning that
incorporates the terrorist threat.9 The focus on guidelines to help management and develop
procedures gives agencies tools to assess their needs and develop solutions in the context of
their transit systems’ unique configurations of threat, risk, and function. However, for
information on specific measures and strategies, transit agencies must turn to other literatures
provided by the building trades, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and
the General Services Administration (GSA). Certainly, the diversity of transit systems and the
uniqueness of each transit environment have frustrated efforts to develop comprehensive
guidelines on specific security strategies and individual measures.
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An ad hoc, reactive approach may have served urban rail transit in an era when the threat of
terror was more diffuse and remote. Indeed, further research may reveal that a solid response
and recovery program is transit’s best defense. However, such research has not yet been done.
Additionally, there has been far less investigation of how design may be employed to reduce
the likelihood of attack and minimize the impact of attacks when they occur. Therefore, this
review will pay particular attention to these longer-term design countermeasures.

Scope of the Literature
Research relevant to urban rail transit security consists of work in a number of disparate
disciplines: risk assessment, transit safety planning, emergency response, crime prevention,
urban design, and architecture. Materials include government guidelines, specifications and
briefings from various federal and state agencies, best practice compendia, academic research,
and industry and academic journals. With some notable exceptions, only very recently have
researchers examined the threat of rail transit terrorism.10 Late in 2003, the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) unveiled a Website devoted to transit security (http://transitsafety.volpe.dot.gov/Security/Default.asp), which assembles many of these varied threads. The
Website is a valuable resource that makes available the FTA’s publications on the subjects of
safety, security, and emergency preparedness, but it also reveals gaps in the literature. Another
task of this review will be to examine the utility and potential pitfalls of adapting strategies
for addressing the problem of transit terrorism from nonterrorism and nontransit situations.

Case Studies and the History of Transit Terrorism
Curiously, much of the national policy literature that discusses terrorism generally does not
dwell on transit terrorism.11 In fact, most of the literature on transportation terrorism tends to
focus on aviation and cargo, despite the fact that mass transit is clearly a target and carries
more passengers annually than air transport. A 2000 article in Transportation Research News
with the auspicious title “Transportation Security: Agenda for the 21st Century” made no
mention of rail transit security issues.12
However, recent deadly attacks on subways in Moscow and Madrid, the impact of the events of
September 11, 2001, on the transit systems of New York and Washington D.C., and the
memory of terrorist attacks on subways in London, Tokyo, and Paris have heightened
awareness of rail transit operators of the threat of terrorism. While the magnitude of the threat
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is the subject of some debate, there is no longer a question that terrorism poses a challenge to
urban rail transit systems. Jenkins’ research for the Mineta Transportation Institute, which
presents a chronology of terrorist attacks on surface transportation systems from 1920 through
2000, concludes that terrorist attacks on transit targets worldwide have increased in frequency
and lethality over the past 25 years.13 Nontransit events such as the Oklahoma City attack,
the Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta, and the September 11, 2001, attack on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, reveal that the United States is vulnerable to both domestic
and international terrorism. Further, while transit systems in the United States have not been
the targets of sustained terrorist campaigns, a majority of the agencies surveyed in a 1997
Transportation Research Board study had actually dealt with bomb threats in addition to a
variety of other security threats.14
For transit operators, the consequences of large-scale violence, or even the threat of such
violence, is too dire to allow us to justify debates over the strict definitions of terrorism. The
FBI’s official definition of terrorism is laid out in the Code of Federal Regulations as “a violent
act or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or
of any state, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment
thereof, in furtherance of political or social goals.”15 The terrorist threat to transit is not
limited to plots by international organizations. In fact, even in the United States, the vast
majority of terrorist acts are carried out by domestic terrorists such as neo-Nazis, antiabortion
extremists, right-wing antigovernment militants, and far-left environmentalists.16 Although
urban rail transit has not been a primary target of such terrorists, the 1995 derailment of
Amtrak’s Sunset Limited by right-wing militants drew awareness to the possibility of such an
attack. Because transit agencies are more concerned with effect, rather than motivation, they
also analyze acts of “quasiterrorism,” such as the 1994 Fulton Street firebombing in the New
York City subway.17 Bomb threats and acts of mass violence not intended to further political
goals are no less crippling to a transit system than nominal terrorist acts.

Chronology
Jenkins and Gerston’s research sheds light on the nature of the terrorist threat facing transit
systems.18 Their work—which examines both rail and bus transit—comprises three volumes
presenting case studies, an extensive chronology, and an executive overview. The chronology
includes more than 800 separate incidents of terrorist attacks and other “significant criminal
incidents” involving public transportation, culled from news accounts, books, and databases
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compiled by the U.S government, the RAND Corporation, and the Kroll-O’Gara Company
(see Appendix A). Roughly half of these incidents involved rail and half bus transit. Bombings
are the most common mode of attack. Other tactics include ambushes and armed assaults,
sabotage, hostage taking, and standoff attacks in which terrorists fire guns from a distance.
The 1995 sarin attack on the Tokyo subway was the only incident of chemical or biological
attack. However, the attack, which killed twelve people and injured thousands of others, has
prompted many transit systems in the industrialized world to include such a scenario in their
security planning.
Jenkins discerned a number of important trends in transit, which is thought to make up a
third of all terrorist targets worldwide. The findings on the lethality of transit terrorism are
disturbing. While only 20 percent of all terrorist incidents involve fatalities, 35 percent of the
attacks reported in the 1997 document resulted in one or more deaths. In the 2001 document,
the percent of fatal attacks rose to 43 percent. While Jenkins cautions that the data are
difficult to compile comprehensively, the combined chronology results in a rate of lethality of
37 percent. Of the 641 incidents reported in the 1997 report, 80 percent involved more than
one fatality and 30 percent more than ten. While transit terrorism has increased in the past 25
years, it remained stable during the 42 months between the 1997 and 2001 reports. Jenkins
noted that changes in the reporting of terrorist acts may have been a factor.19
The implications for the United States and comparable developed nations are less dire,
however, than the numbers above would suggest. Two-thirds of attacks occur in countries with
ongoing civil wars or terrorist campaigns. India, Pakistan, Cambodia, Angola, and Israel have
suffered the greatest number of fatal attacks. Consideration of total attacks changes the
rankings somewhat: Israel, India, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Egypt. As a reference to
the magnitude, 493 people were killed in 54 incidents in India that occurred from 1920 to
1997. The median fatal incident involved four deaths, and the maximum was more than one
hundred. In some sense, it would appear that terrorism on transit is analogous to crime on
transit, in that transit crime generally reflects the level of crime of the larger urban area in
which it is situated. Jenkins concluded that if such countries were left out of the analysis, the
threat would look quite different. Attacks would be less lethal and predictable, and Japan and
Germany would move to the top of the list.
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Case Studies
Jenkins’ 1997 Protecting Surface Transportation Systems and Patrons from Terrorist Activities details
the experience of four transit systems that were targets of terrorism: the New York City
Transit Authority (NYCTA), the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA),
the Réseau Express Régional (RER) in Paris, and Amtrak’s Sunset Limited. Jenkins’ follow-up
report, Protecting Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing
Research on Best Security Practices, documents London’s experience with the IRA’s seven-year
bombing campaign, and the sarin attack on a Tokyo subway in March of 1995.20 It also
reviews the security strategies of greater San Francisco’s Bay Area Rapid Transit District
(BART) and the Valley Transportation Authority (VTA) in Silicon Valley. While these last two
systems have not been the target of any terrorist threat, the authors hoped to shed light on
levels of preparedness that may be more useful to the majority of transit agencies outside the
largest urban areas. All the research was conducted prior to the 9/11 attacks of 2001.
To make comparison and future analysis easier, Jenkins and Gerston applied a consistent
format to all eight of the case studies. The format included a description of the system,
existing security elements, crisis management planning, liaisons with authorities, and an
account of the immediate response to the threat or attack. Existing security elements described
are threat assessment, organization and personnel, environmental design, technology,
emergency communications, response, recovery, and the role of the public. Response elements
included additional security measures put in place after the communication of threat or attack,
emergency response, restoration of services, lessons learned, and problem areas. The
applicability of these categories to each of the case studies varies, as does the depth to which
they are discussed. However, the format allows the researchers to distill from them a number
of “desirable attributes of security.” Coordination with authorities is deemed to be most
important, followed by dedicated security personnel, security technology, advanced planning,
environmental design, communications, training, and public involvement.
In addition to Jenkins and Gerston’s work, case studies are also available from other sources.
The Federal Highway Administration offers a series of reports, Effects of Catastrophic Events on
Transportation System Management, two of which deal with New York’s and Washington’s
transportation response to the events of September 11, 2001.21 The New York report notes
that, despite the significant damage to the PATH World Trade Center Station and the
Cortland Street subway station, there were no transit-related injuries or deaths. Credit is given
to the immediate activation of rehearsed emergency procedures by the transit agencies.
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Finally, Whent’s presentation, “Control of Public Space,” to the American Public
Transportation Association’s 1999 annual conference, provides a particularly insightful case
study of London’s antiterror transit strategy.22 The safety and security strategy employed by
railway networks in England, Scotland, Wales, and throughout the London Underground,
called “Control of Public Space,” was developed in response to the seven-year bombing
campaign carried out by the IRA from 1991 to 1998.
Over the course of the seven-year campaign, three people were killed and sixty-seven were
injured. The system received 7,000 bomb threats, forty-nine of which resulted in actual
detonations. In spite of this, the system was able to operate effectively, which Whent directly
credits to the safety and security strategy. By 1994, three years after the initiation of the
Control of Public Space strategy, no bombs were placed in railways stations. Although the
IRA continued to issue bomb threats, service was disrupted for less than 1.8 percent of the
called-in threats. Whent’s rough estimate of the saving in economic damage was millions of
pounds. He describes the concept of Control of Public Space as “one station stop before zero
tolerance.” Under this theory, data collection, as well as coordination among agencies and the
public, helped to pinpoint concentrations of antisocial behavior where resources could be
concentrated before the commission of any crime or bombing.
This is similar to New York’s crime tracking and accountability CompStat program.
Measurable performance indicators were developed at the outset and reviewed throughout the
campaign. The first three of these goals were increasing passenger satisfaction, revenue, and
the number of rail users. This is in line with the CPTED principle that security should first
support the function of an environment, rather than be an end unto itself. Separating security
from an environment’s primary function increases the danger, particularly relevant to transit,
that security measures themselves will exact too high a cost on the environment that the
security strategy is attempting to protect. The next three goals were increasing arrests and the
number of detected offenses, and decreasing the number of offenses reported. Among the other
strategies that the scheme employed were removal of trash cans from stations, immediate
removal of unsupervised packages, announcements and public notices on trains and stations,
computer-assisted analysis of threats and bombings, contingency planning, regular searching
of facilities, and extensive use of computer-assisted closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems.
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Framework for Addressing Rail Transit Terrorism
The overall framework for conceptualizing rail transit security against terrorism has
traditionally drawn on agencies’ experience with safety, crime prevention, and emergency
response.23 However, the threat of terrorism is differentiated from all these prior concerns. The
type of security concerns transit agencies have confronted in the past, largely personal and
property crimes, typically did not result in the need to mobilize a coordinated emergency
response effort by the system as a whole. Natural disasters and safety failures were more likely
to trigger such a response, but are not deliberate crimes. As the threat of terrorism increases,
agencies are charged with incorporating elements of all three—safety, crime prevention, and
emergency preparedness—into a comprehensive planning effort.
The transit industry began to formally address issues of emergency preparedness and security
in the early 1990s with the development and implementation of the APTA Rail Safety Audit
Program. Within the prescribed elements set out for system safety programs plans, were
elements specifically noted for emergency preparedness and response and security. This
standardized approach to system safety became imbedded in regulation by the FTA (49CFR/
Part 659). Subsequently, in a partnership between APTA, commuter railroads, and the FRA, a
similar program, the Commuter Rail Safety Management Program (including elements
pertaining to emergency response and preparedness and security) was implemented in 1996.
An additional program for bus operations, known as the APTA Bus Safety Management
Program, was introduced in 1997.
Initially, the process of planning for terrorist threats against transit targets involved three
broad categories of consideration: prevention, response, and recovery.24
Prevention includes design, technology, policing, and public education. In the open
environment of a transit system, prevention may be too optimistic an expectation when faced
with a determined attacker. In this case, a more accurate way to conceive of the security
function of prevention is to consider strategies to detect the threat and deter or delay its
realization. Policing, technology, and design strategies are all geared to these two functions.
The response effort comprises planning for disaster, conducting drills, and designing to
facilitate evacuation and minimize damage. Recovery planning focuses on rapid service
restoration. By getting the system up and running to minimize disruption, transit agencies
reduce the reward of the terrorist act. Within these three broad categories, the literature has
given the most attention to response and policing strategies. They are logical first steps that
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are easily folded into existing programs that have long been in place to address more common
incidences of crime and natural disasters. Given the cost of planning, design, and construction,
system design responses tend to be or are limited in scale and ad hoc in nature. Often such
strategies are sought in the immediate aftermath of an attack or in response to an immediate
threat. For example, immediately following the 9/11 attacks, the Metropolitan Transportation
Authority placed New Jersey barriers around the perimeter of Grand Central Station, and
many systems removed trash bins from stations.
With a longer time horizon, transit operators must now identify what strategies are likely to
be most useful given varying levels of threat, vulnerability, and value associated with a system
and its components. The literature has begun to reflect this shift with a number of studies that
seek to apply risk assessment methodologies used by the military, government agencies, and
industry to the context of urban rail transit terrorism.25 These frameworks come under the
titles of “hazard analysis,” “risk and threat assessment,” and “systems approach.” Given the
diversity of transit systems’ designs and needs for security, these frameworks give only general
guidance on individual strategies. Rather, they provide procedures to support agency decision
making around security.
The FTA first began to comprehensively address transit security related to crime with its 1983
publication, Transit Security: A Description of Problems and Countermeasures, by Mauri, Cooney,
and Prowe.26 The report’s findings are based on a literature review, site visits and interviews at
thirteen transit systems, and contact with nontransit organizations with knowledge of security.
The report uses the framework of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime
Reporting (UCR) Program, which provides categories and classifications for criminal acts.
Terrorism and sabotage had not yet appeared on transit agencies’ radar screens as a serious
concern. Instead, the focus was on protecting passengers from individual violence and theft,
and on protecting the system from vandalism and theft. When asked about situations
involving bomb threats and terrorism, the agencies said they would rely on the police.
The most comprehensive of these frameworks applicable to urban rail transit is listed in the
FTA’s 2003 publication, Public Transportation System Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning
Guide.27 The guide deals explicitly, but not exclusively, with terrorist threats against rail and
bus transit. However, more frequently occurring crime and emergency responses to natural
disasters are the basic justifications of these preparations. This is the FTA’s main guidance on
transit security and the first to marry crime prevention with emergency response. It advocates
a systems approach that combines the practices of emergency response planning and criminal
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security planning. System security has been defined in previous documents as “the application
of operating, technical, and management techniques and principles to the security aspects of a
system throughout its life to reduce threats and vulnerabilities to the most practical level
possible through the most effective use of resources.”28
The current framework has refined the broad three-phase approach mentioned earlier to
include five “Elements of Protection.”29 These elements include security planning, security
management, emergency response, physical security and procedures, and threat and
vulnerability resolution. The guide provides step-by-step procedures for threat and
vulnerability resolution and security planning, necessary for implementation of the other three
elements. While transit agencies must turn to other sources for more comprehensive guidance
for the implementation of specific strategies, the guide does introduce available techniques for
implementing security management, emergency response, and physical security measures.
The main component chapters provide detailed methods for developing a Security and
Emergency Preparedness Program (SEPP). Under the federal State Safety Oversight Rule,
thirty-two transit systems in nineteen states and the District of Columbia must have a SEPP in
place. The directive that required the FTA to establish these rules was codified into the Federal
Transit Act in 49 U.S. Code, section 5330. The final rule is codified in 49 CFR Part 659, and
is referred to as the State Safety Oversight Rule or Part 659. The information on SEPP
programs details how agencies develop internal management systems and external
coordination systems with local law enforcement as well as state and federal agencies.
To support the development of a SEPP, the guide covers procedures for conducting capability
assessments as well as threat and vulnerability assessments. A major goal of these assessments
is to rationalize the process of providing security, making it more cost effective and
sustainable. They are designed to enable transit operators to strike a balance between security
needs and practices and available resources. A capabilities assessment is proposed as a way for
transit operators to assess their current procedures and resources to reduce the threat of crime
and terror; respond to incidents that do occur; protect passengers, personnel, and the system
itself during emergencies; and assist the community in emergency response. A threat and
vulnerability assessment is used to analyze the likelihood that a specific threat will occur. The
five elements to be included in a threat and vulnerability assessment are asset analysis, target
and threat identification, vulnerability assessment, consequence analysis, and countermeasure
recommendation. The guide and the accompanying CD-ROM provide checklists to
summarize the issues to be considered in all these assessments.
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The final chapter of the guide offers an overview of available design and technology strategies
to improve security, and briefly describes some of the crime prevention through environmental
design (CPTED) and situational crime prevention (SCP) principles and design strategies
commonly used in transportation environments: concentric security zones and spatial
transitions, natural surveillance, access control, territorial behavior strategies, and good
lighting. These principles will be discussed further in the next section.
The sequence of government publications leading up to the Public Transportation System Security
and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide illustrates just how recently terrorism has emerged as
a major threat to the security of the U.S. transit environment. The 2003 guide builds on
several previous government reports: Transit System Security Program Planning Guide by Balog,
Schwarz, and Doyle, 1994; Perspectives on Transit Security in the 1990s by Boyd, Maier, and J.
Kenney, 1996; Emergency Preparedness for Transit Terrorism by Boyd and Sullivan, 1997; and the
Transit Security Handbook by Boyd, 1998. Terrorism is mentioned only in passing in both a
1994 guide by Balog, Schwartz, and Doyle, and in a 1996 survey by Boyd, Maier, and Kenny.
However, by 1997, with Boyd and Sullivan’s report, terrorism had become a serious enough
concern to warrant its own Transit Cooperative Research Program Synthesis report.30
While the Transportation System Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide and its
predecessor documents are intended to assist established agencies in meeting state and federal
requirements for system security and safety, the FTA also provides guidance for voluntary
safety and security certification in the development of transit projects, both new starts and
extensions. Handbook for Transit Safety and Security Certification was developed cooperatively by
the FTA and the American Public Transportation Association.31 Again, because of the
diversity of transit systems, the role of this document is to provide agencies with an
organizational and management framework that supports the decision making processes
necessary to ensure that new projects are as safe, secure, and cost-effective as possible. Most
systems engage in some form of self-certification procedure, but this document is intended to
help them more fully integrate emerging safety and security considerations into those
procedures. While the handbook does not include direct design guidance, it provides useful
insight into the categories of design elements of transit projects for which safety and security
are a major concern.

Mineta Transportation Institute

Securing Urban Rail Transit Systems Against Terorism: A Review of the Literature

37

Designing for Security
Such frameworks provide useful tools for agencies seeking to define the overall scope of their
antiterrorism efforts and enable them to begin to prioritize their approach. However, the
strategies agencies choose will, by necessity, be specific to their situations and are beyond the
scope of these guides. Designing for terrorism in transit has not received the same amount of
attention as emergency management, response, and policing, and it can be difficult for a
transit security manager to find comprehensive design guidance to suit his or her particular
situation. It is incumbent on the security manager to seek out further guidance in other bodies
of literature for these specific strategies, especially in the case of design. The lack of specific
research and guidance for transit in this area is unfortunate. Security managers want to be
assured that the design elements of their security strategy are effective and do not leave their
passengers and personnel unnecessarily at risk. Additionally, as much as threats and acts of
terrorism can have serious consequences for a transit system, security strategies themselves
may also interfere with the operations of transit. This caution against unintended
consequences has been raised numerous times in the general field of antiterrorism physical
design.32
There are several reasons why design has not been given much attention in the literature of
transit terrorism security. The first is temporal. While the threat of terrorism is not entirely
new, the degree of consideration has been minimal compared to other transit issues, such as
safety and crime prevention. As late as 1988, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO,
today known as the United States Government Accountability Office) reported that among
the agencies in the seven cities they studied, “transit officials had no direct experience of
terrorist incidents, perceived the likelihood of incidents to be remote, and had no
antiterrorism programs.”33 In the 1990s, the first order of business in addressing the emerging
threat was to put systems into place to deal with the consequences of an attack, and only now
do agencies have the dubious luxury of an indefinite time horizon that necessitates and
facilitates design consideration.
Second, the most vulnerable systems are by far the largest; the task of retrofitting security
design is a daunting one. Jenkins and Gerston were careful to include a security criterion
category, called “environmental design and construction features,” for each of the eight case
studies, so that they could compare each system’s efforts. However, Savage of the New York
City Transit Authority (NYCTA), interviewed in one of the case studies, notes that,“NYC
Transit suffers from a disadvantage due to the sheer size of the system because its 468 stations
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were constructed over a span of 120 years. Security was not previously a major consideration in
design and construction and the cost of systemwide remedial construction would be
enormous.”34
Further reading on the NYCTA case does, in fact, show that the agency takes design into
consideration. For example, a security task force from NYCTA visited England, Italy, France,
and Japan, to study those systems’ experiences with terrorism.35 The agency implemented the
task force’s management suggestions, such as the establishment of ventilation procedures, but
held off on the resulting design recommendations. Changes to station layout were considered
infeasible, again, due to the scale of the system. Additionally, a recommendation to remove
trash receptacles from stations was thought to be counterproductive. The heightened risk of
track fires resulting from trash buildup was considered more dire than the perceived-as-remote
risk of a bomb being placed in a trash can. Thus, the decision not to implement security
measures can be as important as the decision to move forward with such measures.
A third reason for the limited attention design has received is that, as one author notes in a
recent issue of Passenger Transport, “Preparedness is the best defense” against terrorism.36 The
expense of capital construction for physical security and the potential for such measures to be
counterproductive in the transit environment may suggest that other alternatives take priority.
This is coupled with the sense that in an era of suicide bombing, security is illusory and there
is no defense against a determined terrorist.37 In other words, the best hope for transit is to
minimize disruption by having a very organized response and recovery strategy.
However, such a pragmatic, fatalist view ignores actual and potential roles that design plays in
security planning for individual crimes and terrorism. Most terror experts call for “layering”
protective strategies so that no single strategy is responsible for the entire system, and the
failure of one layer does not necessarily jeopardize the security of the system overall.38 Physical
security and design dictate the location of system components and the layers of security
encompassing them. Further, on a conceptual level, design is itself one of these many layers of
security strategies, along with policing and response planning. Even if the consensus is that
good policing is the best defense against terrorism and effective emergency response the best
way to minimize the effect of terrorism, design serves the important function of ensuring that
those primary resources are fully utilized.39 In this light, the task of minimizing opportunities
for crime and terrorism through design becomes critical.
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Design Strategies
Security design involves two areas of facility design: the spatial layout of transit facilities, and
the structural design of buildings, track, and rolling stock. Since very little has been written
that is directly applicable to transit vehicles and stations, the most useful guidance in the area
of designing for antiterror security comes mainly from the building trades. The GSA, in its
capacity as the federal government’s landlord, and FEMA provide excellent advice and
specifications for building antiterror security in the areas of target hardening, fire safety, blast
resistance, and situational crime prevention strategies (SCP) such as crime prevention through
environmental design (CPTED).40 The American Institute of Architects (AIA) offers guidance
through its 2003 publication, Security Planning and Design: A Guide for Architects and Building
Design Professionals.41 Additionally, the latest edition of Architectural Graphic Standards
includes a chapter on design criteria for security against terror.42
Academia has provided a number of case studies and best practice guidelines that list
strategies employed by selected transit operators.43 At least one state, Florida, through the
work of the Center for Urban Transportation Research at the University of South Florida in
2001, has developed a list of recommended design measures in its own antiterror analysis.

Environmental Design
The important role that environmental design plays in reducing or supporting crime in the
transit environment is well documented.44 According to Felson and LaVigne, the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA or Metro) and the Port Authority Bus
Terminal are classic examples of success stories of applied security design against crime in rail
transit environments.45 In each case, environmental design shares the credit for increased
security with strategic policing, strict maintenance procedures, and “zero tolerance” policies in
enforcing rules and regulations. However, the applicability of these successes to terrorist threat
must be viewed cautiously. Effective design against crime will not necessarily provide
sufficient protection against terrorist threats because there are significant differences between
criminals’ motivations and the effects of the crimes they seek to commit and those of terrorists.
CPTED and SCP are both aimed at reducing opportunities for specific types of crime,
particularly in public or semiprivate environments. The goal of CPTED is to influence the
social and physical use of space through environmental design that discourages antisocial and
criminal behavior.46
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The main CPTED principles are natural surveillance, natural access control, and
territorial reinforcement. Natural surveillance refers to the use of building design and
layout to increase the ability of legitimate users and security personnel to observe activity.
Clear sight lines have the effect of increasing visibility of users and limiting opportunities for
hidden activities.47 Natural access control is achieved by using building elements to limit or
channel access to the facility; for example, allowing for only one entrance into a facility and
providing an extended “standoff distance” between the building and the street. Territorial
reinforcement strategies encourage desired users to take “ownership” of certain spaces under
the theory that people pay more attention to their surroundings if they are invested in that
space. These strategies concentrate public uses and amenities to increase the likelihood that
improper use of the space will not be tolerated by the critical mass of legitimate users.
Situational crime prevention takes CPTED one further step by incorporating design strategies
with strategic management policy and policing functions.48
LeVigne, Clarke, and Felson are each very careful to note that the successes recorded in their
work are evidence of one of CPTED and SCP’s fundamental principles: that management
procedures and the environment be tailored to highly specific crime problems.49 Balog, Boyd,
and Caton also make note of this in their work.50 The type of designs prescribed for individual
crimes relies on well established theories of criminal behavior, motivation, and individual
perceptions of risk and reward. However, criminals seeking personal gain will necessarily have
very different motivations than those seeking to cause maximum destruction to further a social
or political goal. Even on a purely theoretical level, the direct application of measures that
have been successful in reducing the threat of crime will not necessarily prove successful
against the terrorist threat. For example, LaVigne (1996) notes that CCTV cameras are
mounted in very visible locations in the WMATA stations to alert would-be criminals that
they are being watched.
The cameras alone appear to be enough to deter offenders, as LaVigne quotes former D.C.
Metro Transit Police Chief Angus MacLean as saying, “The cameras mainly serve a
psychological purpose because they read out at the station manager’s kiosk and often no one is
there.”51 It is easy to see where “dummy” cameras and similar devices might not be as effective
in deterring a bomber with a different psychological relationship to the risk of being caught.
For CPTED to work against the threat of terror, its strategies must be tailored to the
motivations and behaviors of terrorists.
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The applicability of crime prevention design strategies to the threat of terrorism has not been
adequately addressed in the literature. Many sources simply extrapolate the CPTED approach
from crime prevention to terrorism prevention. This makes sense where security tactics share
common goals, such as in access control and surveillance. However, relying only on successful
crime prevention strategies to address the terrorist threat ignores important distinctions in
mode, motivation, and magnitude.
In its recent publications on designing buildings against terrorist attack, FEMA takes a more
nuanced approach: “In cases where CPTED techniques conflict with security principles,
designers should seek innovative solutions tailored to the unique situation.”52 The authors
note that many antiterror design strategies are similar to those prescribed under CPTED
principles. For example, using the principle of natural surveillance to limit opportunities to
conceal illicit acts is similar to the common antiterror approach of eliminating spaces where an
attacker could conceal an explosive. However, they also discuss the possibility that individual
crime prevention strategies can conflict with the goals of designing for the threat of an
explosive attack. They offer the example of the location of parking facilities. CPTED
principles would suggest that a parking lot be located in a place that facilitates casual
monitoring by the building’s occupants and visitors. However, allowing vehicles too close to
the building may increase its vulnerability to a car or truck bomb.53 Some design elements
credited with combating crime can, in fact, become liabilities in the event of an incendiary
attack. Both LaVigne and Boyd note the role of trash cans on WMATA’s station platforms in
maintaining a clean environment in which crime is not tolerated.54 This may be a good
strategy in transit systems with low risk of terrorist attack as trash cans and recycling bins are
important passenger amenities. However, Jenkins’ chronology reveals trash cans to be a
favorite delivery device for terrorist bombings in transit stations.55 In response to this threat,
the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) switched from conventional to
bomb-resistant trash cans at busy stations during the 1996 Olympics.56 Other high-risk
systems, especially those with underground stations, have removed or sealed their trash cans
entirely. Such stations have maintained their standard of cleanliness by adopting a “pack it in/
pack it out” policy similar to many state parks, and increasing maintenance rounds.
The use of glass as a design element is particularly problematic in the event of a bombing, but
it is cited in many documents dealing with designing out crime in the transit environment.57
Glass serves an important security function when it enhances formal and informal surveillance
by bringing in natural light, providing a sense of openness, and enhancing visibility. In
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Felson’s study of the Port Authority’s efforts to bring crime under control in the mid-1990’s, a
glass-walled café in the Port Authority Bus terminal affords ample opportunity for casual
surveillance of a once isolated area.58 Glass is also featured extensively in the security strategies
of a proposed subway station in Paris.59 In this case, glass skylights bring in natural light and
glass barriers along the platform prevent accidental falls and pushings.
However, when ruptured by a bomb blast, glass can be extremely hazardous. In its book,
Security Planning and Design, the AIA offers this gentle caution: “Glass fragments generated
during failure are extremely hazardous to building occupants and, if not properly designed,
can cause mass casualties when propelled at high speeds into occupied spaces.”60
This is not the end of glass, because there are several ways in which it can be made safer,
including heat treating and laminating. The AIA book also notes that even if blast resistance
is the only consideration (leaving aside aesthetics and building performance), decisions about
glazing depend on many factors, from the level of the bomb threat to the integrity of the
frame, and the blast load on the facility itself. This caution should serve not as a prohibition
against the use of glass in transit station design. Rather, it is an illustration of the tensions
among the design requirements of traditional crime security, antiterror security, and
aesthetics.
In spite of the hazards inherent in applying crime prevention design strategies directly to the
threat of terrorism, the many guiding principles and lessons of CPTED can inform antiterror
security strategies. This is especially true in an environment as public and open as transit,
where the theories of CPTED can be a valuable countervailing force against traditional targethardening measures, which can interfere with an agency’s mandate to provide efficient public
transportation at minimal cost. A goal of CPTED is to provide security while emphasizing the
objectives of the organization, rather than focusing solely on target hardening.61 But for
design to play a role in securing transit against terrorism, security planners and designers must
first understand the nature of the threats posed by criminals who seek large-scale destruction
of life and property. Then, they must select among the most effective strategies for each
specific threat, according to an evaluation of each measure’s tangible and intangible costs and
benefits. At the very least, the effects of successful anticrime strategies must be decomposed to
see what elements of these anticrime measures would work against the specific requirements of
security under the threat of terrorism.
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Understanding the Threat to the Physical Environment
To better understand the nature of the threat of terrorism in terms of modes of attack and
effects of those attacks on transit’s physical structures, planners can turn to the growing body
of literature provided by the building trades, the military, and the federal government.
Fortunately, the effects of manmade disasters, as well as their mitigations, are well
documented and familiar to the emergency management community. One of the more
accessible discussions of the current state of the practice is found in FEMA’s 2003 publication,
Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. A second 2003 FEMA
publication, titled Integrating Manmade Hazards into Mitigation Planning, is part of a series of
“how to” guides for communities and states.
In Integrating Manmade Hazards into Mitigation Planning, FEMA provides a set of “Event
Profiles for Terrorism” that planners can use to familiarize themselves with the various modes
of attack, the extent of their effects, and any mitigating or exacerbating conditions. The list
includes attack modes relevant to the transit environment such as conventional bombs or
improvised explosive devices, and chemical, biological, or radiological agents. In addition, the
guide provides a list of “Terrorism and Technological Hazard Mitigation Actions,” which they
caution “is by no means exhaustive or definitive; rather, it is intended as a point of departure
for identifying potential mitigation techniques and strategies in your community or state.”
With the foregoing caveat, the recommended actions range from “implement crime
prevention through environmental design (CPTED)” and “eliminate potential site access
through utility tunnels, corridors, manholes, etc.” to “create blast-resistant exterior
envelope.”62 Because the guide is intended for those without specific expertise in antiterrorism
security, it does not discuss the degree of effectiveness of these measures in mitigating specific
threats.
Even more specific guidance is provided by FEMA’s Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. Just as security design against terror builds on the detection
and deterrence functions of anticrime security design measures, FEMA’s reports build on its
experience in mitigating against natural disasters. As an example of this synthesis, they note
that their recommendations for hurricane window design also apply to bomb blasts. However,
they are careful to note where a natural hazards approach may be deficient.63 For example,
mitigating natural hazards does not require the same attention to access control and
surveillance.
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The reference manual begins with a threat and hazard analysis methodology similar to those
recently developed for transit. Part of this methodology includes an extensive “Building
Vulnerability Assessment Checklist” borrowed from the Veterans Administration. The
checklist is composed of questions designed to determine the vulnerability of specific elements
of the building’s design and operation. The questions relate to thirteen categories of building
design and operations, many of which are applicable to the transit environment: site,
architecture, structural systems, building envelope, utility systems, mechanical systems
(heating, ventilation, and air conditioning), plumbing and gas systems, electrical systems, fire
alarm systems, communications and information technology (IT) systems, equipment
operations and maintenance, security systems, and security master plan. Similar assessment
checklists are widely available, including one recently developed specifically for transit
systems on behalf of the FTA.64 FEMA’s checklist is unique, however, in that each question is
associated with specific guidance and a reference to another guide. For example, question 1.3
asks, “In dense, urban areas, does curb lane parking allow uncontrolled vehicles to park
unacceptably close to a building in public rights-of-way?” In response, the guidance offers:
Where distance from the building to the nearest curb provides insufficient setback,
restrict parking in the curb lane. For typical city streets, this may require
negotiating to close the curb lane. Setback is common terminology for the distance
between a building and its associated roadway or parking. It is analogous to standoff between a vehicle bomb and the building. The benefit per foot of increased
stand-off between a potential vehicle bomb and a building is very high when close
to a building and decreases rapidly as the distance increases.65
This is followed by a reference to a publication providing more detailed guidance: General
Services Administration’s Facilities Standards for the Public Buildings Service, published in
2003.66
Security is traditionally addressed from the outside in, from the building’s site perimeter to
the building envelope and, finally, the interior. FEMA’s guide devotes a great deal of its report
to site selection and site design criteria, which, they note, have limited applicability to dense
urban settings. Nonetheless, FEMA does present the potential of urban design to negotiate the
tensions among security, aesthetics, and primary use of space around the building’s perimeter.
Where similar guides have recommended against the use of bus shelters because they can hide
illicit activity from view, FEMA simply suggests that they be designed to enhance
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surveillance. Also unique to this report is its explicit caution against the interference of
security measures with pedestrian traffic flow and a reminder that “the design of bollards,
fences, light posts, and other streetscape and landscape elements should form an urban
ensemble that helps to create a sense of unity and character.”67 The guide’s extensive
discussion of considerations in the use and placement of bollards and planters is particularly
useful to designing secure perimeters for urban rail transit stations. Parking presents a
particular challenge to urban rail transit security because the danger of vehicle bombs
demands more stand-off distance between parking and the station than is generally feasible.
FEMA suggests that planners be creative and offers a sampling of design, operations, and
engineering measures for parking near high-risk facilities.68 Finally, the individual measures
discussed throughout the site design chapter are listed and ranked according to their level of
cost, effort, and protection. Those same measures are then correlated in a table with specific
threats from vehicular bombs to airborne contamination.
Although bombs and other incendiary devices appear to pose the most likely threat to transit
systems, there is no specific guidance for the design of rolling stock in relation to the terrorist
threat.69 However, there are two guides available that address fire safety: 1992’s Fire Safety
Countermeasures for Urban Rail Vehicles by Hathaway, Baker, and Moussa, and Recommended Fire
Safety Practices for Rail Transit Materials Selection, from the Urban Mass Transportation
Administration, 1984. Both reports assume only accidental ignition. The goal of the fire safety
countermeasures prescribed in the reports is to prevent fires from starting, slow down or
contain fires if they do start, and evacuate passengers as quickly as possible. The 1992
document focuses on all aspects of fire safety: fire prevention, early detection, fire hardening,
and passenger evacuation. The shorter 1984 document recommends fire safety tests for
materials used in rail transit—from undercarriage components to seat cushions. Similarly, Fire
Safety Countermeasures for Urban Rail Vehicles focuses on replacement components and
construction materials of rail cars, rather than the fundamental components such as motors
and switches.70 The 1992 report details the major characteristics of rail transit vehicle
equipment, the types of fire problems that are likely to occur, and selected countermeasures
against fire. In addition, potential research and development opportunities are highlighted.
While certainly this is useful in suppressing the devastating secondary effects of fire from a
blast, the guide provides no information on the specific effects and countermeasures for blast
hazards on rail cars.
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Bombs are not the only threat to transit, and terrorists have not historically limited themselves
to one mode of attack. The sarin attack in Tokyo in 1995 alerted security managers to the
threat of chemical and biological agents. There is a considerable body of research and literature
on the behavior of chemical and biological agents in buildings, and mitigations including
those by FEMA and Mead and Gressel. However, chemical and biological agents released in
moving trains have a different impact from those released in buildings. Therefore, this
literature may be of limited use in the transit environment. Fortunately, the potential of a
chemical or biological attack on subways has been given serious attention since the Tokyo gas
attacks.
Much of the guidance that arose out of that event relates to the emergency response and
management functions necessary to reduce the harm done in the event of the release of a
chemical or biological agent.71 Policastro and Gordon have documented prospective
technologies appropriate for the subway environment. Given the limitations of current
automated detection technologies, they note that rapid containment and response are the keys
to limiting casualties in the event of a chemical or biological release in a subway system. The
need to contain or vent a released chemical or biological agent is determined by the properties
of a specific agent. But without highly sensitive detection technologies, subway operators will
not likely know the nature of the release in order to make the critical containment/vent
decision. Therefore, Poliocastro and Gordon recommend a default policy of immediate
containment of the “plume” by stopping the movement of the trains and delaying the
activation of emergency fire and smoke fans.72
They also discuss the system design factors that act to spread or contain a release, noting that
moving trains push contaminated air throughout the station, into adjacent stations, and out
through any street level vents in a piston effect. Because subway system design factors are
assumed to be fixed, they recommend that response strategies be tailored to the design of each
track section (for example, single versus multiple tracks). Technologies that detect chemical or
biological releases and automate part of the response are receiving an increasing amount of
research and testing support because response time is so critical in reducing casualties from an
attack. WMATA has plans to pilot test chemical detection equipment in twelve stations as
part of the Department of Energy’s PROTECTS (Program for Response Options and
Technology Enhancements for Chemical/Biological Terrorism in Subways) program.73
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Challenges to the Security Paradigm
As noted in the introduction, transit presents several unique challenges to the security
paradigm as it has historically been applied in other theaters such as aviation and federal
buildings. In this section, three major challenges as they are presented throughout the
literature of transit terrorism will be discussed.

Dual-Use
Given the existing demands placed on transit systems, and the limited resources with which
transit operators execute their most basic functions, efficiency and effectiveness must play a
large role in any comprehensive approach to security against terrorism. Several articles
advocate for a dual-use approach to transportation security that would protect transportation
systems against terrorism, while at the same time helping agencies meet their other
transportation goals, that is, safety and efficiency.74 In fact, this dual-use approach has been
consistent throughout the literature. Transit security for terrorism is considered at once a new
problem and an extrapolation of the general problem of transit crime and system safety.75
Some, but not all, of the approaches for securing the system against terrorism will necessarily
secure it against general crime and safety. Another reason for approaching transit security from
this angle is that it has been historically difficult to justify the expenditures needed for
securing a system against terrorism, given the low real incidence of terrorism and the
variability of threat levels. Complementary strategies that address other transit goals, in
addition to security against terrorist attack, are more likely to receive funding and support.76
The case studies have suggested that while preparation and planning for terrorism are key, it
does not need to be all encompassing to be effective in the event of an attack. More limited
efforts that focus on mundane crimes and smaller-scale emergencies such as power outages,
technical failures, or natural occurrences have been shown to be as effective in the event of a
major catastrophe:
Advance emergency preparations were the backbone of New York City’s response
on September 11. Representatives of several transportation agencies noted that
documented and practiced emergency response procedures could never have
accommodated a catastrophic event with such widespread impacts. But it is clear
that practicing and preparing for less-significant emergencies did, in fact, help
transportation agencies manage and adapt on September 11.77
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In other words, marathoners do not prepare for running a marathon by running 26.2 miles
regularly. Doing so would be too taxing and leave them without the resources to perform
effectively in daily life and in competition. On the day of the marathon, however, the months
of shorter workouts carry them to the finish line.
The promise of dual-use strategies can easily be overstated. However, the consequences of an
actual attack, rare as it is, may be too dire to risk ill-conceived measures. The fact that a
strategy has a secondary benefit does not eliminate the need to question the assumptions about
the applicability of nonterror strategies to the transit terror arena. Similarly, transit agencies
must be aware of the danger of being swept up in the search for security so they do not waste
resources on what some might call a solution looking for a problem.78

Evaluating Costs
The Federal Transit Administration asserts, “Security and emergency preparedness must be
accountable for their return on their investment”.79 This is, however, easier said than done.
Transit agencies have figured out how to quantify the economic impact of crime on their
systems, both in terms of loss of life and property as well as revenue lost from passengers
choosing other modes.
Transit crime has both financial and social costs. The financial costs, directly borne by the
systems themselves, but indirectly passed on to patrons and taxpayers through higher fares and
higher taxes, reductions in the frequency and quality of service, and higher government
subsidies, can be divided into two categories: the increased financial burden of operating the
system and the reduction of revenues collected. The social costs are borne by both patrons who
suffer from reduced security in the system and nonpatrons who contend with congestion
outside the system as potential passengers concerned about a lack of security turn to other
forms of transportation.80 There is no such economic measurement for the threat of rail transit
terrorism. However, establishing such measurements will be a key task for the security and
transit communities.
There is now a need to address the threat more critically and comprehensively so that transit
security strategies themselves do not, in the long term, cripple transit agencies’ ability to
fulfill their critical role of providing mobility in urban centers. This alarm has been raised in
terms of the mismatch between the level of preparedness that the Department of Homeland
Security calls for and the funding available to local governments and transit agencies to meet
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these calls.81 Peter Guerrero, director of physical infrastructure issues at the Government
Accountability Office, notes, “Every time the administration raises the security threat level,
the private sector and local governments are forced to divert resources from such things as
maintenance and safety.”82
The diversion of funds from maintenance and safety is not the only concern transit agencies
have in balancing the need for antiterrorism security with other transit goals. As transit
security becomes more comprehensive and layered, there arises the potential that these
security strategies conflict with agencies’ primary purpose: to provide accessible, convenient,
and affordable transportation for daily users.83 For example, one countermeasure for arson is
the removal of shelters and benches.84 Indeed, many transit operators have done just that.
However, there is no analysis of the cost of such measures to riders and system ridership.
The effect of these dangers in approaching security extends beyond the transit system to our
environment and the functioning of our economy. Transit agencies struggle to compete with
the private automobile to alleviate the consequences of worsening congestion and air
pollution. To meet these demands, they must provide convenience, attractiveness, and
affordability above and beyond what is offered by private transport. If security measures add
too much delay or cost, or make the trip unpleasant, the cost is borne by the transit operator,
the economy, and the environment in the form of increased dependence on private vehicles.
FEMA’s recent guidance on mitigating manmade disasters provides this cautionary note:
While many benefits can be achieved through implementing mitigation actions,
planners should be sensitive to potential negative impacts as well. For example,
altering traffic patterns may increase commute times and distances, and reducing
on-street parking may impact retail activity. Such considerations can be pivotal in
determining the feasibility, viability, and potential for success of mitigation
planning initiatives.85
In the past, transit agencies have addressed this challenge implicitly by showing a preference
for dealing with transit terror in ways that do not affect operations, such as response planning
and policing. However, in the post-9/11 era, the need to assure the public that more is being
done has generated calls for a comprehensive approach, which ensures security but also
preserves transit’s goals for ridership.
The goals of safety, security, and efficiency in transit operation are not fully compatible. Two
documents discuss the impact of security measures on the functioning of transit. The first is
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transit specific, but does not consider terrorism, while the second deals with antiterror
measures on urban design. In “Target Hardening at a New York City Subway Station:
Decreased Fare Evasion—At What Price?” Weidner questions New York City Transit’s
(NYCTA) efforts to thwart fare evaders with high wheel turnstiles. He raises the issue of
whether the benefits of reduced fare evasion outweighed the creation of a “prison-like”
environment.86 The NYCTA has since installed these turnstiles in hundreds of stations, with
no negative effect on ridership or change in the rate of crime.87 However, Weidner raises an
important question about the nature of the costs security can impose on transit systems.
Similarly, the National Capital Planning Commission’s (NCPC) 2001 publication, Designing
for Security in the Nation’s Capital, considers the effects of public security measures on the urban
design goals of Washington’s Monumental Core. “Even before the 1995 bombing in
Oklahoma City, Washington’s streets and public spaces had become an unsightly jumble of
fences and barriers… The National Capital reflects the spirit of America, but today in
Washington we look like a nation in fear.”88
While urban design in this case has a much different function than the more workaday goal of
transit to move people to their destinations, the NCPC report, like the Weidner article, can
help practitioners frame some of the nonquantitative concerns and costs and compromises that
arise when planning for security. The General Services Administration’s symposium on
security and the design of public buildings, “Balancing Security and Openness,” carries these
questions further by examining the effects of designing for security on the character of
America’s public buildings. The report provides insight into the tensions between the need of
U.S. federal buildings for security and the need of the public for openness in government.89
“Balancing Security and Openness” might as well be the title of a transit security symposium.
However, in the case of transit, openness is a fixed condition of the system and not subject to
questions of balance.

Evaluating Effectiveness
The available frameworks help systems assess their relative risk and vulnerability to terrorism
in an effort to ensure that their security efforts match their financial and institutional
capabilities. However, there has been no formal evaluation of the effectiveness or cost of
individual security strategies in the transit environment. Much of what has been presented in
the guidelines is extrapolated from best practices for dealing with nonterrorist threats. In part,
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this is due to the fact that concrete measures of effectiveness against incidents as rare as
terrorist attacks are elusive, if not impossible. Jenkins notes:
Because terrorist threats are not easily quantifiable, it is difficult to determine the
“right” level of security. Using cost-benefit analysis as the sole criterion to
determine the level of security is not very helpful. The risk of death to any
individual citizen from terrorism is minuscule, making it difficult to argue for any
security measure on the grounds that it will save lives. Since the threat of terrorism
is murky and security measures are costly, it is hard to justify the expenditures
before an attack.90
The fields of building science and disaster response have extensive experience in quantifying
the physical effects of individual natural and manmade hazards on buildings, and designing to
prevent catastrophic failure. In the case of natural hazards, researchers can draw on extensive
historical data to quantify the economic risk and mitigate accordingly.91 Likewise, crime
prevention efforts have begun to rely extensively on historical data to target resources
efficiently and analyze the effectiveness of their efforts. Thankfully, attacks on U.S. urban rail
systems are rare enough that no equivalent databases are available for such analysis. Evaluation
of the effectiveness of specific security measures in deterring terrorists must be more
qualitative and theoretical.
At least one researcher has taken the time to ask the question, “Is there a difference between
designing for crime and designing for terrorism?” Atlas contends that “attack from criminal
behavior or attack from terrorist activity only reflect a change in the level and types of threats.
The process and challenges are the same.”92 He provides a very thorough and informative list
of established CPTED strategies that may address terrorist threats. A comparison of the
current practices against crime with those of London’s successful antiterror security strategies
should give some confidence to security managers of the applicability of current crime control
measures to the emerging terror threat. The integrated approach of London’s antiterror
strategy, “Control of Public Space,” is very similar to the “systems approach” to traditional
transit crime advocated by the FTA. Boyd, Maier, and Kenny present crime data and security
practices of nine transit agencies around the country. They find that most agencies employ a
combination of personnel deployment, system design and technology, data collection, and
training, operating, and management practices. The study lists security measures used by
these agencies in addressing twenty-eight different types of crime, including terrorism.
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However, it was beyond the scope of the study to provide fine-grained analysis of the cost,
consequences, and efficacy of the individual measures.
While a level of compatibility between strategies against crime and terrorism may exist,
CPTED relies heavily on a thorough understanding of criminal motivation and behavior.
Therefore, a change in the level and type of threat is a very significant alteration of practice for
which some established CPTED strategies may not be entirely suited. Balog warns, “Solution
for a particular crime in a particular situation, will not necessarily work for all types of
crime.”93 It certainly seems logical that many design strategies that reduce the opportunity for
crime may also reduce the opportunity for terrorist activities. Still, the application of such
strategies to terrorism in the transit environment deserves more critical analysis of the mode,
motivation, and effect of terrorist actions against transit. It would be especially useful to think
through the differences in motivation, evaluation of risk, and tactics between “ordinary”
criminals who are out for their personal gain and terrorists whose goals are political.
Despite the lack of definitive evaluative research, an outline of best practices has emerged from
the collective recent experience of rail transit terrorism, which suggests that coordination and
response planning, assisted by technologies such as CCTV, are the best tools transit agencies
have. Training police, transit employees, contractors, and the public to watch for suspicious
activity supports a thorough response capability. Environmental design ensures that policing
resources are used efficiently by making surveillance easier and reducing opportunities for
terrorism (for example, eliminating places where bombs can be hidden, or erecting antiram
bollards). Engineering blast resistance into existing transit facilities may be too costly for the
level of threat faced by even the most vulnerable transit systems, but more modest structural
improvements to glazing or light fixtures could be part of a system’s strategy. The threat of
terrorism is no longer a political anomaly, but one of the challenges facing urban rail transit
systems and public infrastructure as a whole. It is too grave a threat to pass up the possible
protection that these strategies afford urban rail transit.
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SECURING TRANSIT SYSTEMS IN THE POST-9/11 ERA: A SURVEY
OF U.S. TRANSIT OPERATORS
Overview
When the September 11, 2001, attacks destroyed parts of the New York City transit system
and the March 11, 2004, commuter rail bombings did the same in Madrid, Spain, the
vulnerability of open, accessible public transit systems and their passengers to terrorist acts
was cast in sharp relief. Well prior to these attacks, research on terrorism and public transit
had shown public transit systems worldwide to be a principal venue for terrorist acts.
Most previous research on transit terrorism has consisted of single or groups of case studies of
major terrorist acts and responses to them by police and transit managers. Case studies are
especially useful when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, when the investigator has
little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some
real-life context.94 Despite these advantages, case studies are limited, in that they are not
necessarily representative and thus may not reflect the conditions or trends facing the transit
industry more broadly. Thus, one cannot generalize from the findings of case studies (though
in practice, researchers often do). This is an especially relevant issue in the study of U.S. transit
systems, because they vary so dramatically in size—from thousands of vehicles and millions of
daily passengers, to just a handful of vehicles carrying dozens of daily passengers. As potential
targets of terrorist acts, these systems, and their stations and vehicles, are likewise dissimilar.
In contrast to case studies, aggregated analyses of data drawn from a representative sample of
the population (in this case, larger U.S. transit operators) are generalizable and allow
researchers to draw conclusions about the population under study.95 However, more
generalized, aggregated studies of the security experiences and practices of transit systems
have been much less common. In the United States, just two such aggregate studies of transit
system security have been published in recent years.
In a 1997 Transit Cooperative Research Program report, Boyd and Sullivan reported on a
survey of forty-two transit managers regarding experiences with terrorist acts, perceptions of
risks, and interagency coordination in planning for transit security. They found that terrorist
acts against transit systems were on the rise in the United States and worldwide, that transit
agencies—particularly those operating rail service—were perceived by respondents to be at
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great risk for attack, and that coordinated efforts to both deter and respond to terrorist acts
were on the rise but not yet commonplace.
Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, Congress asked the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to consider what role the federal government should play in helping public
transit operators reduce both the likelihood and impacts of terrorist attacks on transit systems
in the United States.96 Part of this research included a mid-2002 survey of officials at 155
transit systems in the United States. The survey focused on security planning and preparation
efforts, interagency and intergovernmental transit security coordination efforts, and
perceptions of obstacles to more effective security planning. Perhaps not surprisingly, a
principal finding of the 2002 GAO report was that transit system managers surveyed cited
increased funding as the most important role the federal government could play in assisting
transit systems with security planning.
The findings of these two surveys, which are discussed in more detail in the pages that follow,
contributed significantly to our understanding of the experiences with, perceptions about, and
preparation for terrorist threats to U.S. transit systems. While the 1997 Boyd and Sullivan
survey was of a relatively small sample of transit systems (60 systems surveyed, 42 responded),
it provides a snapshot of transit systems when concerns over terrorist threats were just
beginning to wax for many transit managers. The 2002 GAO report surveyed many more
transit systems (200 surveyed, 155 responded) about six months after the September 11, 2001,
attacks, a time when transit managers (and, of course, their passengers) had a heightened
awareness of terrorist threats, but before many new plans, programs, and procedures could be
put into place. While both surveys devote considerable attention to bureaucratic, policing,
and emergency response issues, they largely ignore the role of system design for transit
security.
The survey reported on here complements and extends the findings of these two surveys in
several ways. First, by surveying transit managers in the late spring and early summer of 2004,
the survey findings provide a profile of experiences, perceptions, and actions nearly three years
after the September 11, 2001, attacks that made security a top priority among U.S. transit
operators, and just after the largest single terrorist attack directed toward transit (in Madrid,
Spain), which further heightened concerns over transit security. This allows us to examine the
degree to which post-9/11 attention, initiatives, and mandates have been integrated into
transit planning practice.
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Second, this research expands on these earlier studies by surveying respondents’ attitudes
toward, and efforts in, four distinct areas of transit security planning: (1) policing, (2) security
hardware/technology, (3) public education/user outreach, and (4) environmental design
strategies. The latter two of these approaches have received considerable attention in research
on personal and property crime on transit systems, but far less in transit security research.
Finally, while previous research on transit system vulnerability has focused on transit systems
operating one or more rail modes, less attention has been paid to systems that use or manage
indoor bus and ferry terminals. Like rail transit stations, terminals—such as the Port
Authority Bus Terminal in Manhattan, or the TransBay Bus Terminal in downtown San
Francisco—host tens of thousands of weekday passengers in enclosed spaces vulnerable to
terrorist attacks. While we separately evaluate rail and nonrail transit systems, we include data
on the experiences and perceptions of transit system managers responsible for enclosed bus and
ferry terminals as well.
Description of Survey
During the spring of 2004, hard copy and electronic letters describing our research and
soliciting participation in a survey were sent to the general managers of all 259 U.S. transit
agencies that, according to the National Transit Database maintained by the Federal Transit
Administration, operate at least 50 vehicles in peak period service. This ranged from a high of
9,136 vehicles at MTA-New York City Transit, to a low of 50 vehicles at South Bend Public
Transportation Corporation in South Bend, Indiana; Bay Metropolitan Transportation
Authority in Bay City, Michigan; and Escambia County Area Transit in Pensacola, Florida.
The letter asked each general manager to designate the appropriate person or persons to
complete an on-line survey. In the case of smaller systems, this was often the general manager
himself or herself, and in larger systems this was most often (but not always) the director of
policing or security. We assume in this analysis that the general manager was in the best
position to determine who should complete the survey, so we do not parse our analysis to
analyze responses by different types of respondents. The survey instrument was designed to
allow respondents the flexibility to complete the survey over the course of several interactive
sessions before submitting a completed survey. Respondents from 113 transit agencies
completed some or all of the survey questions (44 percent of the 259 agencies contacted).97
Figure 1 on page 56 compares the resulting sample to the population with respect to the
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number of vehicles operated during peak period service. The sample is somewhat
underrepresented with respect to smaller systems.

40%
35%

Population (N=259)
Sample (n=113)

% of Systems

30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
50 to 100

100 to 300

300 to 500

500 to 1000

Over 1000

# of Vehicles Operated in Peak Period

Figure 1 System Size Comparison

Transportation systems from 108 cities in 40 different states are represented in the sample.
California has the highest number of responses with 22, followed by Florida (8), and
Washington (7). Almost half (45 percent) of the respondents identified their title as
something associated with security; 28 percent had titles associated with management; 13
percent were associated with operations or maintenance; and 14 percent reported various other
titles (a complete categorization of titles is presented in Appendix B).
Most (80 percent) of the systems analyzed here operate more than one transit mode. Fifty-nine
systems (or about half—52 percent—of the entire sample) operate bus and paratransit only.
One-fourth (twenty-eight) of the systems operate rail service;98 twenty-three of these systems
are multimodal operations, while five systems operate rail service only. Fifty-two of the fiftynine nonrail systems (which were drawn from the largest such systems in the country) report
that they operate service out of at least one enclosed bus terminal or multimodal transfer
facility; these fifty-two systems represent 46 percent of all respondents. Systems operating rail
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service or that operate out of an enclosed bus terminal or multimodal facility (n = 80)
responded to a more extensive set of questions than did the nonrail, nonenclosed terminal
systems. Table 1 shows the percent of systems analyzed operating each of the specified transit
modes.
Table 1 System Travel Modes
Mode

# of Systems

% of Systems

Commuter Rail

9

8%

Heavy Rail

7

6%

Light Rail

18

16%

104

92%

Ferry

10

9%

Paratransit

91

80%

Othera

13

11%

Bus

a. Includes vanpool, carpool, cable car, trolley,
streetcar, incline, automated guideway, airports

The range of responding agencies’ services is broad. For example, the Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority reported operating all modes of transit listed in Table 1, while the
Dallas Area Rapid Transit, New Jersey Transit, and the Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority operate commuter and light rail as well as bus and paratransit
service. The Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (GCRTA) system in Cleveland
operates heavy and light rail plus bus and paratransit, while the King County Metro Transit
system offers light rail, bus, ferry, and paratransit.
Three-fourths of the twenty-eight systems with rail service modes operate out of multiple
types of stations. All but two systems have some or all at-grade stations, and about 60 percent
have elevated and/or below-ground/subway type stations (see Table 2 on page 58).
Respondents were asked to identify the busiest station in the system and the year it was built.
The oldest station in the sample is South Station Rapid in Boston, which was built in 1899.
Most of the stations for which year-of-construction data were provided were built since 1970.
Table 3 on page 58 lists the twenty rail transit systems that provided information on the age of
their busiest station.
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Table 2 Rail Station Types
Type

# of Systems

% of Systems

Elevated

16

57%

Below-ground/subway

16

57%

At grade

26

93%

1

4%

21

75%

Don’t know
More than one type

Table 3 Busiest U.S. Rail Systems
Agency
Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority
Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority
Metrolink
New Jersey Transit
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid
Transit District
Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority
San Diego Trolley Inc.
Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit
Authority
Niagara Frontier Transportation
Authority
Tri-County Metropolitan Transit
District
Sacramento Regional Transit
Santa Clara Valley
Transportation Authority
GCRTA
Virginia Railway Express

Headquarters

Station

Year Built

Boston

South Station Rapid

1899

Philadelphia

Suburban Station

1920

Los Angeles
Newark
Oakland

Union Station
Penn Station, New York
Embarcadero

1939
1965
1971

Washington, D.C. Metro Center

1976

San Diego
Atlanta

San Ysidro
Five Points

1980
1980

Buffalo

University Station

1984

Portland

Rose Quarter

1985

Sacramento
San Jose

St. Rose of Lima Station
Tamien

1987
1987

Cleveland
Alexandria

Tower City
L’Enfant

1987
1991
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Table 3 Busiest U.S. Rail Systems (Continued)
Agency

Headquarters

Regional Transportation District
Dallas Area Rapid Transit
Montebello Bus Lines
Memphis Area Transit Authority
Utah Transit Authority
Port Authority Trans-Hudson

Denver
Dallas
Montebello, CA
Memphis
Salt Lake
Jersey City

Station

Year Built

I-25/Broadway
West End
Montebello/Commerce
North End Terminal
Sandy Civic
World Trade Center
Station

1994
1996
1998
1998
1999
Reopened
2003

Incidents and Perceived Threats
Substantive security incidents on United States transit systems are rare, but not
unprecedented. Respondents were asked about the occurrence of various types of security
incidents and the frequency of such incidents over the past decade. The results of this query
track very closely with those reported in 2002 by the United States Government
Accountability Office (2002), suggesting some reliability in the results. Agencies with rail
systems (n = 28, or 25 percent of respondents) or that operate out of an enclosed bus terminal
or multimodal transfer station (n = 52, or 46 percent of respondents) were asked about
possible terrorist incidents experienced on their systems. Of these eighty systems queried,
there were sixty-eight valid responses. A total of twenty-eight agencies reported experiencing
some sort of incident; twelve of these were rail transit systems, and sixteen were nonrail
operators. Counts of different types of incidents experienced are shown in Figure 2 on page 60.
Use of arson/incendiary devices on a system was the most common type of incident recorded.
The “Other” category included reports by two systems of suspicious packages that were
identified but turned out to be false alarms, a bomb threat, two knife attacks, a shooting with
no victims, theft of a radio system, hazardous materials contamination on a bus, and a case of
rail-track tampering. Details on these incidents are summarized in Table 4 on page 61 and
Table 5 on page 64.
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Other
Use of arson/incendiary devices
Shooting incident with multiple victims
Employee sabotage
Hostage/barricade situation
Identification of explosive device
Vehicle hijacking

No Rail

Breach of essential computer/software systems

Rail

Identification of chemical or biological contaminants
Detonation of explosive device
0

1

2

3
# of Incidents

Figure 2 Incidents Experienced by Systems
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Table 4 Description of Security Incidents

Identification of
explosive device on
system

No. of
Incidents
in Last
Decade

Year of
Most
Recent
Incident

Location of
Incident

Mineta Transportation Institute

No

1

2002 Bus Stop

Pipe bomb placed in trash can was located and
destroyed.

Yes

1

2002 Vehicle

Suspicious package on bus removed from vehicle.

Yes

< 12

Station

No

1

2003 Vehicle

Explosive device detonated by juveniles on a bus.

No

1

2004 Station

Soda bottle bomb was detonated on a bus at
main transfer point injuring one passenger.

No

3-4

2003 Vehicle

Juveniles playing with matches ignited various
things.

No

Several

Detonation of explosive
device on system

Use of arson/incendiary
devices on system

Description of Incident

No

Yearly Vehicle/Bus
Stop
2003 Bus Stop
Shelter

No

1-2

Yes

120

Yes

3

Station

Pipe bomb found on rail transit platform.

Arson vandalism by juveniles.
Juvenile lit a bus stop shelter on fire.
Fire started in restroom trash container.

2004 Station/
Vehicle

Intentional lighting of newspapers to make a fire.

2002 Bus/Train

Five buses destroyed by fire and three more
damaged.
Rail car seat set on fire.

Chemical or biological
contaminant

Yes

1

2002 Vehicle

Fire intentionally started on floor of vehicle.

No

1

2003 Vehicle

Suspect sprayed pepper or mace on board.

Yes

20

2002-03 Vehicle
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System
Has
Rail

White powder anthrax scare.
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Type of Incident

No. of
Incidents
in Last
Decade

No

Vehicle hijacking

Location of
Incident

Description of Incident

2002 Vehicle

Intoxicated male assaulted driver and attempted
to leave using vehicle.
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No

1

1988 Vehicle

Passenger wanted to go to a city where the bus
did not go. No other passengers were on board.

No

1

1994 Vehicle

Passenger who said he had a gun demanded to
be taken to the airport. He was arrested there.

Yes

1

2004 Vehicle

Passenger took control of bus when it started
back to the location where he boarded.

No

1

2003 Vehicle

Armed suspect boarded a bus. Shots were
exchanged with no injuries and suspect captured.

No

1-2

2004 Vehicle

Passenger told driver he had a bomb strapped to
his chest. Police were notified by silent alarm.
There was no bomb.

Yes
Hostage/barricade
situation

Year of
Most
Recent
Incident

Station

Yes

2

Yes

1

1999 Vehicle
Bus Terminal

Incident at rail station handled by local law
enforcement.
Mentally disturbed persons threatening to harm
others.
Man barricaded in coffee shop threatening to kill
himself. Surrendered after negotiations with
police.
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Table 4 Description of Security Incidents (Continued)

Table 4 Description of Security Incidents (Continued)

Type of Incident

No

No. of
Incidents
in Last
Decade
several

Description of Incident

Miscellaneous instances.

No

2003 Maintenance
Facility

Sabotaged oil on several revenue and support
vehicles.

No

2003 Vehicle/Bus
Garage

Removal of microphones; damage to cameras.
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No

Shooting incident with
multiple victims

Location of
Incident

2004 Vehicle/Bus
Garage

Employee Sabotage

Breach of computer/
software systems

Year of
Most
Recent
Incident

Station

Yes

1

No

several
dozen

No

Disabled buses.

1985 Building

Employee drove stolen vehicle into administration
building.

2004 Vehicle

Sabotaging digital cameras and/or audio devices.

2004 Other

Systems infected with computer viruses.

Yes

1

2003 Computer

Accidental hacking caused brief shutdown of
operations.

No

1

2002 Vehicle

Male passenger boarded bus with shotgun and
shot another passenger and himself.

No

1

Yes

1

1996 Station

Gang members shot other gang members in
stairwell at entrance to the station.

Yes

1

1994 Station

Subject shot two or three passengers at station.

Yes

Other

Maintenance
Facility

North Hollywood shoot out.

Disgruntled employee went to work and started
shooting.
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System
Has
Rail

No. of
Incidents
in Last
Decade

No

2-3

No

Year of
Most
Recent
Incident

Location of
Incident

Description of Incident
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2002 Vehicle

Passenger told bus driver he had left a bomb on rear seat
and ran away.

2

2004 Outside
Vehicle

Vehicle windows shot out while traveling on road.

No

3

2004 Multi-Modal
Transfer
Center

Suspicious bag left on bench. Terminal evacuated until bomb
squad determined it was not a bomb.

No

2

2000 Vehicle

Chemicals for methamphetamine production released
accidentally.

No

1

2004 Vehicle

Radio stolen from service vehicle and vehicle set on fire.

No

1

2004 Vehicle

One passenger stabbed another after verbal altercation.

Yes

1

2003 Tracks

Track jacked up and boulder placed under track.

2004 Vehicle

Operator shot by estranged husband.

Other

Yes
Yes

2

2001 Station

Two planes hit the WTC Towers causing a collapse onto
station.

Yes

< 10

2004 Vehicle

Male climbed through bus window and robbed driver.
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Table 5 Description of Other Security Incidents
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Sixteen agencies indicated that they had received one or more of what respondents believed to
be credible threats (for example, bomb, chemical, biological, fire attacks) in the last year. Most
of these (fourteen of the sixteen) had received from one to four threats. Two other very large
rail operators reported large numbers of threats; one cited thirty-one credible threats in the
past year, and the other twelve.
In addition to providing information on actual threats and attacks, respondents were also
asked about their perceptions of vulnerabilities. While one could argue that these survey
respondents (who were designated by each system’s general manager as the person at that
agency who is most knowledgeable about transit security issues) are in perhaps the best
position of anyone to offer vulnerability assessments, such perceptions should probably be
treated more as informed speculation than concrete assessments of vulnerability. What is most
clear from responses to these questions, however, is that transit systems are, by their very
nature, perceived by system managers as very vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Of respondents
who expressed opinions on vulnerability, only in the case of paratransit did fewer than 60
percent of the respondents rank a transit mode or system component as somewhat or very
vulnerable. Overall, rail modes were perceived by respondents to be the most vulnerable (see
Table 6), though these findings are based on relatively few responses.99 Finally, respondents
collectively did not assign much difference in vulnerability ratings of various system
components (Table 7 on page 66).
Table 6 Vulnerability of System Modes to Attack
Not
Vulnerable

Somewhat
Vulnerable

Very
Vulnerable

-

-

20%

80%

5

Commuter rail

12%

-

25%

63%

8

Light rail

13%

-

27%

60%

15

6%

19%

29%

45%

97

18%

18%

27%

36%

11

7%

41%

27%

26%

83

22%

19%

44%

22%

9

Mode
Heavy rail

Bus
Other
Paratransit
Ferry

Don’t
Know
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Table 7 Vulnerability of System Components
Component
Tracks and rail lines
Rail stations
Bridges/tunnels
Multimodal terminals
(bus and rail)
Vehicles

Don’t
Know

Not
Vulnerable

Somewhat
Vulnerable

Very
Vulnerable

8%

15%

11%

66%

26

12%

14%

11%

63%

27

4%

8%

26%

62%

38

11%

10%

23%

56%

50

6%

10%

32%

52%

67

n

Given this overview of actual and perceived security threats on our sample of U.S. transit
systems, our analysis now looks at the security planning efforts of these same systems.

Threat and Vulnerability Assessments
Of the 113 agencies represented in the sample, 85 percent indicated that they have conducted
some level of threat and vulnerability assessment of key system infrastructure. Agencies with
rail were much more likely to conduct a comprehensive assessment than other agencies. This is
a significant increase over the 54 percent reported by respondents to the 2002 GAO survey.
Almost half (46 percent) of the agencies with rail have conducted a comprehensive security
assessment, compared to only about 13 percent of agencies without rail (see Table 8 on
page 67).100 Most transit agencies without rail have conducted security assessments, but they
are more likely to be described by respondents as moderate or partial assessments, rather than
comprehensive. Considering only transportation systems without rail, we find little difference
with respect to assessment practices between those with a multimodal transfer or enclosed bus
terminal and those without.
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Table 8 Conducted Threat and Vulnerability Assessments
Level of Assessment

# of Systems

% of
Systems

Cumulative%

ALL Systems
YES, Comprehensive

24

21%

21%

YES, Moderate

38

34%

55%

YES, Partial

34

30%

85%

NO

11

10%

95%

6

5%

100%

113

100%

YES, Comprehensive

13

46%

46%

YES, Moderate

11

39%

86%

YES, Partial

1

4%

89%

NO

2

7%

96%

Don’t Know

1

4%

100%

28

100%

7

13%

13%

YES, Moderate

15

29%

42%

YES, Partial

19

37%

79%

NO

7

13%

92%

Don’t Know

4

8%

100%

52

100%

4

12%

12%

YES, Moderate

12

36%

48%

YES, Partial

14

42%

91%

Don’t Know
TOTAL
Systems with Rail

TOTAL
Systems without Rail
Systems with Multimodal Transfer or
Enclosed Bus Terminal
YES, Comprehensive

TOTAL
Other Systems
YES, Comprehensive
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Table 8 Conducted Threat and Vulnerability Assessments (Continued)
Level of Assessment

# of Systems

% of
Systems

Cumulative%

NO

2

6%

97%

Don’t Know

1

3%

100%

33

100%

TOTAL

Among those systems that have not conducted security assessments, the primary reasons given
for not doing so were lack of resources (n = 5) or the fact that services were contracted to an
outside agency (n = 3). Four agencies indicated that they were in the process of planning an
assessment at the time of the survey, while one respondent stated simply that his/her agency
was not a “high-value target.”
Thirty-five agencies report conducting assessments at least once a year, while twenty-eight
agencies report conducting assessments every two or three years (see Table 9 on page 69). The
remaining agencies report no regular policy regarding frequency, but rather conduct
assessments as deemed necessary. Seventy percent of agencies conducting assessments had done
so in the last two years (see Table 10 on page 69). In general, the reported frequency of such
assessments is substantially higher than was reported in the GAO survey just two years earlier.
There was not a significant difference in the timing of assessments between agencies that
operate rail and those that do not.
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Table 9 Frequency of Assessment
Frequency

# of Systems

More than once a year

% of Systems

Cumulative%

8

8%

8%

Once a year

27

28%

36%

Once every 2 years

19

20%

56%

Once every 3 years

9

9%

66%

Other

23

24%

90%

Don’t Know

10

10%

100%

TOTAL

96

100%

Table 10 Year of Most Recent Assessment
Year

# of Systems

% of Systems

Cumulative%

1999

2

2%

2%

2001

7

7%

9%

2002

16

17%

26%

2003

36

38%

64%

2004

32

33%

97%

3

3%

100%

96

100%

Don’t Know
TOTAL

The most common purposes reported for the most recent threat and vulnerability assessment
conducted were to assess terrorism-related vulnerabilities (80 percent of systems) and crimerelated vulnerabilities (70 percent of systems). Only 38 percent of the systems used the process
to assess natural disaster-related vulnerabilities (see Table 11 on page 70), which contrasts
significantly from the 85 percent reported in the 2002 GAO survey. Other purposes
mentioned were to assist in developing a security plan and to help prioritize security
enhancements for implementation. All but one of the systems with rail (96 percent)
mentioned terrorism as a purpose of the assessment as compared to three-fourths of systems
without rail.101 Systems without rail were somewhat more likely to have conducted a crime or
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natural disaster assessment than systems with rail (though the observed differences were not
statistically significant). Further, among systems without rail there were essentially no
differences in the stated purposes of the assessments between systems that operated a
multimodal transfer or enclosed bus terminal and those that did not.
Table 11 Purpose of Assessment
Purpose

All Systems

Systems with Rail

Systems
without Rail

# of
% of
# of
% of
# of
% of
Systems Systems Systems Systems Systems Systems
Assess terrorism-related
vulnerabilities

78

80%

24

92%

54

76%

Assess crime-related
vulnerabilities

68

70%

16

62%

52

73%

Assess natural disasterrelated vulnerabilities

37

38%

8

31%

29

41%

Other

4

4%

1

4%

3

4%

Don’t Know

2

2%

0

0%

2

3%

More than one purpose

67

69%

17

65%

50

70%

Total systems conducting
assessment

96

25

71

Identifying effective security and technology procedures and supporting decision making at
the executive level were the most prevalent uses of the threat and vulnerability assessment
results reported (see Table 12 on page 71). Almost all systems with rail have multiple uses for
the assessment results, and are much more likely to use the assessment for the specific uses
listed in the survey than are systems without rail. For example, 58 percent of systems with rail
use the assessment results to apply for Urban Area Security Initiative grants as compared to
only 6 percent of systems without rail. In Figure 3 on page 72, we do see that there are some
differences in use of assessment between systems operating an enclosed bus terminal/
multimodal transfer and those without.
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Table 12 Use of Assessment
Use of Results

All Systems

Systems with Rail

Systems without
Rail

# of
% of
# of
% of
# of
% of
Systems Systems Systems Systems Systems Systems
Identify effective security
technology & procedures

79

81%

23

88%

56

79%

Support decision making
at the executive level

67

69%

22

85%

45

63%

Support preparation of
budgets

56

58%

17

65%

39

55%

Fulfill requirements of
System Security Program
Plan and/or State Safety
Oversight Program

55

57%

18

69%

37

52%

Support FTA’s security
outreach & technical
assistance program

37

38%

18

69%

19

27%

Apply for Urban Area
Security Initiative grants

19

20%

15

58%

4

6%

Other

3

3%

2

8%

1

1%

Have not used results yet

4

4%

0

0%

4

6%

Don’t know

1

1%

0

0%

1

1%

More than one use

82

85%

24

92%

58

82%

Total systems conducting
assessment

96

25
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Support decision making at the executive level

Fulfill requirements of System Security Program Plan and/or
State Safety Oversight Program

Apply for Urban Area Security Initiative grants
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100
%
% of Systems
Has Neither

Has Multimodal Transfer or Enclosed Station

Has Rail

Figure 3 Use of Assessment

About one-third of the agencies without rail reported using an in-house team to conduct their
threat and vulnerability assessments, while only 12 percent of systems with rail conducted
such assessments in-house. Systems with rail were more likely to use a combination of groups
to conduct the assessment, primarily made up of an in-house team along with contracted
security consultants (see Table 13 on page 73). Systems without rail were twice as likely to use
the sheriff’s or police department (about one-third) than systems with rail (16 percent). The
most common “other” group mentioned was assistance from the FTA (listed by nine agencies).
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Table 13 Who Conducted Assessment?

Who Conducted
Assessment?

All Systems

Systems with
Rail

Systems with
Multimodal
Transfer or
Enclosed
Station

Systems with
Neither

# of
% of
# of
% of
# of
% of
# of
% of
Systems Systems Systems Systems Systems Systems Systems Systems

In-house team

64

67%

15

60%

29

71%

20

67%

Contracted security
consultants

28

29%

14

56%

7

17%

7

23%

Sheriff’s or police
department

26

27%

4

16%

13

32%

9

30%

Other

26

27%

8

32%

10

24%

8

27%

5

5%

2

8%

2

5%

1

3%

More than one
group

41

43%

13

52%

18

44%

10

33%

Total systems
conducting
assessment

96

Contracted other
consultants
Don’t know

25

41

30

Security Strategies
Respondents were asked about their views on the importance of each of four distinct security
strategies, and whether these views had changed since September 11, 2001. The four strategies
are:
• policing.
• security hardware/technology.
• public education/user outreach.
• environmental design strategies.
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The percentage of respondents who believe that all four of these strategies are central to
security planning more than doubled after 9/11 (see Figure 4 on page 74 through Figure 7 on
page 76). Both before and after 9/11, however, policing was considered the most central
strategy, followed by security hardware and technology. Neither public education and user
outreach, nor environmental design strategies, were given much importance by respondents
before 9/11. Following 9/11, however, respondents from over half of the agencies said that
these factors had become significant and even central parts of security planning. While
attention to security increased for all types of transit agencies following 9/11, all four of the
strategies analyzed here (policing, technology, outreach, and design) were considered more
significant or central to security planning for agencies with rail than for agencies without.
70%
60%
% of Agencies

Policing
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Central

Significant
Before 9/11

Minor Part

No Part

Don't Know

After 9/11

Figure 4 Importance of Strategies in Security Planning: Policing
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70%
60%
% of Agencies

Public Education/User Outreach
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Central

Significant
Before 9/11

Minor Part

No Part

Don't Know

After 9/11

Figure 5 Importance of Strategies in Security Planning: Education & User Outreach

70%

Security Hardware/Technology

60%

% of Agencies

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Central

Significant
Before 9/11

Minor Part
After 9/11
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Figure 6 Importance of Strategies in Security Planning: Security Hardware/Technology
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Environmental Design Strategies
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Before 9/11
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No Part

Don't Know

After 9/11

Figure 7 Importance of Strategies in Security Planning: Environmental Design

Before 9/11, respondents from agencies with rail were much more likely to have considered
policing significant or central to security planning than were those from agencies without rail
(see Figure 8 on page 77). Following 9/11, however, respondents from all types of agencies
thought policing to be a significant or central strategy. Environmental design strategies were
also considered by respondents from agencies with rail to be a more significant part of security
planning, both before and after 9/11. Given that operators of rail systems are likely to be
responsible for securing many rail stations and miles of rail rights-of-way, this result is not
surprising. By contrast, nonrail operators of enclosed stations or terminals typically operate
just one or few such stations and are not responsible for securing the streets and sea lanes on
which their vehicles operate.
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Com paring Agencies
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Before
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Before
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Before
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After
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Environm ental
Design Strategies

Figure 8 Strategies Considered Central or Significant in Security Planning

When asked about specific changes in security strategies after 9/11, many respondents
reported that increased resources (for example, funding) were now devoted to policing
strategies. For some agencies this entailed the development of a new in-house police or
security force; in other cases, where police forces were already in place, the number of police or
security officers increased. Specifically, many respondents reported having a greater public
police presence with greater attention paid to increased public visibility of police officers and
security guards. In addition, many respondents reported increased coordination with local law
enforcement, as well as increased employee awareness training regarding the vulnerabilities of
systems to terrorism.
Following 9/11, agencies have tended to look for new ways to engage passengers on security
issues. A number of agencies have implemented a Transit Watch program, which engages the
public as additional security “eyes” and “ears.” Others have sought to increase public
awareness of security issues through posters, pamphlets, Web pages, and regular newsletters.
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The most common change in security hardware/technology strategies reported after 9/11 is the
increased use of surveillance cameras both on vehicles and at stations. Also, more electronically
controlled access points have been implemented.
Finally, respondents reported greater awareness of, and attention to, crime prevention through
environmental design (CPTED) strategies after 9/11. While awareness of CPTED strategies
was high, fewer agencies reported actually implementing CPTED strategies after 9/11. Such a
result is not surprising, however, because while strategies like policing and public outreach are
operational and amenable to short-term adjustments, changes in the design or rehabilitation of
capital facilities to reflect security concerns is a longer-term and more incremental enterprise.
Accordingly, most respondents report that their agencies intend to incorporate CPTED
strategies into future facility designs.
Prior to 9/11, transit system security planning focused far more on personal and property
crime than on acts of terrorism. While efforts to address crime and terrorism are frequently
complementary, they are not always one and the same. When asked how they tend to consider
antiterrorism and anticrime strategies, most respondents reported viewing the strategies as
either hand in hand (46 percent) or partly overlapping (41 percent). Across all agency types,
only a few respondents, however, reported that anticrime and antiterrorism strategies were
largely separate from one another (see Table 14).
Table 14 Antiterrorism Versus Anticrime Strategies

Agency Opinion

All Systems

# of
Systems

Completely
separate from
one another

Systems with
Rail

Systems with
Multimodal
Transfer or
Enclosed
Station

Systems with
Neither

% of
# of
% of
# of
% of
# of
% of
Systems Systems Systems Systems Systems Systems Systems

8

7%

1

4%

6

12%

1

3%

Partly overlap one
another

44

41%

13

46%

20

41%

11

35%

Considered
hand in hand

50

46%

13

46%

19

39%

18

58%
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Table 14 Antiterrorism Versus Anticrime Strategies (Cont.)

Agency Opinion

All Systems

Don’t know
Total systems

Systems with
Rail

Systems with
Multimodal
Transfer or
Enclosed
Station

Systems with
Neither

6

6%

1

4%

4

8%

1

3%

108

100%

28

100%

49

100%

31

100%

Policing Strategies
Respondents were asked how policing is provided at their transit system. The survey
instrument offered five possibilities, plus an “other” category:
• sworn transit law enforcement.
• nonsworn transit police (private security).
• contracted local police.
• dedicated bureau of local law enforcement.
• no formal security; rely exclusively on local law enforcement.
About half (47 percent) of the agencies use just one policing strategy; this total includes 19
percent that have no formal security and rely exclusively on local law enforcement (see
Table 15). The remaining agencies use a combination of policing options, with nonsworn
transit police the most common. Over half of the agencies use nonsworn police for all (10
percent) or part (43 percent) of their policing activities. The least-used policing option is a
dedicated bureau of local law enforcement—only 7 percent of agencies rely completely or
partially on this strategy.
Table 15 Agencies’ Reliance on Policing Strategies
Policing Strategy

% of Agencies
Use
Exclusively

Use as Part of
Overall Strategy

Total

Sworn transit law enforcement

10%

19%

29%

Nonsworn transit police

10%

43%

53%
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Table 15 Agencies’ Reliance on Policing Strategies (Cont.)
Policing Strategy

% of Agencies

Contracted local police

4%

24%

28%

Dedicated bureau of local law
enforcement

4%

3%

7%

19%

14%

33%

0%

19%

19%

Rely exclusively on local law
enforcement
Other strategy
Total

47%

When comparing 2002 GAO survey results to our 2004 survey, we find the percentage of
systems relying on regular local law enforcement (33 percent in 2002 and 33 percent in 2004)
or with a contract or dedicated arrangement with local law enforcement (34 percent in 2002
and 35 percent in 2004) was essentially the same. However, our 2004 survey found
significantly higher shares of transit operators with an in-house transit police department of
sworn officers (8 percent in the 2002 GAO survey and 29 percent in our 2004 survey) and
using contracted nonsworn transit security (35 percent in 2002 and 53 percent in 2004).
While these differences might reflect random variation or bias in one or both of the two
samples, the questions posed in these two surveys were similar enough to suggest that, in the
three years since 9/11, the proportion of transit agencies with in-house police/security services
has increased significantly.102
Systems with rail were more likely to rely on sworn transit police than systems without; 64
percent of agencies with rail used sworn transit police for at least half of policing, compared to
only 10 percent of agencies without rail. In contrast, systems without rail service were twice as
likely to rely heavily on nonsworn police than systems with rail; 37 percent of systems without
rail use nonsworn police for over half of their policing, compared to 18 percent of systems with
rail. These differences are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
Eighty-one percent of the respondents provided us with information on the number of fulltime equivalent security/police personnel contracted for or employed by the agency. The
numbers ranged from zero to 1,500 (at the Port Authority Trans-Hudson headquartered in
Jersey City, and with responsibilities for three airports and the New York seaports in addition
to the PATH trains and stations). Just over one-fourth (27 percent) of the respondents were
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from agencies with no in-house or contract security personnel. Sixteen agencies—all of which
have rail—employ or contract for over fifty security personnel, and seven of these agencies
have over one hundred. Thirty-four percent of the agencies have between one and ten security
personnel and 20 percent between ten and fifty (see Figure 9).

40%
35%
No Rail

Has Rail

% of A

30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
0

< 10

10 - 50

51 - 100

> 100

# of Security Personnel

Figure 9 Full-Time Equivalent Security/Police Personnel

Regarding perceptions of effectiveness in addressing terrorist threats, policing strategies were
ranked high by respondents. Policing was ranked by 84 percent of respondents as “very” or
“somewhat” effective in preparing for terrorist attacks. This percentage is even higher (93
percent) for agencies with rail; 39 percent of respondents from agencies with rail consider
policing strategies to be very effective, while 54 percent consider them to be somewhat
effective. By comparison, only 24 percent of agencies without rail find policing strategies very
effective and 57 percent find them somewhat effective—a total of 81 percent.

Security and Hardware Technology Strategies
In this era of rapidly evolving and extensively deploying information and communication
technologies both inside and outside of the transit industry, it should come as no surprise that
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transit agencies are turning to technology to support increased security efforts. The most
extensively used security hardware technologies in our sample were personnel radio
communications systems, used extensively by over 90 percent of all agencies—both with rail
and without. The only other technology hardware used extensively by over half the agencies is
emergency alert/notification systems on transit vehicles, which are used extensively by almost
70 percent of agencies. Public address systems and closed-circuit cameras are used to some
degree by most agencies (see Figure 10), while electronic access control, emergency
telephones, and GPS locators are used to some degree by about half the agencies. There was
little use of the other security-related hardware and technologies asked about in our survey,
such as tunnel intruder detection systems, explosives detection equipment, and chemical/
biological sensors.

Personnel radio communications system
Emergency alert/notification systems on transit vehicles
Public address system
Closed-circuit cameras (CCTV)
Electronic access control
Emergency telephones
GPS locators
Automatic track and signal monitoring systems
Reversible fans
Moderate Use

Intrusion detection systems (e.g., at tunnel entrances)

Extensive Use

Portable explosive detection equipment
Chemical/biological sensors
Metal detectors at entrance and exit points
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90% 100%

Figure 10 Security Hardware Technologies/Strategies Employed by Agencies

Systems with rail are more than twice as likely to make extensive use of electronic access
control and emergency telephones than systems without rail, and are somewhat more likely to
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make extensive use of public address systems, closed-circuit cameras, and GPS locators than
systems without rail (see Figure 11).

Personnel radio
communications system
Emergency alert/notification
systems on transit vehicles
Public address system
Closed-circuit cameras
(CCTV)
Without Rail

Electronic access control

With Rail

Emergency telephones
GPS locators
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

% of Agencies

Figure 11 Extensive Use of Security Hardware and Technology Strategies

Just over one-fourth of the respondents consider security hardware strategies very effective in
preparing for terrorist attacks and an additional 55 percent think these strategies are
somewhat effective, for a total of 81 percent. There is little difference of opinion on this type of
strategy between respondents from systems with rail and those without rail.

Information and Outreach Strategies
A stream of crime and public safety literature has for years suggested that public awareness of
and involvement in crime reporting and prevention can greatly increase the watchful “eyes on
the street” and help to reduce the acceptability of both petty and felonious criminal
behavior.103 Many transit systems abroad—such as the London Underground—have actively
sought to enlist the help of patrons in watching for and reporting suspicious activity. When
asked about information and outreach strategies to educate transit riders about general
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emergency and safety issues, three-quarters of those from rail systems report having such
programs in place, and 86 percent of these include specific strategies to educate transit riders
about dealing with terrorist attacks (see Table 16).
Table 16 Information and Outreach Strategies
Agency Has
Transit-Rider
Education
Strategies

All Systems
# of
Systems

Systems with Rail

% of
Systems

# of
Systems

% of
Systems

Systems without Rail
# of
Systems

% of
Systems

General Emergency and Safety Issues
Yes, Extensive

16

15%

11

41%

5

6%

Yes, Modest

47

44%

10

37%

37

46%

No

36

34%

6

22%

30

38%

8

7%

0

0%

8

10%

107

100%

27

100%

80

100%

8

7%

8

30%

0

0%

Yes, Modest

26

24%

10

37%

16

20%

No

64

60%

8

30%

56

70%

9

8%

1

4%

8

10%

107

100%

27

100%

80

100%

Don’t Know
TOTAL

Dealing with Terrorist Attacks
Yes, Extensive

Don’t Know
TOTAL

Efforts by transit agencies to educate passengers on safety and security issues appear to have
increased dramatically since 9/11. In its 2002 survey, the GAO report found that just 18
percent of agencies surveyed had conducted transit safety/security campaigns prior to 9/11,
while 23 percent had done so in the six months after 9/11. Two years later, our survey found a
very different picture: 59 percent of agencies reported having a general safety/security public
education program in place, and 32 percent reported having programs specifically devoted to
educating passengers about terrorism.
The proportion of surveyed agencies without rail that have information and outreach strategies
is (statistically at the 0.005 level) significantly lower than those with rail. Only 6 percent of
the surveyed agencies without rail have “extensive” strategies in place to educate passengers on
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general emergency and safety issues, compared to 41 percent of agencies with rail. While
nearly a third of respondents (30 percent) from agencies with rail report having extensive
programs in place to educate passengers on what to do in case of a terrorist attack, none of the
respondents from nonrail systems reported having an extensive education program in place.
We found no differences between rail and nonrail agencies in the specific information and
outreach strategies employed to educate transit riders about general emergency and safety
issues and strategies to educate riders about dealing with terrorist attacks. Transit Watch
programs are popular, as well as posters and pamphlets that emphasize the message that
security is everyone’s responsibility. Respondents also report using passenger newsletters, Web
pages, public forums on transportation issues, and neighborhood outreach to keep riders
informed.
Information and outreach strategies are considered by over half the respondents to be very
effective or effective in preparing for terrorist attacks. This percentage is even higher for
agencies with rail. Twenty-one percent of respondents from agencies with rail consider
information and outreach strategies to be very effective and 50 percent believe that they are
somewhat effective—a total of 71 percent. In comparison, only 11 percent of respondents from
agencies without rail find public education and outreach strategies to be very effective and 43
percent find them somewhat effective—a total of 54 percent.

Environmental Design Strategies
While system design for transit security received little attention in the two previous security
surveys of U.S. transit systems,104 this strategy was familiar to most respondents in our survey.
More than two-thirds (69 percent) of the respondents in our survey reported that they were
familiar with crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) and could define the
concept. Well over half (58 percent) of the respondents said that their systems employ CPTED
strategies.
Given that rail transit systems tend to have many enclosed stations and miles of exclusive
rights-of-way, it is not surprising that familiarity with, and employment of, CPTED strategies
is higher at agencies operating rail transit service (see Table 17 on page 86). Almost all the
respondents from agencies with rail (twenty-two out of twenty-five, or 88 percent) indicated
that they are familiar with CPTED and could define the concept. Seven of these twenty-two
respondents from rail systems are associated with agencies that make extensive use of CPTED
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strategies, and another fifteen agencies report having a moderate CPTED strategy program, for
a total of 88 percent of rail transit agencies reporting use of CPTED. By contrast, about half
(49 percent) of agencies without rail report making use of CPTED strategies, and about twothirds (63 percent) of respondents from these agencies could define the term.
Table 17 Use of CPTED Strategies
CPTED Crime Prevention
through Environmental Design

All Systems

Systems with
Rail

Systems without
Rail

# of
Systems

% of
Systems

# of
Systems

% of
Systems

# of
Systems

% of
Systems

Yes, familiar with term

72

69%

22

88%

50

63%

Uncertain about meaning

18

17%

2

8%

16

20%

Don't Know/Not Sure

15

14%

1

4%

14

18%

105

100%

25

100%

80

100%

Yes, extensive use

14

13%

7

28%

7

9%

Yes, moderate use

47

45%

15

60%

32

40%

No

32

30%

2

8%

30

38%

Don't Know/Not Sure

12

11%

1

4%

11

14%

105

100%

25

100%

80

100%

Can you define CPTED?

TOTAL
Agency makes use of CPTED?

TOTAL

Definitions of CPTED were reasonably consistent across respondents. Some of the definitions
were rather broad, such as:
• “The proper design and effective use of the built environment that leads to a reduction in
the fear and incidence of crime, and an improvement in a community’s quality of life”
(Manager, Special Projects, system with bus and paratransit only).
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• “Design that eliminates or reduces criminal behavior and at the same time encourages
people to be aware of each other and their environment” (Manager, Protective Services,
system with bus only).
• “CPTED is a proactive strategy that builds security into the design with a focus on
prevention through solid security design, e.g., adequate lighting, ease of patrol, perimeter
protection and access control, minimizing landscaping and hiding places, etc.” (Manager,
Public Safety, regional system with light rail and bus).
Other definitions were quite specific, and often included specific design ideas:
• “Designing system and facilities with the intention of reducing potential criminal
breaches, e.g.: lighting, open architecture limiting and/or eliminating alleyways and blind
spots, reducing and/or eliminating use of or access to equipment and containers (such as
enclosed trash cans) where IEDs (improvised explosive devices) or other potentially
hazardous items can be left, etc.” (Safety, Training Coordinator, system with bus only).
• “CPTED refers to the incorporation of anticrime design initiatives directly into the
planning and construction of facilities and structures. This includes, but is not limited to,
the reduction or elimination of ‘blind’ areas from the ‘blueprint’ phase through to aesthetic
considerations (for example, landscaping, lighting). Both visual and psychological impacts
are considered.” (Government Relations Officer for Homeland Security, metropolitan
transit authority with commuter, heavy, and light rail).
Two-thirds of the respondents from the sixty-one agencies that make use of CPTED strategies
think that these strategies are very important in overall security planning, while the
remaining third consider CPTED strategies to be somewhat important to transit security
efforts. No respondents considered the strategies to be unimportant. These perceptions were
similar among systems with and without rail.
Figure 12 on page 88 shows that agencies that use CPTED strategies are most likely to apply
them to entrances and exits (82 percent), parking lots (75 percent), or gates (61 percent). By
contrast, CPTED strategies are least likely to be applied to elevators, escalators, and vending
machines. Comments listed under the “Other” category included landscaping and physical
barriers around facilities. CPTED strategies employed for each component mentioned are
summarized in Table 18 on page 89. When asked to rank CPTED strategies for costeffectiveness (most “bang for the buck”), improved lighting and the addition of security
cameras and/or closed circuit TV were the most commonly mentioned. Other strategies
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mentioned by multiple respondents were access control, open facility design with clear lines of
sight, and landscaping.

82%

Entrances and exits
75%

Parking lots
61%

Gates

56%

Pathways

54%

Platforms

51%

Trash cans
43%

Restrooms

38%

Vehicles
28%

Elevators
20%

Vending machines

18%

Other
Escalators
0%

11%
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

% of Systems (n = 61)

Figure 12 Components with CPTED Strategies

When asked specifically about application of CPTED concepts to rail systems, about half the
agencies with rail use CPTED in the design of maintenance facilities and station tunnels (see
Figure 13 on page 90). The other components listed—control centers, traction power stations
and distribution, and tracks—were mentioned by between 20 percent and 40 percent of rail
agency respondents.
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Table 18 CPTED Strategies for System Components
TABLE 18: CPTED STRATEGIES FOR SYSTEM COMPONENTS

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

Keep Clear of Obstacles

9

No Hidden Corners/Dead Areas

9

9

Limit Access Paths/Points

9

9

Electronic Access Control
9

Security Cameras

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

9

Emergency Alarms
9

9

9

9

9

9

Explosive Resistant

9

See-through Containers

9
9

9
9

Minimal/Low Landscaping

9

9
9

Fencing
Public Information Signage

9

9

Curved Entrance Wall without Doors

Location*

9

9

Emergency Telephones
Monitoring by Staff/Security

Vehicles

9

Trash Cans

9

Vending Machines

Use of Glass & Natural Light

Parking Lots

9

Pathways

Visibility (clear lines of sight)

Restrooms

9

Escalators

9

Elevators

Entrances & Exits

Lighting

CPTED Strategy

Gates

Platforms

System Component

9

9

Large Windows

9

Secure Parking

9

Vandal- and Graffiti-Proof

9

* Configure location of gates to be able to close off sections of station. Locate vending machines
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Maintenance Facilities
(yards & shops)

48%

Station Tunnels

48%

Control Center(s)

40%

Other

32%

Traction Power Stations &
Distribution

36%

Tracks

20%
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25%
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40%
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Figure 13 Rail System Components with CPTED Strategies

Respondents from just twenty-three agencies (22 percent) reported having CPTED guidelines
in place (ten with rail and thirteen without).105 Most (61 percent) of these guidelines were
developed by an in-house team (fourteen of the twenty-three agencies with guidelines). Five
contracted with consultants to prepare their CPTED guidelines, two used the sheriff’s or
police department, one adopted FTA guidelines, and one developed guidelines through
CPTED training at a local technical college. The lead department for developing guidelines
was most often associated with safety and security or operations. One respondent specified the
district architect and another, capital development.

Conclusion
The findings of this survey in many ways reflect the asymmetry inherent in public transit in
the United States. While hundreds of transit systems operate in dozens of cities, most of the
stations, vehicles, and passengers are concentrated on a few, very large, high-profile systems—
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systems that are the mostly likely targets for terrorist attacks. The ten largest U.S. transit
systems (operating in nine metropolitan areas) carried 65 percent of all transit trips reported to
the Federal Transit Administration for 2002, while the remaining transit systems carry the
remaining 35 percent. Thirty-nine percent of all 2002 transit trips in the United States
occurred in one metropolitan area, New York, and 31 percent of all United States transit trips
were carried by just one system, the New York MTA.106
While significant attacks against U.S. transit systems remain rare, they are likewise
asymmetric. Just sixteen of the eighty systems with rail service and/or enclosed bus/ferry
terminals queried for this research reported receiving a credible threat (for example, bomb,
chemical, biological, fire attacks) in the past year. While fourteen of these sixteen systems had
received fewer than five threats, one agency reported receiving twelve credible threats, and
another reported receiving thirty-one. These threats and incidents, combined with the tragic
events of 9/11 and the recent, deadly transit attacks in London, have pushed security to the
forefront of transit policy debates.
This survey of 113 U.S. transit systems finds that attention to transit system security increased
significantly after 9/11, and this attention has been translated in the three years since into
increased policing, use of security technologies, public information and outreach, and CPTED
strategies. In its 2002 survey of U.S. transit systems, the GAO found that just over half (54
percent) of transit systems had conducted security threat assessments. Just two years later, we
found in this survey that the proportion of large U.S. transit agencies that had conducted such
assessments had increased to 85 percent.
Our survey asked in detail about four types of security strategies—policing, technology,
education and outreach, and crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). We
found that attention to all these strategies has increased since 9/11, and over half the
respondents now view all four strategies as central or significant parts of security planning
efforts. Prior to 9/11, CPTED and, especially, information and outreach, were given much less
weight in security planning by the respondents to our survey. Because they manage and
operate large numbers of stations and rail rights-of-way, respondents from rail transit systems
tended to exhibit higher levels of concern over, and attention to, security issues than did
respondents from systems with no rail service.
With respect to system design, over 80 percent of the respondents to this portion of our survey
now believe that CPTED is a somewhat or very effective strategy in preventing terrorist
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attacks (see Table 19). This ranking of effectiveness is similar to policing and security
hardware and technology strategies (though we should note that half again as many
respondents answered questions about policing and technology as those who answered
questions about CPTED strategies). Among the four types of security strategies analyzed here,
public education/user outreach strategies were generally viewed as less effective than the other
three types of strategies; nonetheless, 58 percent of respondents rated these strategies as
somewhat or very effective. In general, systems with rail were more likely to view most
strategies as very effective compared to systems without rail.
Table 19 Perceived Effectiveness of Security Planning Strategies
Strategy

Policing

Security hardware/
technology

CPTED

Public education/user
outreach

Agency
Type

Very
Somewhat
Effective Effective

Not
Effective

Don’t
Know

n

Rail

40%

53%

7%

0%

27

No Rail

24%

57%

9%

10%

79

TOTAL

28%

56%

8%

8%

106

Rail

27%

62%

4%

7%

26

No Rail

26%

53%

13%

9%

80

TOTAL

26%

55%

10%

8%

106

Rail

32%

50%

9%

9%

21

No Rail

19%

62%

11%

8%

37

TOTAL

24%

58%

10%

9%

58

Rail

22%

49%

18%

11%

27

No Rail

11%

43%

20%

26%

80

TOTAL

14%

44%

19%

22%

107

Collectively, the findings of this survey reflect the fundamental dilemmas of transit security
planning. Because transit systems are open, dynamic systems that congregate hundreds, and
even thousands, of people together in stations and onto vehicles, most transit managers and
security officials responding to our survey view transit systems (with the exception of
paratransit services) as very vulnerable to terrorist attacks. On the other hand, the time,
energy, and resources devoted to transit system security have increased dramatically over the
past decade, particularly since 9/11, and a majority of respondents to this survey view four
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distinct security strategies as either somewhat or very effective in increasing the safety and
security of these inherently open and vulnerable systems: policing (84 percent), technology (81
percent), public education (58 percent), and system design (82 percent).
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INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO INCREASING TRANSIT SECURITY
THREATS: INTERVIEWS WITH KEY U.S. STAKEHOLDERS
Public transportation in the United States is traditionally a local responsibility, although
assistance from the national government in the form of funding and technical expertise is a
long-established practice. Much of that assistance historically has flowed from the U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT)—at one time from the Urban Mass Transit
Administration and more recently from its descendent, the Federal Transit Administration
(FTA). With the sudden apparent need for enhanced security of local transit systems, the
events of 9/11 created the impetus for a significant reconstitution of national government
security responsibilities. At the same time, local transit systems faced the challenges and
burdens of enhancing the security of their systems while balancing security mandates and
demands with operational and managerial concerns.
This section provides an overview and analysis of the initiatives taken by the various agencies
and organizations involved in the transit security in the United States, including federal
agencies, a national industry organization, and local operators. It necessarily omits any
information about any classified or otherwise sensitive activities in which these agencies and
organizations may be engaged. The information presented is based primarily on face-to-face
and telephone interviews with representatives from these agencies and the nongovernmental
organizations that work with them, along with publicly available documents and agency
Websites.

The Role of Federal Agencies and Industry Interest Groups
With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the concomitant
placement of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) therein, newly formed entities
assumed the primary federal responsibility for domestic transportation security, including
local rail transit. Other federal agencies play a significant collaborative role in what appears to
be an evolving constellation of specific assignments in a rapidly developing component of
transportation policy.
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• The FTA, more specifically, the Office of Safety and Security (OSS), plays an “oversight role
and an asset management role.” Other offices within FTA, such as the Office of Research
Management, also play significant roles.
• The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) shares this oversight role with FTA with
respect to local commuter rail systems only and also assists with the dissemination of
security-related information to such systems.
Additionally, at least two nongovernmental public interest groups are active partners in the
ongoing efforts to enhance the security of local transit systems:
• The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) serves as a liaison between federal
security agencies and the local transit industry through several committees that focus on
transit security issues. APTA interfaces with the various federal agencies listed earlier, as
well as the General Accountability Office (GAO), and has helped create safety and securityrelated standards for the rail-transit industry.
• The Community Transportation Association of America (CTAA) similarly helps federal
agencies validate their various policy initiatives, and relays technical assistance on security
matters to its local transit agency membership.
In considering the present state of federal government efforts to enhance the security of local
transit facility environments, perhaps the most noticeable consideration is their unsettled
character. Clearly, the attacks of 9/11, coupled with the more recent spate of terrorist attacks
on transit systems around the globe, have necessitated an almost improvisational response
among the agencies charged with responsibility in this arena. The more conventional, carefully
considered, and incremental approach to policy making has generally been supplanted by
more direct responses. Therefore, three themes were particularly recurrent among those
interviewed from these agencies: (1) a sense of urgency about the need to effect improvements
in transit security from terrorist attacks, (2) the rapidly evolving set of roles and
responsibilities of different entities, and (3) the significant amount of uncertainty that is
attendant to these efforts. With these factors in mind, the following sections explore the roles
and initiatives currently being pursued by the major institutions involved in these efforts.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
The Department of Homeland Security has the lead responsibility for federal efforts to
maintain and enhance the security of public rail transit systems. More specifically, the
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Passenger Safety division of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
responsibility for all nonaviation transit modes, including buses, school buses, passenger and
commuter rail (including Amtrak), mass transit, and maritime transit. This responsibility
overlaps to an extent with modal counterparts in the DOT, although DOT’s responsibility is
primarily transit safety, in contrast to TSA’s charge to maintain security. The result, according
to Brian O’Malley, Branch Chief, Mass Transit Infrastructure Security, is that responsibility for
transit security-related functions is currently “oddly divided up.”
According to Don Thompson, TSA Director of Passenger Safety, TSA’s responsibilities are
outlined in the Aviation Security Act, which tasks the agency with broad authority to
maintain security of both aviation and “all other modes.” TSA has used this broad legislative
mandate to become active in the security of local rail transit. The extent of TSA’s role in transit
security has evolved rapidly with the creation of the agency in 2002 to build upon what the
FTA, FRA, APTA, and other organizations have been doing from the standpoint of security. In
the aftermath of 9/11, a great deal of “good work done in haste” was accomplished by these
entities, according to Thompson. Meanwhile, some additional clarification of roles and
responsibilities has developed, due in part to legislative mandates that have served to help
define expectations for TSA.
The primary means by which TSA acts to enhance the security of local transit systems is to
concentrate on the intermodal and interactive aspects of such systems, with the underlying
principle being to avoid “hardening” one potential target at the expense of another by
diverting potential threats to other target and modes. A key underlying principle in this
endeavor is to balance the need for security with the viability of transit systems. The potential
fiscal fragility of these systems is acknowledged in TSA’s efforts to enhance security, therefore
making it unlikely that costly security requirements will be foisted upon local systems absent
the funding necessary to implement them. To date, despite its legislative authority to do so,
TSA has eschewed the promulgation of transit-security regulations, but some may be
forthcoming if it is apparent that the security of local agencies will benefit from them. TSA
did recently issue a set of extremely generic regulations regarding local transit security
directives. In fact, the FTA has been more active in this realm, as will be discussed below.
Although specific budgetary and manpower allocations were not available for this report,
interviews with TSA officials strongly suggest that the vast majority of the agency’s current
efforts are on airline passenger safety. With respect to public transit, the TSA focus is on
operational security initiatives rather than on facility design and environment. The DHS grant
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program for improving rail and transit security in urban areas has awarded or allocated over
$115 million since May 2003, some of which may have been devoted to a transit environment
focus. TSA has facilitated an analysis of the threats and vulnerabilities of transit systems, and
has provided grant funds for sharing the costs of enhancing local transit security systems; these
efforts might be construed as potentially useful in the area of transit design. Thompson
suggested that the TSA-hosted “transit security roundtables” conducted at various regional
settings across the nation might also provide a contribution.
The gradual historic shift from the old “pillar” style of transit station (for example, the New
York subway system) to the more contemporary open style (for example, BART in the San
Francisco Bay Area) is clearly superior from a safety standpoint, and perhaps from a security
standpoint as well. According to Brian O’Malley, the 2004 Madrid attacks would have been
much more deadly had they occurred within the confines of a more closed station. In this
respect, the newer light rail transit stops (which tend to be above ground and open) may prove
to be safer in the event of such an attack. The issue of design for security is new territory for
the TSA and others endeavoring to envision a more secure transit environment.
More generally, TSA is struggling with the “entire panoply” of the terrorist threat to
transportation, said O’Malley. Many aspects of transit design that were once taken for granted
must now be reconsidered. For example, redundancies in transit systems were traditionally
thought by many to be inefficient. Now they are being reconsidered as possibly useful for
helping to maintain system operations in the wake of an attack.
Yet answers to the questions posed by the threat of terror attacks on transit systems are not
readily quantified. If a system is to be redesigned, or a design improvement to be effected at
significant cost, how can the costs and benefits be reconciled against the unknown likelihood
and impact of a terror attack? The uncertainty inherent in the problems posed by such threats
has forced TSA to take a relatively measured approach to policy making in this area. By
contrast, enhancements to the security of transit system operations can be made relatively
simply (although not necessarily cheaply).
Perhaps the activity most relevant to enhancement of transit security design is currently
underway at TSA’s Mass Transit Infrastructure Security office, and entails the study of the
possible implementation of countermeasures to terrorist actions. Considerable efforts have
been made with respect to planning and studying such measures, which would actually
discourage the instigation and/or enhance the mitigation of terror attacks. However, according
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to O’Malley, sufficient resources have not yet been committed to implementing these
measures. Evidently a critical mass of commitment to the idea of countermeasures does not yet
exist at the policy making level. So, most of the effort is currently aimed at doing vulnerability
assessments with relatively little being done to actively counteract the threats or weaknesses
that are identified. More resources, therefore, are needed for mitigation measures to become a
reality.
The countermeasures under consideration at TSA include a range of technologies that could
mitigate and/or discourage terrorist attacks. According to TSA officials, it may be entirely
possible to render bombs and chemical/biological attacks harmless. However, these measures
need to be integrated into the design of transit facilities and cannot be readily retrofitted into
them. Such measures, however, would likely be more effective in the context of smaller,
Madrid-style attacks than massive “doomsday” attacks. At least until recently, according to
O’Malley, TSA’s efforts have been more focused on the latter.
In sum, although the Madrid attacks appear to have spurred significant response in the local
transit realm generally at TSA/DHS, interviews with TSA officials suggest that to date most
of that activity has been directed at the security of local rail transit operations and
consequently, relatively few concrete results have been achieved in the area of transit system
design.

Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
Although it lacks the regulatory authority of the TSA, the FTA’s role in transit security—and
specifically the safety and security environment of public transit—is in some ways deeper and
more direct. Perhaps due to its institutional focus on and experience with transit, the FTA is
active in pursuing research into the design of transit facilities, promulgating possible
regulations for the design of such facilities, providing local transit agencies with technical
assistance, and interacting with TSA and other federal agencies in these efforts.
With respect to research, FTA’s Office of Research Management is engaged in a study looking
at the design of transit facilities in light of the potential for terrorism. This entails an analysis
of the planning and design side of transit to see how different practices, procedures, and
features could prevent incidents from occurring. Such efforts may also facilitate emergency
responses to incidents as they do occur and facilitate the recovery of systems in the event of a
terrorist attack.
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Rhonda Crawley, Team Leader for the FTA’s Safety and Security Research, said that the agency
has partnered with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) and the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) to research a chemical agent detection
program in a project titled “PROTECT” that has funded research at Drexel University’s
transportation center for bio-agent detection and filtration. Additionally, an intrusion
detection project was underway at MBTA as of June 2004 to pilot a test system to prevent
unauthorized access to bus tunnels. Congress has also earmarked $6.9 million in FTA funds for
Florida Atlantic University (and a consortium of Florida universities) to use visual and virtual
engineering techniques to test the design of transit facilities with respect to security. Florida
transit properties will also participate. These techniques will enable visual simulation of
transit facilities before they are built, rebuilt, or retrofitted.
The research being conducted at FTA has several components, including one that deals with
transit infrastructure. It also touches on communications systems, including emergency
communications systems and access management. FTA is looking at systems integration in
terms of networking these things together to complement one another and to provide a higher
level of security while at the same time facilitating the operations and efficiency of local transit
systems.
FTA’s assistance to local transit agencies is aimed at trying to standardize practices and provide
support such that the agencies are prepared for a possible attack and can share information
with one another, Crawley indicated. The goal is to identify best practices and their
dissemination to other agencies in similar circumstances. More generically, FTA conducted
threat and vulnerability assessments for the thirty-seven largest transit properties and
provided on-site technical assistance to the fifty largest ones. In New York City, the rebuilding
of PATH and MTA subway stations damaged or destroyed on 9/11 is being overseen by FTA to
include design for security. This consists of hiring consultants who will review the work done
by local operators and their contractors in rebuilding the stations.
However, the security needs of local transit agencies vary widely, and each agency needs to
look at its circumstance and determine what efforts make the most sense. Some local agencies
are undertaking major expansion programs, including building new facilities, new stations,
and so on. Those agencies have a different set of opportunities (and challenges) than
organizations with large, installed infrastructure that have been operational for decades.
Agencies that have been operating for long periods of time on large, extensive networks have a
whole different set of constraints and realities than do systems that are expanding anew.
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Consequently, each agency has to develop its own security approach, again based on its current
state, threats and vulnerabilities, and financial status. FTA recognizes that transit agencies are
not equally capable from a financial standpoint, and as agencies develop their strategies, they
have to base them around the resources that they have available. Lewis Clopton, Director of
Research Management at the FTA Office of Research Management, said that “from a national
standpoint the federal government can’t define a solution and expect it to be incorporated by
everybody. It’s not a one-size-fits-all kind of issue…it’s a matter of generating alternatives,
processes, and approaches that agencies can apply to where they are.”
Although TSA/DHS has primary regulatory authority, FTA is developing security-related
guidelines for the construction of transit facilities, although these guidelines are not being
developed as regulations. Several interviewees stated that the diversity of transit agencies and
their milieus makes it impractical and undesirable to promulgate uniform regulations on a
national scale. Said Clopton, “One agency may be able to look at hardening facilities; one
agency may be able to look at how to locate and how to position things on site; whereas
another agency may have to rely more upon softer measures in terms of security enforcement to
achieve the same kinds of outcomes.” So these guidelines—which were expected to be in draft
form in late 2004—simply inform transit operators of design alternatives and allow local
agencies to determine which alternatives fit their situation.
Comments from officials at TSA suggest that efforts to enhance security environments may at
times conflict with the more traditional goal of crime prevention. Said Clopton, “Although
the threat of terrorism is real, if you spend a lot of money and put in place a lot of practices
which have no immediate utility, you’ve got a question of convincing an agency that it’s worth
doing those sorts of things when they have other more pressing needs up front. If we can show
that these things have benefits that go beyond being prepared for what may be a very
unfortunate occurrence but is by no means a certainty...” Thus, FTA officials hope to make
security suggestions that can leverage at least some benefits relative to safety, improved
operational efficiency, and attracting riders as a byproduct.
According to Clopton, the process of attempting to quantify these efforts to both heighten
security and achieve efficiencies is highly challenging, given the number of different (and
possibly conflicting) objectives:
You have to look at each issue and the particulars. An emergency situation is not
just a terrorist situation. An emergency situation can be a significant accident or
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another kind of emergency occurrence on a vehicle or in a transit system. From the
security standpoint, these communication kinds of things do have a broad impact.
On the other hand, we don’t want to issue requirements for emergency
communications that don’t complement an agency that’s getting ready to go out
and acquire a new communications system. If an agency is getting ready to go out
and acquire a new communications system, the emergency communication needs to
be a driving requirement in the decision as to what to acquire. The same could be
said for a number of other areas. In some cases, we’re pointing to how to quantify
some of these things, but it really depends on the particular situation that you’re
looking at.
Despite the fact that multiple agencies are working in this area, those interviewed from federal
and national organizations were unanimous in their opinion that interagency coordination is
occurring smoothly. Some commented that this was in part due to the fact that officials are
working together on a personal, frequently face-to-face basis. Clopton cited the example of the
effort to create secure credentials for transit workers:
TSA is clearly going to be in the lead for establishing that requirement [for identity
cards]. And the question is essentially going to be what are going to be the
particulars of technology and the particulars of background checks and the
particulars of application. We’re addressing some of the issues relative to the
particulars of application in terms of secured spaces versus nonsecured spaces and
how that identity card will tie into permitting access to various privileges within
the system. So we’re addressing the operational side of the card assuming that TSA
will eventually issue a requirement for such an instrument to be adopted by all
transit agencies.
Similar cooperation has been achieved with the APTA and CTAA, as well as the FRA,
according to Clopton:
We’re trying to make sure that anything that we do has a reality check such that
the industry finds it useful and the industry finds it to have some utility. And any
recommendations that we make we hope have gone through this kind of reality
testing with various industry groups as we go ahead. We’ve also been working to
some degree in keeping the FRA advised of the work that we’re doing because on
the commuter side they become very important there. We’re going to be reaching
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out more to the engineering/design community…the people that actually design
and plan these systems in the coming year to make sure that those communities
review the work that we’re doing before we adopt them as official FTA practices
and so on… We’ve got to reach out to a fairly diverse and broad community to
discuss these things before we issue any kind of recommendation about how it
should be done.
Coordination is also proceeding at the local transit agency level, although funding for such
agencies is clearly a hindrance as many recently have been scaling back operations as a result of
the recent recession, trying to identify what are their core functions so they can keep those
going in a time of fiscal challenge. Additionally, the assumption of vulnerability to a terrorist
threat varies by locality. “Different agencies may have different perceptions about how
vulnerable they may be,” commented Clopton.
In sum, the FTA’s effort to enhance the security of local transit environments is a work in
progress. Technical assistance is perhaps the most tangible reflection of this effort, although
draft guidelines for transit facility designs (at the time of the interviews) were due to appear
sometime soon. FTA is attempting to provide helpful advice and guidelines that stand the test
of the complicated reality of the diverse local rail transit environment. The FTA has also
provided significant support, worked closely with the transit industry, and developed many
resources, including funding programs through the National Transit Institute and the Volpe
Center.

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
The FRA has regulatory authority over freight and commuter (“heavy”) railroad systems. Its
general safety and security role is to ensure public safety in commuter rail, with security being
a significant component of that duty. More specifically, FRA is involved in ensuring transit
security in the following ways:
• Fosters emergency planning for security among local rail systems, including a regulatory
function over local rail systems—its regional offices conduct audits of local preparedness
and security.
• Shares information with local rail systems, including participation in the National-Joint
Terrorism Task Force (which also includes representatives from various federal, state, and
local law enforcement officials).
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• Participates in Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ST-ISAC),
a consortium of agencies that share information about terrorism threats, incidents, and
other information.
The primary means by which the FRA acts to enhance the security of local rail systems is
information sharing, a role similar to and shared with that of the FTA. This includes some of
the activities listed above, as well as offering training in transit security to local transit law
enforcement personnel. FRA also assists the FTA in ensuring that federal grants to transit
agencies include appropriate provisions for security uses.
Some security policy initiatives originate from within the FRA, particularly those that are
linked to some specific threat. The focus of such initiatives is almost exclusively on security
operations (in contrast to environmental or system design considerations). According to Bill
Fagan with FRA security, this is due to the fact that most facilities are privately owned and
most consist of older infrastructure that cannot readily be modified to address emerging
security threats. The FRA does offer guidance to the railroads on building design and is
considering changing these guidelines to reflect the latest research and information. However,
such changes must clear standard regulatory hurdles and are not immediately forthcoming.
Rail systems are quite often easily accessible to the general public and the FRA has therefore
focused much more on the operations side of security enhancement.
Fagan said that, to date, FRA officials are satisfied that the coordinated efforts of the FRA and
other agencies comprise a “synchronized effort between industry, labor, government, and trade
associations,” resulting in effective information sharing and thereby enhancing the safety of
commuter rail transit systems. Yet relatively little concrete progress has been achieved in the
area of transit facility design and environments.

American Public Transportation Association (APTA)
APTA is a transit industry organization with a membership of over 1,500 transit agencies and
business representatives from across the United States. The organization historically has served
as an interface between operators and the federal government; this liaison role is even more
significant with the issue of transit security. Greg Hull, APTA’s director of operations, safety,
and security programs, says that the agency has actively engaged individuals in various federal
agencies working on security issues, particularly DHS and TSA, in order to educate them
about public transit. According to Hull, APTA has used a Transit 101 presentation with the
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message that their organization—not the federal government—has the real expertise in
transit. APTA involves the transit industry in all important stages of planning:
They [the federal government] may have the expertise in terms of security
development for certain perspectives, and certainly they have the funds and the
legislative mandate. But the bottom line is that if there are any directions or
mandates to the transit industry…the only way that those things can be successful
is by engaging us at a very early stage so that the industry can have proper buy-in
and actually have a hand in the development of any such standards that might come
forward.
One of APTA’s strongest federal partnerships has been with the FTA, due in part to the funds
available through the agency to develop a wide range of programs and support services. Just
days after September 11, 2001, APTA sent the FTA a listing of key areas and immediate needs
both within operations and capital programs. In the program development that followed,
APTA populated working groups formed by the FTA. Hull described the relationship between
the FTA and DHS, and in particular TSA, as evolving now that TSA has been given the lead
role in addressing security-related issues in transportation modes of all types; the FTA will
play more of a support role for TSA as opposed to taking the lead as they had in the past.
APTA also has worked with the FRA on various transit security issues. Hull cited the example
of APTA’s involvement in the development of standards for commuter rail systems. The
organization had not participated in this aspect of transit safety and security management and
operations until about six years ago. After a series of incidents in the commuter railroad
industry, the FRA sought to develop standards through collaborative discussions. APTA
worked with the FRA to establish what are known as “Passenger Rail Equipment Safety
Standards,” or PRESS Standards. APTA has now created approximately 100 standards for the
rail-transit industry and recently became engaged in the development of standards for bus
operations as well; last year APTA also became established as a standards development
organization, a new role for the organization.
In addition, for the past several years APTA has assisted the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) with a series of studies about the government’s attention to security issues,
particularly transit security. These include reports about the roles and activities of FTA and
TSA relative to the needs of the transit industry, with recommendations put forth to provide
better guidance to those administrations.
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Hull says that there are “tools that enhance security and we certainly see more of the transit
agencies moving towards introducing a variety of technologies,” but he emphasizes two
particular security strategies: training and emergency preparedness drills. The first includes
the formal training of transit staff and also outreach to transit customers—“the whole concept
of having a broad network of eyes and ears and voices that will look for and let us know when
they see something that just doesn’t seem right.”
In terms of understanding the threat of transit terrorism at the local level, Hull acknowledges
that perspectives on the level of risk and threat vary widely. However, he argues, perhaps
reflecting the breadth of his organization’s membership, that the threat is pervasive regardless
of whether the transit system is located in a large metropolitan area or a small one:
Some of us might argue that it doesn’t matter where you are. I mean, look at
Oklahoma City. This isn’t just Al Qaeda we’re dealing with. There are domestic
terrorists, there are people who have political missions, there are people who are
wackos, there are people who are copycats, and so it doesn’t matter, from my
perspective, it doesn’t matter where you are located, whether in Pocatello, Idaho, or
Washington, D.C….it doesn’t matter what city you live in or what town you live
in, there is a need to address these issues.
Hull also argues that agencies need to address requirements in all modes—from subways to
buses—and he says that transit terrorism is not confined to the largest population centers.
However, he acknowledges that practically and realistically, when making decisions about
security using a risk management approach, local agencies carrying the most passengers do
pose the greatest vulnerabilities.
Agency coordination and the dissemination of information are also crucial, says Hull. Very few
people in the transit industry, even among the police forces, have security clearances. He says
that after 9/11, APTA realized that the transit industry and federal transportation agencies
needed to access security intelligence information. Transit agencies in major cities usually had
good working relationships with the FBI through established joint terrorism task forces.
However, this was not the case across the board. The DOT designated APTA a sector
coordinator for establishing a Public Transit Information Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC), part
of the umbrella Surface Transportation ISAC, and APTA worked on this project through an
FTA grant. Hull says that APTA used the grant to contract with a company based in Virginia:
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They have on staff, those people who have backgrounds, past careers with the FBI
and Department of Defense. They have top-level security clearances. And they are
able to glean through sources of information and package it in a manner that’s
meaningful to the transit industry. We are now in the process of connecting all
transit agencies within this ISAC to be able to access this information.
Hull says the flow of information is from the ISAC out to transit agencies, but there is also a
push to have agencies input their own information into the intelligence system:
If an agency experiences a certain degree of trespassing, they might see that as kids
getting into the train yards or something. But maybe it’s part of something that’s
more of a trend in the industry and that becomes good information that needs to be
analyzed and disseminated out to the industry.
The direct exchange of information among agencies is also a priority for APTA and something
it helps facilitate:
We get the permission of the transit agencies to share whatever the best practice
might be. It might be something like preventive maintenance, it might be a design
concept in a facility, it might the way that staff are utilized for safety and security.
Our industry has historically and continues to be very supportive of one another.
One of the things that has occurred is that, where prior to 9/11 we saw more
agencies more willing to share their security plans, now that’s a little more closely
guarded. They may share those plans with one another, but it would be eye-to-eye
and hand-to-hand as opposed to what we may have seen in prior years. But there’s a
very, very open sharing of information within the system.
Hull acknowledges that transit security is happening in an international context. As such, the
organization has formal partnerships with other transit industry groups around the world: the
Canadian Urban Transit Association, the International Union of Public Transport (based in
Brussels), the Latin American Association of Underground Networks and Subways
(ALAMYS), and the Cooperation for the Continuing Development of Urban and Suburban
Transportation (CODATU), based in Paris and representing transit systems in developing
nations. A couple of years ago, APTA invited these associations and some of their prime
agency members to meet with them in Washington. The goal was to share information about
program development and relationships with government agencies. Hull says that APTA
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representatives continue to share information with these other groups, and they invite each
other to special conferences and workshops on security.

Transit Operators in the Northeastern United States
The New York metropolitan area is home to, by far, the largest network of public transit
systems in the country. New York accounted for 39 percent of all transit trips taken in the
entire United States in 2002, and 31 percent of all U.S. transit trips that same year were
carried by just one system, the MTA-New York City Transit.107
While the venue of the 9/11 attacks was the air transport system, their effect on New York’s
public transit systems was dramatic and long-lasting and profoundly tested the ability of
transit staff to respond to a major crisis. Given New York’s dominant role in U.S. public
transit and its recent experience with an extraordinary terrorist attack, it is the venue for one of
our case studies. Accordingly, this section reports on findings from interviews with several
transit security officials at major agencies in the northeastern United States, including the
New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), the Port Authority Trans-Hudson
(PATH), and Amtrak.
Security staff remain extremely concerned about the possibility of transit terrorism on their
systems. Chief John O’Connor at Amtrak believes that the threat of terrorism on transit
systems is “very real and that it is a question of when rather than if.” For O’Connor, 9/11 was a
galvanizing force, but it had started to fade somewhat. The events in Madrid in March 2004
brought the issue of transportation security back to the forefront and “now for most transit
agencies it’s one of their top priorities, if not the top.” Officials are concerned about the
publicity as a terrorist target that transit is getting after the events of Moscow and Madrid.
Attention is now focused on rail and stations such as Penn Station and Grand Central
Station—large multimodal facilities and landmarks—that are considered targets of particular
concern.
Passenger outreach and awareness is a strategy that many transit operators in the New York
City area consider extremely important. At PATH, flyers about security are put out at stations
and monitors flash messages that say, “Be Alert.” The agency trains all employees and
contractors about security awareness and “everyone knows what to look for, and if they do see
something, how to respond.” William Morange of the MTA believes that rider and employee
awareness is the most effective transit security strategy. He notes that the executive director of
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MTA had an “If you see something, say something” program in place before 9/11 “where if
you see something that’s not kosher—the way it should look—report it to the conductors,
report it to the motormen… Now calls are going up, but it’s worth it for us.”
Policing strategies changed in some transit agencies in New York after the events in Madrid.
At PATH, police started using patrol tactics that included scrutinizing the areas between
parked cars and in station vestibules, as well as looking at unoccupied cars at terminal stations.
In addition, the agency started using more undercover police and also began flooding different
parts of the system with police at varying times of the day and night. After the Tokyo sarin
incident, PATH police organized an elite group, the Emergency Services Unit. Half of this
group was trained in chemical incident response at Fort McClellan in Alabama. Martha Gulick
of PATH indicated that this was the first civilian or nonarmed forces group to be trained at
Fort McClellan. This unit provides rapid response in the event of a Tokyo-type attack on the
PATH system, whereas the response time of federal teams is seen by those interviewed as
unacceptably long.
Transit operators in the New York metropolitan area are not strangers to environmental design
as a security strategy. Security staff at the agencies feel that design elements are extremely
important and ideally should be addressed during the actual building of facilities. Said one
transit security official, “We’ve now incorporated security in the designs and boilerplates.
Whereas at one time if you were going to construct a station, you would have only had to do
safety: fire suppression, fire and life safety, ventilation, lighting, fire alarms. But now there’s a
security piece that gets incorporated.” By including security as an integral part of the design
process, agencies can avoid costly and sometimes impossible station retrofits and redesigns. At
PATH, environmental design strategies have included, among other things, removing trash
cans, locking down the seats in cars (which were not secured prior to 9/11), taking out recessed
telephones, eliminating nooks and crannies, and installing access controls on all doors. Gulick
notes security by design is an underlying philosophy at the new World Trade Center Terminal,
and FTA expects this to be a model for new construction around the country.
Amtrak’s O’Connor says that after 9/11, the agency took some steps to put environmental
design features into place. At the major stations, barricades and CCTV systems were installed
with no major renovations to the stations. In terms of design features for the future, O’Connor
suggests that agencies will have to think about creating “secure zones” where people are
screened and checked before they enter boarding areas, particularly for intercity trains.
However, he acknowledges that this type of system is difficult to implement in the transit
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environment with people coming and going quickly. He also pointed to the Washington,
D.C., Metro system as one of the best in terms of environmental design with its clear sight
lines and few nooks and crannies. He adds that it is not extremely well lit, but it is bright
enough that people feel comfortable in it.
One transit official points out that security decisions should involve more than just security
staff because these procedures affect many facets of the system outside of security itself:
…As the security people come up with ideas that may not fit, if you have
operations people sitting there, that’s better. We have to reach some sort of a
balance, some sort of a medium. How do we stop trains, how do we do inspections,
but weave it into the regular fabric of our operations so our customers hardly
notice?
He goes on to describe an example of a situation where security impacts smooth system
operations, which then leads to other potential safety and security problems:
If we have a suspicious package, what is the procedure to deal with it? We try to
minimize the delay to the train while still answering the concern... Because when
you start delaying trains, you create another safety problem as more trains get
backed up. Now you’re creating a service disruption. In Penn Station or Grand
Central, many of the subway stations where they have such volume, just delaying a
train or two, you can lose a station. We end up having to shut down things. And
then you get thousands and thousands of people in a panic situation wondering,
‘What’s going on? Why am I being evacuated?’ Once you can’t run trains, you can’t
let people into the station because you have a crush load.
This is a common tension transit security officials face—how to implement security strategies
and maintain an effective level of security, while keeping the system running smoothly.
This discussion points to an ongoing issue faced by transit security officials: balancing the
security of their systems with other operations and management objectives. Says Gulick,
“Inspecting bags is not conducive to operating a rapid transit [system]. Explosive detection
technology is out there, but to do it would increase the dwell time, taking the rapid out of
transit. That’s unacceptable in our business.” However, O’Connor at Amtrak does not see
security and effective system operations as mutually exclusive goals. Rather, he believes that
they are intertwined, with secure environments bolstering ridership: “If people do not feel safe
and secure, they won’t use the system; they’ll avoid it if possible… If you allow the system to
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fall into disorder and decay, it will definitely affect your ridership.” Thus, operators are aware
that weighing the costs and benefits of system security overall, as well as of particular
measures, is a complex process and includes variables that can be difficult to quantify.
How do transit security officials in the New York area measure the effectiveness of security
strategies? How do they decide which strategies to pursue, given the wide range of possible
measures? Gulick says that at PATH there is an attempt to quantify reductions in risk and
vulnerability as part of the mitigation project. They recently implemented a risk management
and vulnerability assessment software package that evaluates terrorist threats for a particular
site. It is a Department of Defense program modified for civilian use. Gulick says that as
PATH and other Port Authority businesses put different security programs into action, they
will be putting that information into this program. The software will actually document and
demonstrate the effectiveness of mitigation measures. However, she points out that “from a
cost-effectiveness standpoint, you don’t necessarily go for the cheapest technology. You want to
go for technology that is going to work on your system.”
O’Connor says that all security strategies are important, and the distinction is between shortterm and longer-term strategies: “On a day-to-day basis, your focus is on operations, police
deployment, both prevention and response. Long-term, you need to set goals and design
activities to help achieve those goals. You need to plan long term capital improvement that
will help you achieve those goals. And you have to constantly—daily, weekly, quarterly,
yearly—measure the effectiveness of your strategies and tactics to see if they are in fact
achieving those goals.”
Transit security officials in New York describe a significant amount of interagency
cooperation, not just in the New York area but in the Northeast corridor generally. O’Connor
of Amtrak says that his agency deals with the MBTA in Boston, the Connecticut Department
of Transportation, the Long Island Railroad, New Jersey Transit, the Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Agency (SEPTA), and the Maryland Rail Commuter (MARC).
Some of these agencies have their own police departments and others do not; some agencies
provide security services for others. In a place such as Penn Station, there is a
multijurisdictional structure where the station is owned by Amtrak and Amtrak patrols the
majority of the facility. Long Island Railroad leases a portion and the MTA police patrol the
lower level. Finally, the street level and subway entrances are policed by the New York Police
Department (NYPD).
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Gulick says that PATH has very good relationships with municipal fire services, police, and
emergency medical service providers. Gulick described a large meeting that included PATH,
the New Jersey State Police, New York Police, fire departments, Coast Guard, Office of
Emergency Management staff, and chemical response teams “just to discuss the potential
threats that were concerns for the last holiday season. It pays dividends because, if they have
issues, they are very comfortable picking up the phone and saying, ‘Have you considered…?’
and vice versa if we need to reach out to them.” PATH has also bridged the gap between
transit agencies and intelligence agencies. The Port Authority Police sit on the Joint Terrorism
Task Forces of both New York and New Jersey. These bodies serve to connect the FBI and local
law enforcement so any intelligence from the FBI is accessible to security officials at PATH. In
addition to these domestic collaborations, transit security officials mentioned meeting with
their international counterparts in Tokyo, London, Moscow, Madrid, and Israel to learn about
past incidents and to share best practices information.

Conclusions
This section has provided an overview of the efforts of organizations in the United States—
federal agencies, industry organizations, and a sample of key transit operators in metropolitan
areas of the northeastern United States—to maintain and enhance the security of local rail
transit system design and environments. The bulk of federal efforts currently appear to be
focused on the challenges with intelligence, policing, and emergency responses. Officials
perceive that security operations produce the quickest and perhaps most noticeable results. As
several officials who were interviewed commented, it is extremely difficult to quantify the
costs and benefits of the various strategies for enhancing transit security. However, whereas the
rush to increase security via policing and surveillance is probably warranted, it is possible that
the longer-term potential benefits from changes in the design of local transit facilities may be
shortchanged in the process. Additionally, the impact of the recent rash of terrorist attacks on
foreign transit systems appears to have caused an increased shift in efforts to secure local
transit, but the nature of this shift makes it difficult to forecast the evolving roles of federal
agencies in this arena.
Those federal initiatives that are being directed toward the transit system design are either
currently under development (such as FTA’s guidelines for transit facility design) or in the
planning and research stages (such as implementation of potential countermeasures at transit
sites). Thus the implications of these efforts for the future design of transit facilities are
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difficult to predict. However, federal initiatives are being undertaken to address the diverse set
of conditions under which local transit agencies operate and are managed.
One of the more positive developments in this regard is the amount of cooperation that
appears to be occurring among federal and local agencies. Federal interviewees were
unanimous in their view that relatively little in the way of “turf battles” was occurring as
agencies juggle their evolving and, in some cases, newly acquired roles and responsibilities,
although industry and local agencies’ representatives also raised concerns over increasingly
underfunded federal mandates. The contributions of nongovernmental industry organizations,
particularly APTA, deserve special mention in this regard. APTA has assisted each of the
agencies discussed in this section in a variety of ways, including cooperation in the
development of the ISAC, which facilitates the sharing of security-related information among
transit and government agencies. APTA and transit operators in the United States also appear
eager to foster these relationships, both in the domestic and international contexts.
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CASE STUDIES OF CONTEMPORARY TERRORIST INCIDENTS
Some of the security measures that we can apply to station design are the result of lessons
learned by transit agencies that have experienced terrorist incidents. There have been hundreds
of terrorist attacks on rail systems throughout the twentieth century.108 These have ranged in
severity from mere threats causing evacuation and service disruptions to sabotage resulting in
property damage to large-scale attacks inflicting injuries and fatalities. A chronology of these
incidents can be found in Appendix A. This section consists of case studies of five terrorist or
quasiterrorist campaigns that inflicted serious property damage, injuries, or fatalities:
1. The IRA (Irish Republican Army) bombings against the London rail system—early 1970s
to mid-1990s, London
2. The Fulton Street Station fire bombing—December 21, 1994, New York City
3. The sarin chemical agent release on the Tokyo subway—March 20, 1995, Tokyo
4. The GIA (Armed Islamic Group) bombings on the Paris rail system—July 1995 through
December 1996
5. Al Qaeda’s attack on the RENFE (La Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Españoles) subway
system—March 11, 2004, Madrid
These case studies were chosen because of their severity and high visibility, and because they
targeted five major transit systems of the world. Additionally, these incidents span a range of
geographic areas, including Europe, North America, and Asia. The IRA attacks were a
prolonged campaign that lasted from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s and terrorized British
rail passengers. The Fulton Street Station bombing was the second bombing by the
perpetrator and had unique characteristics in comparison to the other three case studies,
because the bomb was an incendiary device. The sarin chemical agent release was the first time
a chemical weapon of mass destruction was utilized by a terrorist group in a major attack. The
Paris bombing campaign was similar in nature to the IRA campaign, but much shorter in
duration, lasting a couple of years in the mid-1990s. Finally, the Madrid attack was the first
time Al Qaeda’s new brand of global terrorism hit a major railway system.
This section discusses each of the five case studies, describing the events and identifying the
key design elements that had a significant impact on the response, recovery, and mitigation of
the effects of the terrorist attack. Primary sources of information for this section were drawn
from interviews with transit officials in London, New York, Tokyo, Paris, and Madrid.
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Additionally, a full array of secondary sources was utilized that included books, reports, and
newspaper articles written about the different incidents. We should note that the literature on
each of these attacks is rather scarce when it comes to the role of design in mitigating or
aggravating the impact of the terrorist incident. Therefore, much information had to be drawn
from sources written for other purposes, such as news articles, medical journals, and historical
narratives.

IRA Bombing Campaign: London
(For maps of London’s Underground system, please see http://www.tfl.gov.uk/tube/maps.)

Incident Description
The Irish Republican Army conducted a bombing campaign in London and Ireland that lasted
over twenty years; the London campaign in particular lasted from the early 1970s to the mid1990s. Starting in Northern Ireland in 1969, their terrorist campaign moved to London in
February 1973 with several coordinated car bombings. According to Coogan (1995) and
Taylor (1997), the terrorists hoped to bring the reality of “the troubles” of the north to the
British people. IRA members began targeting British rail facilities in September 1973. After
that, they bombed or attempted to bomb stations and trains in London no less than twentytwo times. The following is a timeline of the attacks that occurred on London’s underground
rail network.
Chronology of IRA Bombings on London’s Rail Network (Source: Jenkins 1997)

9/8/1973

Bomb explodes at Victoria Station (1 injury, 0 fatalities)

9/8/1973

Bomb explodes at King’s Cross and Euston stations (13 injuries, 0 fatalities)

10/9/1975

Bomb explodes at entrance of Green Park Station (20 injuries, 1 fatality)

2/12/1976

Bomb defused at Oxford Circus Station

3/4/1976

Bomb explodes on commuter train minutes after Cannon Street Station stop

3/15/1976

West Ham Station explosion (1 injury, 2 fatalities)

3/18/1976

Wood Green Station bombing (1 injury, 0 fatalities)

2/18/1991

Victoria and Paddington stations bombed (43 injuries, 1 fatality)

8/29/1991

Incendiary devices found under seats of subway train
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12/16/1991 Bombing near Clapham Junction Station (0 injuries, 0 fatalities)
12/23/1991 Incendiary devices found hidden on commuter train
1/30/1992

Firebomb found under seat of subway car

2/7/1992

Incendiary device ignited on the subway tracks at Barking (0 injuries,
0 fatalities)

Almost all attacks were preceded by a warning of some kind. The IRA’s alleged primary
strategy was to cause disruption and damage, not fatalities. Therefore, they claimed that the
injuries and fatalities that occurred were the fault of the British Transport Police, who did not
heed their warnings and evacuate the system. The relatively small number of injuries and
fatalities was not, however, entirely a result of IRA’s advanced warning. Many disasters were
averted because of increased vigilance and systematic interpretation of bomb threats on the
part of the transit police. Most of the time, the warnings were deliberately vague and often
resulted in no bomb at all. Of 6,500 bomb threats between 1991 and 1997, fewer than one
hundred were considered serious and of those, only forty-one required evacuation.109
The incidents that caused the greatest amount of injury were the Victoria Station bombing on
February 18, 1991, which injured forty-three and killed one person, and the London Bridge
Station bombing on February 28, 1992, which injured twenty-eight. The Victoria Station
bombing was preceded by a bomb that exploded at Paddington Station at 4:20 a.m. This
bomb exploded early enough that there were no injuries. It is likely that this bomb was some
sort of warning for the explosions that followed. At 7:00 a.m., the IRA called and said that in
40 minutes, bombs would explode in all eleven of the mainline British Rail stations, but there
was not adequate time for the police to check each of the stations. At 7:45 a.m., a bomb
exploded in a metal trash can on the crowded main concourse of Victoria Station, sending
shrapnel throughout the platform. The explosive used was one or two pounds of Semtex-H,
with a 60-minute timer. The bomb had been hidden in a trash can near an automatic ticket
machine close to phone booths, planters, and concession stands. Much of the shrapnel that
injured the passengers was metal and glass from the facilities.110 The survivors of the blast
were taken out of the station through the main entrance, which was 150 feet away from the
site of the blast.111
The London Bridge Station bomb attack was quite similar. At 8:20 a.m., a man called an Irish
television station to state that a bomb had been left in a station. Within 10 minutes, the bomb
exploded in the London Bridge Station men’s restroom. Again, it was probably a two-pound
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charge of Semtex-H that was set on a timer. The bomb blew shards of metal and glass through
the platform. Most of the injuries were a result of the flying debris.112
Both attacks demonstrate common tactics and results. They were preceded by a telephone
warning indicating that bombs would explode. The time was perhaps sufficient to evacuate
the system, but not to find the hidden bombs. Nevertheless, the railway authority did not
proceed with evacuation, but took a calculated risk and lost. In fact, British Transport Police
officers were searching Victoria Station when the bomb went off. After the Victoria Station
bombing, all the stations’ trash cans were removed. This forced the terrorists to place their
bomb in the bathroom of the London Bridge Station, where it was potentially more visible.
Both incidents caused major, albeit temporary, disruption in transit service. The Victoria
Station bombing caused British Rail to close all its mainline rail stations in London for the
first time in its history. The London Bridge bombing also resulted in a temporary closure of
the system. In both cases, service resumed later in the afternoon, but thousands of commuters
were stranded for hours during the morning rush hour.

Design and Policy Responses
The vulnerabilities of London’s rail network were exploited by the IRA as long as possible.
Jenkins argues that “a target was chosen simply because it was vulnerable, and once it was
selected, the IRA would continue to attack it for as long as circumstances permitted. London’s
vulnerable Underground met these criteria.”113 The terrorists targeted the most vulnerable
and concealed locations of the stations. In response to the IRA terrorist attacks, British Rail
took a series of measures. Just weeks before the Victoria Station bombing, storage lockers were
removed from all British Rail stations. In the absence of lockers, the most concealed location
for a bombs became trash cans. When these were removed after the Victoria Station bombing,
restrooms became the best place to conceal a bomb.114 The stations were subsequently
retrofitted so that there would be less opportunity for hiding bombs.
Most of the serious bomb threats by the IRA were successfully tackled by the police, who
found the bombs before they were detonated or evacuated the system before bombs exploded.
This is a result of careful planning, station retrofit, and execution of operational strategies to
assess risk. Dwyer outlines some of the strategies that the British Transport Police took to
effectively eliminate targeting of stations. Primarily, it put into place a comprehensive closed
circuit television (CCTV) system that covered all stations. New stations or redesigned stations
were developed so that all areas were visible to CCTV cameras. Because bombs were often left
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in poorly lit parts of the station, lighting improvements were made. Similarly, trash cans,
which typically provided hiding places for bombs, were removed from stations. Those trash
cans that were left in stations were replaced with blast-resistant cans in well-lit areas,
constantly covered by CCTV cameras and located some distance away from secondary
fragmentation sources such as windows.115
In addition, there were increased patrols of public spaces. To prevent attacks on trains, staff
were trained to inspect the seats during cleaning. They fitted tamper-evident seals to the seats
after they were checked to prevent someone from hiding something under seats. The new
rolling stock was redesigned so that there were fewer places to hide objects.
Some of the strategies utilized by the British authorities in response to railway terrorism were
summarized by Whent in 1999. They included (1) removal of trash cans; (2) use of a
coordinated and centralized CCTV system; (3) announcements on trains and in stations; (4)
the posting of notices such as “Bombs, be Alert”; (5) spatial analysis to identify possible
terrorist targets; (6) contingency planning for evacuation and re-entry; (7) regular searching to
prevent a bomb attack; and (8) a system to manage luggage left behind.
The large number of bomb threats made by the IRA made it difficult to make informed
decisions on whether to evacuate a station or to disregard the threat. British Railway
authorities employed roaming bomb response vehicles to quickly respond to bomb threats and
determine whether they were serious or a hoax. The British Transport Police utilized a
computer algorithm to analyze bomb threats and made judgments as to the credibility of those
threats based on previous threats.
In 2002’s Transportation Risk Management: A New Paradigm, Appleton reports on the risk of
evacuating stations due to bomb threats. He demonstrates that the evacuation may at times be
more dangerous to the passengers than the possibility of an explosion. There are many hazards
associated with rapidly evacuating passengers, and evacuation should only be carried out when
there is certainty of a bomb. Some guidelines that he suggests include:
1. Perform on-the-spot threat assessment of suspicious packages by train station personnel.
They must make informed decisions and their criteria must be consistent among agencies.
2. Provide bomb detection equipment at high-risk stations: many times, the equipment or
personnel take too long to arrive.
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3. Provide public information: Rather than encouraging the public to report suspicious
luggage, encourage them to be cautious not to leave their luggage behind.
The previously outlined measures and strategies effectively eliminated the targeting of stations
in the urban core of London.116 London’s experience with the IRA is unique because it was a
long bombing campaign that spanned three decades. It is clear that the IRA chose targets
based on their vulnerability. The Underground stations and transit network were initially
perfect examples of vulnerable systems. The IRA exploited this vulnerability with two
devastating bombings and several other less severe attacks. By implementing several design
strategies such as removal and reinforcement of trash cans, improved lighting, increased video
surveillance, removal of sources of secondary fragmentation, and redesign of rolling stock,
terrorism vulnerabilities were effectively eliminated in the subway network. However, these
design strategies are not enough to deter terrorism. They must be coupled with inspection and
policing to send the message to terrorists that bombs placed in a station will be found and that
the risk associated with carrying out a terrorist attack is too great. The London experience
illustrates the benefits of a coordinated response to terrorist threats that discouraged attacks on
their system.

Fulton Street Station Firebombing: NYC
(For maps of the New York City (NYC) subway system, please see http://www.mta.nyc.ny.us/
nyct/maps/submap.htm.)
The New York City subway system has had relatively less experience with terrorism compared
to other railway systems, but it is considered a significant target. In 1916, union members
detonated dynamite on a New York train. In 1927, bombs exploded in two subway stations.
Another bomb exploded in the Times Square Station on October 30, 1960, injuring thirtythree people. A small bomb exploded on May 31, 1966, in a subway corridor, injuring two
passengers. On May 2, 1971, a fire bomb was thrown on a train as it approached a station,
injuring three people. On December 21, 1980, pipe bombs exploded in lockers at the
Pennsylvania Station causing damage, but no injuries. The transit systems were also affected
and partially destroyed by the World Trade Center attacks of 1993 and 2001, but these attacks
did not specifically target the transit system. The most significant contemporary attack on the
New York City system took place December 21, 1994, at the Fulton Street Station, when
Edward Leary detonated two fire bombs that injured fifty-one passengers.
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Incident Description
This attack is relatively minor compared to terrorist attacks on other systems and it is also,
strictly speaking, not a terrorist attack but a quasiterrorist attack. Little has been written
about it, but the details of the attack are best described in newspaper articles.117 Although the
attack is not representative of current terrorist threats, some interesting lessons can be learned.
This incident was unique in the fact that the attacker was not a part of a larger group or
movement, but was motivated by greed. Edward Leary attempted to extort money from the
New York City Transit Authority through a terror campaign that included remote-controlled
fire bombs and a rifle attack. Fortunately, he was captured before he could carry out many of
his planned attacks.
Leary’s strategy was to make fire bombs out of gasoline-filled jars rigged with timers and
detonation devices. In order to inflict the maximum possible damage, he would rig those
bombs to detonate in the tunnels below the East River. He successfully detonated two bombs
on the system, but neither worked as planned. The first bomb was left on a Number 2
Interborough Rapid Transit (IRT) train on December 15, 1994. It was presumably timed to
detonate when the train passed through the tunnel, but did not go off until about 30 minutes
later. The fire bomb partially detonated at 3:15 p.m. as the train approached the 145th Street
Station in Harlem. Two teenagers were severely burned; they were initially considered suspects
in the explosion.
On December 21, Leary boarded the southbound Number 4 train of the Lexington Avenue
IRT line. He carried a canvas bag with two jars filled with gasoline and an ignition device. As
the train pulled into the Fulton Street Station at about 1:30 p.m., Leary reached into the bag
and attempted to set the timer. The timer malfunctioned and the bomb exploded under the
seat that Leary was sitting on. There were two explosions in rapid succession. The fireball
filled the car and flames shot out of the doors as the doors opened and fed air to the flames.
Many people were on fire and smoke filled the platform. An off-duty officer who was on the
train ran to the token booth and got a fire extinguisher. He quickly put out the flames in the
car. Because of the presence of this fire extinguisher and the quick thinking of the officer, the
bomb was much less damaging than it could have been.

Emergency Response
In the end, forty-eight people were injured, seventeen were hospitalized with serious burns,
and many others were treated for smoke inhalation. The emergency response was “close to
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miraculous” according to then-Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Despite the fact that the Fulton
Street Station is a very large and cavernous station, rescuers were quickly able to react and treat
the wounded.
There was no structural damage to the station due to the explosion, but the operations of the
subway were suspended for hours. Fulton Street Station is a major transfer point, so many lines
were affected. The transit authority shut down power to some lines for a couple of hours. The
charred train was left on the tracks for several hours after the attack. This power shutdown
forced at least 100,000 passengers to use other forms of transportation in Manhattan.
Fortunately, the bombs did not explode in the tunnels under the East River; otherwise, the
impact of the explosion could have been much greater. Service resumed on all lines within
three hours of the bombing.

Design and Policy Response
Apparently the Fulton Street Station bombing was considered an isolated incident and did not
result in any major design or policy response on the part of the responsible transit authorities.
According to an official in a 2004 interview, who wished not to be identified,
Prior to 9/11, security on the New York subway system was very limited. Mostly
the measures we took on security were through police, and were mostly crimedriven. New York had had terrorist attacks such as the first World Trade Center.
There was also a threat of an attack on the Long Island Network in 1997. So we
were aware of it, but we didn’t really have much going on.
There were, however, some limited security drills in certain stations (particularly Penn
Station) for emergency preparedness and security. Also, an emergency response committee for
Penn Station was formed in 1995, which moved to consolidate three different emergency
action plans for the station (by Amtrak, New York City Transit, and New Jersey Transit) into
one cohesive document.

Sarin Chemical Agent Attack: Tokyo
(For maps of Tokyo’s Metro system, please see http://www.tokyometro.jp/network/pdf/
rosen_eng.pdf.)
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Incident Description
The leaders of the Aum Shinrikyo cult decided to attack the Tokyo subway system by releasing
the sarin agent on three Tokyo Metro subway lines, all converging on Kasumigaseki Station,
which served as the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Headquarters. The attack took place on March
20, 1995, around 8:00 a.m., during a heavily congested commute time. The cult’s original
plan was to release the sarin on six different trains, two trains on each line approaching
Kasumigaseki from different directions. The attack was planned with built-in redundancy to
enable cult members to arrive from a variety of points in the system (on the Chiyoda, Hibiya,
and Marunouchi Lines), lessening the chance of detection and enhancing the likelihood of
successful release of at least some of the chemical agent. They were not able to develop enough
of the sarin agent for all six trains, so one approach of the Chiyoda Line was eliminated.
Figure 14 illustrates the relevant Tokyo Metro subway lines and stations targeted in this
attack.

Ikebukuro

Hongo
Sanchome

Kita-Senju
Chiyoda Line
Marunouchi Line

Ueno

Hibiya Line
Akihabara

Sarin Release Station
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Shinjuku
Roppongi

Nakano
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Koenji
Ebisu
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Tsukiji
Kasumigaseki

Figure 14 Tokyo Metro Subway Map Showing Sarin Release Sites

The dispersion tools were very crude, but effective. The sarin, in liquid form, was sealed into
plastic bags, and terrorists were given two or three bags each. These bags, which contained
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about 900 milliliters of sarin each, were wrapped in newspaper and placed on the floor of five
trains. The bags were punctured by perpetrators with sharpened umbrella tips when the doors
opened at the designated station. The perpetrators then quickly exited, before being exposed
to sarin. The liquid sarin evaporated quickly and almost instantaneously began attacking the
nervous systems of those exposed. The sarin also spread to other stations on the line through
the air current generated by the trains. A large number of passengers collapsed, fainted, or
convulsed at nineteen stations. In all, twelve people (ten passengers and two Tokyo Metro
employees) died and about 5,000 were injured. The two Metro employees had carried the sarin
bag that was placed in the Chiyoda Line train car into the station office. The potential for loss
of human life was much worse. The sarin used by the cult was only about 30 percent pure. If it
had been 70 to 80 percent pure, thousands could have died and it would have taken days to
decontaminate the system.
Even after this attack, Aum Shinrikyo members still attempted to exploit the weaknesses of
the subway system. On May 5, 1995, and on July 5, 1995, members of the cult left devices
used to release cyanide gas into the station in the restrooms of Shinjuku and Kayabacho
Stations. These restrooms were chosen because they have ventilation ducts that go onto the
platform. These devices, if they had not been found and disarmed, could have potentially
caused thousands of deaths.

Emergency Response
After the attack, the entire system was shut down and evacuated. At 10:20 a.m., the National
Japanese Self Defense Force and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department Laboratory
identified the agent as sarin. This information was not shared with the other emergency
agencies until 11:00 a.m., and the hospitals were never formally notified that the agent was
sarin. Because of communication breakdowns, many of the station attendants thought they
were dealing with an isolated incident. Confusion also resulted when the train driver in the
Hibiya Line Train reported on his radio that there had been an explosion with white smoke,
which led to misinformation and confusion regarding the required response. Cross-agency
communication was a major problem in the response to this attack.118
The operation of the trains also helped to spread the sarin chemical agent. After the trains were
evacuated, the drivers left them parked by the platform with the doors open. This allowed the
spread of sarin into the stations. While the trains were traveling, most of the people opened
the windows for ventilation and went through the doors between the cars to escape the gas.
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This might have provided temporary relief, but it acted to circulate the air and spread the
sarin throughout the train.
As much as 10 percent of the injuries were a result of secondary contamination of hospital and
emergency personnel and police officers.119 The emergency services were completely
unprepared for such an incident. The first sign that something was wrong was the notification
of an explosion at Tsukiji Station. As a result, all ambulances were sent to that station. It took
ambulances over an hour-and-a-half to reach some of the other stations. Even when
ambulances arrived, there were too many people in need of help. Some victims walked to
hospitals; others were taken there by radio-dispatched taxis or by passing motorists.120 Many
victims lay on the ground in the cars or on the platform while they were treated. This made
the symptoms worse because the concentrations of sarin were higher on the floor. The most
seriously injured passengers were at Kasumigaseki, Tsukiji, Kamiyacho, and Kodemmacho
stations. In addition, Kasumigaseki and Kodemmacho stations received little ambulance
service.
After the evacuation, Japanese Self Defense Force soldiers in full chemical protection
equipment began decontaminating the system, primarily by washing the cars and stations
with a bleach and water mixture to neutralize the agent. Limited service was resumed later in
the day and full service was resumed the following day. Overall, there was a very fast recovery,
considering the magnitude of the attack.

Design and Policy Response
In response to this terrorist incident, the Tokyo Metro has initiated a series of preventive
measures according to Makoto Himeda of the Tokyo Metro. In the station environment, these
measures include:
• Installation at all stations of security cameras with a recording function, placed at strategic
locations throughout the station. The system now has about 2,200 cameras, which were
installed after the sarin attack.
• Initiation of new patrols of special security guards trained to watch for suspicious objects
and activities. There were no security guards prior to the sarin attack, but employees
patrolled the station during their down time. In the post-sarin and post-9/11 era, this type
of ad hoc patrolling was considered inadequate, and private security guards were hired to
patrol the system.
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Measures taken by the Toei subway—Tokyo’s other main subway system—initially included
the removal of all trash cans from the station circulation areas and concourses.121 The trash
cans were removed after the sarin attack, but were moved back two years later and placed in
locations easily surveyed by station masters. Eventually, all the trash cans once removed from
the station were placed back in their original locations. However, as recently as February 2004,
trash cans were again removed from the stations as a preventive response to the Japanese
military involvement in Iraq.
Some design changes also have been introduced on the trains with the installation of windows
that can open and close easily. Because of the importance of ventilation in a chemical attack,
newly installed windows have wider portions that can open.122 All train materials are now
fireproof, and trains are equipped with emergency phones that enable the station master in the
traffic control office to communicate with passengers in the train. Stickers placed on train
doors ask passengers to report any suspicious persons or objects to the station staff.
To better increase the readiness and disaster response, the Tokyo Metro has a manual that
instructs employees how to respond to disasters and communicate with other agencies.
Employees are cautioned to immediately report to police and fire departments any suspicious
incidents. According to Makoto Himeda, Tokyo Metro’s assistant supervisor, Technology
Section, the most important response activity in case of a terrorist event is to evacuate the
passengers to a safe place without panicking them. In the case of terrorist events, rules
established after the sarin attack require that all eight lines of the system are stopped
immediately, even if the incident takes place on a single line.123 After it is confirmed that all
trains are safe, the Metro will resume the operation on each line.
Finally, Tokyo Metro has established a Disaster Prevention District Network, which has
divided the system into fifteen districts. Each Metro employee is assigned to the district
closest to his or her workplace. If an incident happens at one station, all employees of that
district are supposed to report to the station.
The attack on the Tokyo subway system ushered in a new reality for terrorism planning. Since
this attack, there has been some research in design, technology, and operational procedures to
mitigate the effects of a chemical or biological attack. In “The Use of Technology in Preparing
Subway Systems for Chemical/Biological Terrorism,” which was read at the 1999 Commuter
Rail/Rapid Transit Conference, Policastro and Gordon identify three ways that chemical and
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biological weapons can be dispersed on a subway system: released in the station; released in the
train car; and released in the tunnel (possibly through a ventilation shaft).
As the trains travel through the tunnels, a large amount of air moves with them, being pushed
and pulled by the movement of the train. This is known as the piston effect, and it stirs the air
and spreads the agent throughout the station and system. The higher the proportion of the
tunnel covered by a passing train, the larger the piston effect. Trains can be slowed down to
reduce this effect.
A containment strategy to keep the agent from spreading is recommended for biological and
chemical attacks. Swansiger’s 1998 presentation, “Mitigation of Chemical Attacks in Enclosed
Public Transportation Facilities,” at the SPIE (International Society of Optical Engineering)
Enforcement and Security Technology conference, as well as Policastro and Gordon’s
presentation, warn against using emergency ventilation that is designed for smoke. Venting
the agent above ground could affect much larger numbers of people than those in the station.
Additionally, many people can walk faster than the agent can spread, so by turning on
ventilation fans, those who would have escaped will instead be affected by the more rapidly
spreading agent. The recommended strategies include platform edge doors (Figure 15 and
Figure 16) that reduce the piston effect of the trains within the station. Rapid detection
through CCTV technology from a remote location with incident detection algorithms is
essential to reducing the negative impacts of the attack and isolating the agent and the
victims. Chemical detectors are error-prone, but can also be effective tools identifying a
chemical attack.
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Figure 15 Platform Edge Doors, Hong Kong

Figure 16 Another View of Platform Edge Doors, Hong Kong

Savage’s 1996 presentation at the Terrorism in Surface Transportation Symposium, “Lessons
Learned by the New York City Transit Authority from Recent Terrorist Attacks,” discusses an
investigation of the Tokyo case by the New York City Transit Authority. Some of the strategies
and lessons learned include the following:
• Provide information and guidance about gas attacks to employees.
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• Establish ventilation procedures for subway cars, stations, and facilities.
• Submit new gas attack procedures for coordination of effort between transit and other city
agencies.
• Eliminate open and idle space behind token booths and concession stands.
• Remove trash cans in subway stations.
These lessons could have made the effects of the sarin attack less significant. Many of the
casualties were subway personnel who did not know how to handle hazardous material. Even
though sarin was released on the trains, 43 percent of the injuries occurred on the platforms,
32 percent on the trains, 15 percent in other parts of the station, and 10 percent in other
places.124 This indicates that sarin was effective in leaving the trains and spreading
throughout the platforms and the station. Operational procedures and design elements that
help contain the sarin and create an air-tight car and tunnel system relatively separate from the
platform would have been effective in reducing the effects of the chemical attack.
Additionally, procedures for speedy evacuation of the station, such as opening ticket barriers,
would have speeded the evacuation.

Algerian Bombing Campaign on Paris’ Rail Network
(For maps of the Paris Metro system, please see http://www.ratp.info/informer/anglais/
index.php#, or for an interactive map, http://www.ratp.info/cv/cv_en/carteparis.php.)

Incident Description
The Algerians were in conflict with the French during the 1950s and the 1960s, and
undertook several terror campaigns during that time. A 1991 civil war erupted in Algeria,
raising the threat of continued terrorism in France. From July 1995 through December 1996,
the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) conducted a bombing campaign on the Paris subway system
in an attempt to reduce France’s influence in the Algerian war.125 The following is a timeline
of the GIA bombing campaign on the Paris subway.
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Chronology of GIA Bombings on Paris’ Rail Network (Source: Jenkins 1997)

7/27/95

Bomb explodes in commuter rail line as it pulls into St. Michel Station (8
fatalities, 80 injuries)

8/18/95

Bomb explodes at Arc de Triomphe near the entrance of the Charles de Gaulle
Metro Station (0 fatalities, 17 injuries)

8/26/95

Unexploded bomb found on train

10/9/95

Bomb found and detonated outside of Maison Blanche Station

10/17/95

Bomb explodes on subway line in the tunnel between Musée d’Orsay and St.
Michel stations (0 fatalities, 24 injured)

12/4/96

Bomb explodes on train as it pulls into Port Royal Station (2 fatalities, 83
injuries)

This bombing campaign was very focused and severe, with the terrorists taking advantage of
the vulnerabilities of the system. The first bombing, at St. Michel Station, had the most
casualties, as it resulted in eight deaths and over eighty injuries. The following section draws
from news articles and reports on the design issues that influenced this attack specifically and
all of the other attacks in general.126
Two youths boarded the Réseau Express Régional (RER) train on July 25, 1995, during the
evening rush hour. The terrorists left a bag under their seats and exited at Châtalet Station.
The train arrived at the next stop, St. Michel Station, at 5:30 p.m., and the bomb detonated as
the train doors opened. The bomb was a 28-pound camping canister that was filled with
explosive powder, nails, and bolts, and set on a timer. An extremely hot fire started, but
quickly went out due to the absence of flammable materials in the train and station. Most of
the injuries were caused by the shrapnel from the bomb and flying glass from the train’s
windows. Several people were also burned by the ensuing fire. The train sustained heavy
damage. Its sides bulged out so much that it would not fit through the tunnel. The station
experienced minor damage, primarily to its communication cables.

Emergency Response
The response was rapid and efficient. While the police conducted their investigation, a “lifting
team” removed the doors and pulled in the sides of the train car. The emergency workers set
up first aid posts in the station according to an organized disaster plan. The station is many
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feet under ground, so many of the injured required immediate treatment and stabilization
before being transported to the surface. Within three-and-a-half hours, all of the injured
passengers were taken from the station. Within five hours, the communication cables were
repaired and the train was removed from the station. During the night, the station was cleaned
up and service resumed the next morning. Overall, considering the magnitude of the explosion
and the deep underground location of the station, the response was very successful. The
medical attention was sufficient and service was quickly restored.
There were some communication problems. For one, radio communication was poor due to the
damaged communication cables, and there were difficulties getting information from the
platform to the surface. Additionally, the evacuation broadcast was only in French, which
undoubtedly confused non-French speaking passengers.127

Other Terrorist Attacks
This incident was the beginning of a series of bombings that occurred in underground subway
stations of Paris. Three weeks after the bombing at St. Michel Station, another bomb exploded
in a trash can outside of the Charles de Gaulle Station near the Arc de Triomphe, resulting in
seventeen injuries. Two months later, another bomb exploded under the seat of a train in the
tunnel between the St. Michel and Museé d’Orsay stations. This bomb injured twenty-nine
passengers. Over a year later, a bomb exploded on the fourth car of a train as it pulled into Port
Royal Station. The bomb was the same as all others: a 28-pound nail-packed canister was
placed under a seat and detonated by a timer. There was a subsequent fire and a large amount
of smoke, which caused many of the injuries. The bomb exploded immediately after the train
exited the tunnel. If it had been inside of the tunnel, the damage would have been much
worse. This was the last attack on the Paris subway system.

Design and Policy Response
Even before the first bombing incident in Paris, the Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens
(RATP), the rail agency in Paris, began instituting security measures to protect its system.
These included the placement of physical barriers to protect vital systems, the installation of
intrusion alarms, the development of an integrated CCTV system, and a vehicle and personnel
location system. In an attempt to reduce fire hazards, the agency also removed combustible
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material and sources of toxic fumes from the stations and rolling stock. A smoke evacuation
system was introduced to quickly clear smoke and hazardous fumes out of stations.
The bombings resulted in the institution of “Vigipirate,” a policy that mobilized 37,000
police and troops throughout the Paris metropolitan area. High-profile officers carrying
automatic weapons started patrolling the subway stations, conducting searches of individuals
who appeared to be North African. The policy was accompanied by public awareness
campaigns urging vigilance. These policing efforts were, in many cases, extreme and
politically unfavorable. The Vigipirate plan, which adds a high number of security agents to
the stations, is mobilized during periods of high alert and during special occasions (for
example, the D-Day anniversary in France).
After the bomb explosion in a trash can, the subway authority sealed 8,000 trash cans
throughout the metropolitan area. They also installed devices to prevent bags being placed
under the train seats. According to Patrick Dillenseger, Defense Assistant for RATP, during
the Vigipirate periods, trash cans in the French stations are typically replaced by plastic bags.
As very high temperatures, fires, and smoke were a part of all of the bombings, RATP
redesigned train interiors using fireproof materials. More important, the French have
integrated a series of design innovations in some new and state-of-the-art stations, such as
Météor, which include more transparent materials in station areas, more natural lighting, and
spaces with no curves. All these serve to facilitate surveillance from central command posts.
These station design innovations for security will be discussed in a following section.
Some of the design changes that were initiated before and during the attacks had an effect on
the mitigation and prevention of terrorist activities. Determined terrorists were successful in
several bombings in Paris, but the effects were reduced considerably and the attractiveness of
the target was eliminated due to design changes, advanced disaster planning, and policing.

Al Qaeda Attack on RENFE Subway System: Madrid
(For maps of the Madrid Metro, please go to http://www.metromadrid.es/default.asp?id=293.)

Incident Description
On March 11, 2004, Madrid suffered the most lethal terrorist attack by nonstate actors in
contemporary Spain and the second deadliest incident in Western Europe. Terrorists detonated
ten bombs on four suburban commuter trains of the national rail system, RENFE. Later the
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Spanish police discovered and detonated three remaining bombs in the Atocha station, Spain’s
largest and busiest rail station and transportation hub. Based on the placement and timing of
the bombs, we can assume the goal was to decimate the Atocha station, much like the World
Trade Center in the September 11, 2001, attacks. The terrorist incident in Madrid resulted in
the death of nearly 200 people and injury to another 1,800.
Spain has had a long history of terrorist attacks, but they had been an indigenous brand of
terrorism. In the last four decades, the Basque group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) had
repeatedly detonated explosive devices in a number of public spaces in Spain. As Manuel
Rodriguez Simons, Security Director for RENFE, explained:
Unfortunately, we have a huge terrorist problem in Spain, and we’ve had it before
March 11. ETA in its history has placed around 100 bombs in different places.128
Normally they call when they place bombs to warn us, but anyway, we already have
this experience. So, we’ve always had to prepare a security device to prevent
terrorist attacks for each of our facilities. We had already considered the possibility
of a terrorist attack. Well, we never imagined a terrorist attack so much bigger than
anything else.
There were a number of things that took the Spanish authorities by surprise, including the
scale of the attack. In addition, previous terrorist events by ETA typically targeted smaller
areas or specific individuals. They were mostly preceded by telephone calls giving advance
warning of the explosion. Finally, the bombs were placed on trains departing stations in
working-class neighborhoods carrying mainly working-class commuters and students, and did
not fit the profile of the common ETA targets. According to Jose Molina, Director of the
Consorcio de Transportes de Madrid, even though RENFE employees were always vigilant
about suspicious objects and suspicious people with backpacks, no particular antiterrorist
system was in place for the Madrid commuter rail system.
To have an antiterrorist system is super expensive. And the type of transportation
that we provide is mass transportation where you cannot easily implement that
kind of control. So, there weren’t any antiterrorist methods in place before 3/11.
There wasn’t an assumption that something so major could occur. Always there was
a possibility that somebody crazy could do something like start a fire in a station,
but we never thought there was a capacity to do something like this.
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Emergency Response
Immediately after the attack, RENFE alerted the emergency services in Madrid, and an
emergency response team of police and fire department forces and medical emergency
personnel rushed to the rescue of wounded passengers. According to RENFE officials,
“everything went as well as it could and it was quite well coordinated.” Throughout the day,
the team managed to evacuate all the wounded people and send them to hospitals. RENFE
also halted service on affected lines; this did not happen for all the Metro. Soon thereafter,
police work started to identify the perpetrators and any evidence that would help the police
investigation.
The next day, representatives from the police, RENFE, and Madrid Metro held a meeting to
discuss security strategies. As described by Javier García Cadiñanos of the Madrid Metro,
We had a meeting and we said, “What do we do?” Nobody knew; the world had no
experts. We had to use common sense and experience. In criminology this is called
“the biological maturity.” What do we do to confront a situation about which
nobody has any idea? The first conclusion we came up with was to have a campaign
called “To See and to Be Seen.” The elements of security, you have to make very
clear to give a sense of security to the riders. As a consequence, we put bright
orange vests on all the security agents. They already had it in London, so we used it
here. This gave us a very important result because the security agents go through
dark areas and with these bright colors, they were very obvious and we wanted
people to think there was a lot of vigilance and security guards watching for their
security.

Design and Policy Response
The March 11 attack led to the intensification of existing security measures and the adoption
of new ones. RENFE intensified and redeployed its police forces and directed them to focus on
attending to the needs of the passengers, but also intensifying their vigilance against
suspicious persons. At the same time, security forces (the Spanish army) were asked to police
the railroads. In Spain, the municipal police have oversight in large cities (such as Madrid),
while the civil guard has oversight in the rest of the country (small towns and rural areas). For
the first time, the army was asked to give a helping hand in policing railway facilities. RENFE
officials describe as good the coordination between the army forces, the municipal police, and
the RENFE security forces.
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Additionally, RENFE is in the process of contracting security dog services and purchasing Xray machines, as well as fixed and mobile scanners.129 Mobile scanners will be installed on
small vehicles operating in large and busy stations. Since the attack, the transit operator has
expanded the existing CCTV network with the purchase of new cameras. It is also considering
the purchase of special containers, “portabombas,” in which security staff could put all
suspicious objects. According to Metro Madrid and RENFE officials, the difficulty of sealing
150,000 trash cans and the inconvenience to passengers if these were removed prompted them
not to take any action.
RENFE was concerned that the adopted measures might raise the already high levels of fear of
the Spanish public. For this reason, they decided against posting messages, posters, and signs
on trains and station facilities warning people to be vigilant. As explained by Rodriguez
Simons,
We didn’t want to create more alarm and we thought that leaving this as it was
would be better. There were occasions where people shouldn’t have called, but they
were calling anyway. Before, the things that were normal in stations, backpacks,
mobile phone, things people lost, well in those moments after the attack, if
somebody had left a mobile phone in the seat and exited the train in a hurry, this
caused alarm even though before it was normal. So, in that moment, we decided not
to create more alarm and psychosis and leave this technique for another time in the
future. Now, we’re rethinking it because the amount of calls has already decreased.
If we think it makes sense, we’ll implement this.
Today, the system seems to have recovered and to a great extent gained back its ridership.
According to RENFE officials, “We have recovered after March 11; practically all the
passengers are back, except in the line affected, which now has about two to three percent
fewer passengers.” Metro Madrid officials attribute people’s return to the railways to the fact
that the system was hit only once. Javier García Cadiñanos of the Madrid Metro says,
If there had been an attack following this one, on whatever public transportation in
Madrid, in all of Spain, in Paris or wherever, if there would have been another
attack on public transportation, there would have been a lot more terror and we
would have had a lot more problems. Fortunately this didn’t happen, so practically,
in 24 hours everything “returned to normal.” The only thing that didn’t return to
normal right away, and took several months, and in cases still exists, is the
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conscious fear that people have because about 200 people were killed and it could
have happened to them. This is what later we had to combat immediately and to
attempt as soon as possible to return a trust to the rider.

Conclusions
The experiences of rail agencies throughout the world can aid railway station designers in
developing systems that are more difficult for terrorists to attack and, in the event of an attack,
more inclined to rapid and efficient evacuation, emergency response, and recovery. Many of the
attacks have common characteristics, resulting from persons who carried small devices onto
trains or into stations. Mostly, the perpetrators relied on some sort of delayed effect or timer so
that the terrorists could escape. Improved CCTV coverage can be an effective deterrent of
transit terrorism when the perpetrator does not desire to be captured. However, it is ineffective
in the cases of the recent suicide attacks.
Passenger and staff vigilance inside trains and in the station is an essential aspect of any
antiterrorism strategy. Passengers, railway employees, and security personnel need to have
clear lines of sight to all parts of the station and trains. Many terrorists utilized seating to hide
bombs. Additionally, trash cans have been used as hiding places and should be removed,
sealed, or reinforced.
Secondary fragmentation—shrapnel resulting from building materials, such as shattered
glass—can became a “fragmentation bomb” and cause injuries and havoc. Facilities should be
designed to reduce secondary fragmentation as much as possible. This applies to ground-level
glass, vending machines, chairs and railings, and decorations. Facilities should also be fire
resistant and not emit toxic fumes if exposed to extreme heat. Rapid extinguishing of the fires
in these attacks resulted in limited injuries due to burns and smoke inhalation. Fire
extinguishing devices should be readily available in stations and on trains.
In the case of chemical or biological weapons, early detection is essential. Unfortunately, many
commercially available chemical detectors are costly and error prone. Incident identification
might be best achieved through remote CCTV monitoring. It has been found that utilizing
fans designed for smoke might only aggravate the situation and spread the agent faster than it
would spread otherwise, but not fast enough to lower it to nonlethal levels. Additionally, there
could be more exposure above ground than in the station. Hoods designed for chemical
removal and deactivation would be more appropriate, but costly. Platform edge doors separate
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the airflow in the tunnels from the stations, reducing the piston effect of the trains. These are
very expensive, but provide additional benefits besides terrorism mitigation. They provide a
physical barrier between the platform and the railway, improving safety and comfort for
passengers waiting on the platform. Rapid and informed responses can also greatly reduce
damage caused by this type of attack.
Identifying vulnerabilities in rail car and station design and eliminating them can aid in
securing transit systems from terrorist activity. Providing rapid response and recovery
minimizes the damage. Removing places where bombs can be hidden, improving surveillance
and lighting, removing sources of ground-level secondary fragmentation, controlling air
currents in cars and stations, and providing on-site emergency response equipment and
training are all design strategies that should be considered when encountering a terror threat.
Designing stations, rolling stock, and systems that can withstand attacks and quickly recover
reduces the attractiveness of targeting transit because the attack does not result in the desired
disruption or alarm. Designing for terrorism has, and will, effectively reduce its threat.
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TRANSIT SECURITY STRATEGIES OF INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES
How are transportation systems in different cities of the world handling issues of transit
security? What are their concerns and challenges? What mix of strategies do they use? Do
transit officials around the world perceive terrorism prevention through environmental design
as a valid security strategy? What lessons can United States transit systems learn from the
experiences of transit systems in other cities?
To respond to these questions, we undertook extensive fieldwork research in four cities—
London, Madrid, Paris, and Tokyo—and their railway systems, and also interviewed
representatives from the International Union of Public Transport (UITP), which has
headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. Our fieldwork consisted of interviews with transit
managers and transit officials responsible for the security of the systems, architects and
engineers designing systems, and transit industry group officials. We also visited many
stations in each system to see some of the design measures identified in the interviews. In some
cities, we were shown the control and command centers of the transit systems. We also visited
stations that had been recently designed or renovated to comply with state-of-the-art measures
of security, such as the Alto del Arenal station on the Madrid Metro’s Line 1, the Gare de Lyon
Station on Line 14 in Paris, and the recently retrofitted St. Lazare station on the Eole line in
the same city.
In Paris, we interviewed officials with the Regie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (RATP), a
multimodal transit operator in Paris; with SNCF (French National Railways); and
representatives from CERTU in Lyon, a think-tank technical agency of France’s Ministry of
Transportation. In Tokyo, we interviewed officials responsible for security at Tokyo Metro Co.,
Ltd., which operates the Tokyo Metro, and the Transportation Bureau of the Tokyo
Metropolitan Government, which operates the Toei Subway system, also in Tokyo. In London,
we interviewed transit officials from the London Underground, Transport for London, and
Network Rail; a security chief with the British Transport Police; and a managing architect
with Jefferson Sheard Architects, an architectural firm specializing in the design of
transportation infrastructure. In Madrid, we interviewed officials from the Madrid Metro,
RENFE, Spain’s national train system, and Consorcio Regional de Transportes de Madrid
(CRTM). Finally, in Brussels we interviewed officials from the UITP, an international
association aimed at promoting public transport in Europe and around the world. This section
discusses the major findings of our empirical research in each of the five cities.
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Paris
The French perceive Paris as a “potential target for domestic or international terrorism.”
According to Patrick Dillenseger, Special Assistant for Defense at RATP, the transit
infrastructure in Paris is an obvious target for terrorist attacks. In our interview, he admitted,
however, that international terrorism may be aimed mostly at countries, like the United
States, Great Britain, and Spain, that participated in the war against Iraq. Nevertheless, the
French remain extremely vigilant against terrorist threats. According to Dillenseger, the
domestic terrorist attacks against the French transit systems (described in the section “Case
Studies of Contemporary Terrorist Incidents”) have led to considerable reflection about how to
better protect transit systems. At the same time, François Blasin of CERTU says the French
recognize that “the threat has evolved and morphed from single modest man-made bombs,
both limited in scope and capacity to harm, to multiple impact and large-scale paramilitarystyle bomb attacks, such as those recently witnessed at the World Trade Center or in Madrid.”
Therefore, the French clearly recognize that security is today a global issue, says Michel
Poulain of SNCF. According to the officials we talked to, “security, without forgetting daily
vandalism and also safety, has become a ‘hot’ goal, regarding the reality of today and the high
vulnerability of crowded public transport systems.” Therefore, they perceive their primary
goal to be to “create an efficient feeling of security rather than reduce the risk to zero, which is
practically impossible,” according to François Rambaud of CERTU.

The Role of Government and Centralized Planning
Prior to the mid-1990s different security measures were adopted by agencies with little, if any,
coordination between them. Patrick Dillenseger of RATP says the terrorist attacks led the
French transit agencies to realize that “it was time for a holistic approach to transit security
with government support and guidelines and private sector backing.” Consistent with the
arguments we heard from transit operators in the other international cities of our survey, the
French transit authorities also argued that the evaluation of and response to security threats go
beyond the prerogatives and responsibilities of operators and transit agencies. The
international situation has certain consequences to national security. Transit agencies simply
have neither the capacity nor the financial resources to address such a dire threat in a
comprehensive way. Therefore, in France, it is the Office of the Prime Minister, assisted by the
Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Transport, that draws up comprehensive security plans and
guidelines, and conducts and responds to threat assessments.
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Regional authorities (generally the prefect or prefet de zone de defense) have locally approved
general emergency plans for civil security such as le plan rouge, which is executed in response to
major disasters with many victims, such as record floods or massive forest fires and explosions.
These plans are coordinated by the prefect.130 In each region, local security committees exist
that coordinate operators, police, and local representatives of the government. According to
Michel Persin of SNCF, the first transit security plan dates back to 1978, but was not adapted
to today’s threats of global terrorism. The French government did not produce any new
security plans until 1990, when the First Gulf War started. Then the global situation, along
with increases in public transit crime and incivilities, led the government to initiate global
security plans, integrating forces of municipal and transit police and representatives of
national governments and regional authorities, as a global answer to the growing insecurity in
urban areas, including public transit. These plans are organized and implemented by the
Ministry of Interior as well as transit operators. For Paris, in particular, after the attacks of
Algerian terrorists against the French railway in 1995, the authorities elaborated the
Vigipirate plan, which can mobilize a significant number of police forces during periods of
high alert and during special occasions (such as the D-Day anniversary in France).
The early French security plans were simply a series of memos about security. The events of
1995, however, resulted in a push for the integration of the various security components into a
comprehensive plan for transit security, which was adopted in 2000. According to Persin:
...early on there wasn’t a real service in charge of transit security. The [terrorist]
events pushed public authorities to move toward institutionalizing security
management in public transit through existing measures and directives. This was
rather hard as there wasn’t a central authority within SNCF dealing with these
issues. From four people we had to develop departments where 100 people are
working today. And what triggered the new awareness of transit security were
terrorist attacks; efforts accelerated after September 11.
CERTU, a technical agency of the French Ministry of Transport for infrastructure, transport,
and spatial planning, is in charge of building up and sharing the knowledge available on a
broad variety of urban issues. It deals with prioritizing transit safety needs and capitalizing
security matters on sensitive sites. Evaluation of the potential danger of each site, based on the
degree of hazard they represent to the population, highlights various security responses. These
may range from preventing intrusions in sensitive areas to developing a safe zone perimeter

Mineta Transportation Institute

142

Transit Security Strategies of International Agencies

around certain facilities or putting train cars under permanent surveillance, and finally even
changing the route of cargo transit. SNCF’s Persin said,
The answer in many cases is identical whether it’s a terrorist attack or equipment
failure; we need to minimize casualties and environmental pollution among many
other impacts. It is therefore crucial for us to map these industrial zones and hazard
corridors which are not part of our network but whose proximity to the grid or
stations could endanger our customers’ lives.
An area that the Ministry of Transport and other French governmental agencies have
emphasized after 9/11 is the protection of the transit system against a chemical or biological
attack, because it was in this area the French felt they had the least experience, says SNCF’s
Persin. Today, both RATP and SNCF have agents trained by civil defense authorities, as well
as firefighters who can respond to biological or chemical threat, in charge of decontamination
in the case of attack and who are ready to intervene 24 hours a day, seven days a week in Paris
and Ile-de-France. As a way to prepare for and anticipate risks from chemical and biological
attacks, the French authorities staged a nerve agent attack simulation in Paris in October
2003. According to Persin, this simulation, which had been in the works for months, was
designed to test a plan, “Piratox,” put in place last year for dealing with chemical attacks. The
agency also has similar plans for dealing with biological and radiological threats.

The Role of Transit Operators
Two major transit operators in Paris are RATP and SNCF. RATP, which is a regional and
multimodal public transit operator, operates four mass transit systems or networks: the
subway (Paris Metro), the Commuter Express Rail (RER), buses, and trams. In cooperation
with SNCF, it also operates the Orly airport driverless rail shuttle, Orlyval. SNCF operates the
French railway system. Representatives of these two operators believed that their facilities and
systems are the primary targets of any transit attack in France. The budget dedicated to
security clearly sets these two agencies apart from other national operators.131
Our interviewees from SNCF told us that their office of security (called “defense pole”)
evaluates risks in their service based on information coming from the French ministries. They
also implement the general plans issued by the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Transport, and
Ministry of Interior. Additionally, some of their services respond to situational crime, and they
employ about 2,300 officers throughout France. SNCF translates the general policies from the
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central authorities into concrete measures for each of the twenty-three regions of its
jurisdiction. They also conduct research and gather data and statistics with respect to security.
Communication and coordination are essential for SNCF for crisis management and
emergency response to attacks. The following excerpt from our interview with Michel Persin
shows the extent and importance that the French operators place on coordination and
integration of various security measures:
There is a central center of coordination (dispatching center) which coordinates
different regional centers that we could put in service within one hour. Here, in
front of our offices, we have the crisis headquarters of national management of
SNCF which is responsible for communication and emergency response. Here we
answer to general guidelines and we work in cooperation with those in charge of
immediate response to any crisis. SNCF has opted for a strong planning of security
strategy. The result of these years of planning is that in case of a terrorist attack
SNCF is capable of coordination with other actors. The main policy in the case of
attack is to create a synergy between actors to maximize our capabilities to face a
disaster. SNCF can organize a group of 2,000 to 3,000 people in response to any
attack. This obviously is the result of a strong will to put forward the operational
segment of railway transit security.
At the same time, we do have an eye on long-term strategies, and how we should
organize and build a new secure environment. The difference with Spain is that
they had been used to fast response to crisis as the terrorists [ETA] traditionally had
called a few minutes before an explosion and authorities need to be fast in their
responses. The explosion in Madrid showed that this was clearly not enough. Of
course today nothing in France can prevent a terrorist attack 100 percent. We have
put in place a wide variety of policies such as detection portals, a canine group with
dogs which are trained to detect explosives, as well as mobile de-mining
equipments. But with 32,000 kilometers of railways we can obviously not have 100
percent security. As far as to what degree and where we prioritize which segment, it
is rather case by case. On the operational side, it is mostly public health authorities
who, in coordination with the governor and the government, establish priorities.
On the systemic and long-term strategy side, we do work in cooperation with our
European colleagues through inter-European programs. Nationally we are putting
our efforts in synergy with RATP, firefighters, Municipality of Paris, Electricity of
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France, Aeroports de Paris, and Air France, among many other actors involved. We
all have terrorism in mind but the way we perceive and answer to this risk may be
different. For this reason we need to coordinate. In one word, our security strategy
is rather systemic. We do integrate these segments in evaluating risks, anticipating
threats, informing users, and in the case of a disaster, administer assistance and
speed up decontamination if necessary.
Indeed, comprehensiveness, coordination, communication, and the adoption of a systemic
approach were the keywords used repeatedly by the different French officials we interviewed.
They identified as a “systemic approach to security” one that takes into account all the
vulnerabilities of the transit system and responds to them in a comprehensive way, and argued
that effectiveness cannot be achieved in terms of single actions, but is also about coordination
with other agencies and integration of different strategies, without forgetting design matters
of infrastructure and rolling stock.

Coordination with Other European Agencies
The importance of coordination with other European agencies and transit operators was also
strongly emphasized by Patrick Dillenseger of RATP. According to him, “the future of public
transit security (PTS) resides in pan-European cooperation, and the UITP has taken the lead in
this respect.” Such coordination is absolutely necessary, since many of the European transit
operators (for example, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom) have highly integrated grids. Dillenseger pointed out that such cooperation is
already underway and is based on sharing experiences, statistics and data, and to a lesser
degree, the outcome of various simulations of terrorist attacks.
A European program with the objective to formulate policy recommendations for the future of
public transport in Europe was the Voyager program. Voyager is an initiative of the European
Union’s Directorate General for Transport and Energy, Clean Urban Transport Unit.132
Originally, the goals of promoting public transit and increasing ridership motivated the
Voyager program. Today, the project is split into two phases. The preliminary phase examines
state-of-the-art security practices and identifies key barriers and challenges to the
implementation of competitive and attractive public transport systems. In its second phase,
Voyager considers global trends likely to impact the future of public transport. This is to
facilitate the drafting of policy and recommendations for all public transport stakeholders at
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local, regional, national, and European levels. As will be discussed later, the terrorist attacks in
New York and Madrid brought the issue of security to the forefront of Voyager’s concerns.

Security Strategies
The integration of different security strategies can be best seen in the design and
implementation of a new line. In Paris, Météor (Métro Est-Ouest Rapide) is an excellent
example of integrating security elements in the design of the railway network. Météor, which
is now Line 14, was designed to ease the rush-hour traffic on the overcrowded east-west link of
the Commuter Express Rail (Réseau Express Régional, RER), a long-distance heavy-rail Métro
line serving the distant suburbs of Paris. Météor is 8 kilometers in length, and extends from
the northwest suburbs, through the high-traffic areas in the center of Paris, down to the
southeast suburbs. Its eight stations provide direct connections with eleven existing Paris
Métro lines, five RER lines, numerous bus lines, and two railroad stations (Gare St. Lazare and
Gare de Lyon).
The line’s computerized and automatic trains are under constant surveillance by the command
center (PCC) or traffic control center, which both operate the trains and monitor the station
attendants. On the platforms, glass doors enable an unobstructed view of the other platform as
well as trains which arrive at 1.5- to 2-minute intervals. Locks on train doors and platforms are
adjusted and can be manually activated to prevent the escape of criminals. Traffic control
oversees all operations including maintenance, technical support, and basic security. Staff and
field agents are equipped with two-way radios. If a given situation gets out of hand or becomes
life threatening, the matter is handed over to the RATP security control center (PC Securité or
“SECURITY”). At PC SEC, uniformed staff, as well as attendants in civilian clothes, are
constantly present and in communication with the Regional Transport Police (RTP). In the
Metro and RER networks, remote-controlled closed-circuit cameras (CCTV) are linked to line
PCCs and activated through intercoms, call buttons, and emergency alarms. These enable
SECURITY to communicate to passengers through loudspeakers. Line 14 is equipped with
both fixed cameras on the platforms and discreet CCTV located in the trains. Each of these
cameras is easily selected for live or remote viewing from traffic control.
The environment and context of the stations of Line 14 is quite different from the rest of the
network. Absent are the maze-like access ways and tunnels to the platforms and exit doors as
well as the dead angles, which characterize pre-Météor classic design and slow down any
intervention of police forces to prevent or respond to a terrorist attack. In place there is a very
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linear glass-enclosed track, the monotony of which is occasionally broken by soft curves,
linking spotless and brightly lit stations sharing a homogeneous design. Spaces are wider,
lending better opportunities for remote surveillance. Station materials are mostly transparent,
reflective, and resistant to graffiti and vandalism. There is maximum use of direct natural or
indirect artificial light. Overall the feeling for the user is that of high security, warmth, and
cleanliness, which is quite different from the rest of the network. According to Patrick
Dillenseger, the use of these materials and lighting complements and supports the surveillance
technology and minimizes opportunities for situational crime and terrorist attacks.
Other environmental design innovations are implemented at the Eole Line, which is a 30meter underground line connecting the stations of St. Lazare and Gare du Nord in Paris. To
minimize the negative consequences of terrorist attacks and bomb explosions, architects used
new materials such a shatterproof fiberglass. The construction of wooden access bridges is
sufficiently strong to resist the blow impact of an explosion. At Gare du Nord, in case of fire,
there is pressure or an air curtain that isolates the sector involved from the rest of the platform.
It is hoped that such a feature will help in the case of a chemical attack as well. The station
lighting is designed to enhance a feeling of security.
The retrofit of the old St. Lazare station has integrated design features to respond to concerns
of crime and terrorism. The station now has limited entrances and exits, which are all well lit.
Warm-colored materials, such as green panels above the access bridge and red plexiglass panels
above the station platforms, reflect and redirect the light.
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Figure 17 Red and Green Lighting at Retrofitted St. Lazare Station, Paris

Figure 18 Transparent Elevator, St. Lazare Station, Paris
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Station entrances can be easily closed or blocked by police in the case of an attack, and the old
and new parts of the station can be easily separated. The passages connecting the entrances to
the platforms as well as the lobby areas are wide, which prevents overcrowding. Straight, wide
passageways leave no room for corners, dead spaces, and blind spots, adding to the feeling of
security. Arches, overhead passages, and bridges have an open view to the lower levels and give
a feeling of spaciousness. Similarly, the platforms are wide and straight and have high arches.
They are equipped with CCTV cameras, which can be activated by rapid movement or loud
voices. Public telephones, ticket seller booths, and elevators are constructed with transparent
and resistant materials. Transparent and reflective materials on the walls and light-colored
floors are designed to reflect lighting.
While these examples represent good models of how to implement design strategies for transit
security, the French officials do not believe that they can be easily applied to their whole
railway network. As Patrick Dillenseger argued:
While in new construction, we are taking lessons of past terrorist attacks such as at
St. Germain and we are integrating design features to minimize risk, it is hard to
consider any major changes to the environmental design of old segments of the
network. It is indeed very costly to make major physical changes to cavernous and
old access areas, platforms, and tunnels. To make these spaces more secure, there is a
need to be creative but there is very limited margin for maneuver, as we can not
break the old fabric and rebuild all the access areas or platforms. A trend which is
increasingly followed by operators and agencies is, as in the case of Lille’s metro, to
create new structures and command centers dedicated solely to security. It is the
case in Paris with the new lines. In the past it was the operator which had to
regulate the line to take care of security and inform end-users. The result of that
was a single structure which was constantly overloaded with work and had
difficulties in prioritizing when there was a security concern coming up. The new
trend is structures which are dedicated to security alone and which integrate
different levels of security.
During Vigipirate periods, minor design measures were implemented at the stations which
could have an impact on security. These included sealing off garbage cans in stations and on
platforms, or replacing them with plastic bags, and closing or removing lockers and safe boxes.
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In addition to design strategies, the French interviewees also talked about the importance of
technology for security, referring to the development of new techniques, currently underway,
that would greatly improve video surveillance and object detection by integrating smart
programs.133 They also referred to the importance of information and security awareness
campaigns to educate transit riders about the different aspects of threat in public transit. As
Francois Rambaud, from the French Ministry of Transport, claimed, “We have to combine and
juxtapose environmental design, audio/video surveillance, rescuing, policing, prosecuting, and
information campaigns in order to create an effective feeling of security for all passengers.”
This is, after all, the major goal of transit authorities and operators.

Tokyo
The sarin attack of 1995 took the Japanese society in general, and the Tokyo transit operators
in particular, by surprise. The Japanese were used to a safe society and were quite unprepared
for such an incident. Shocked by the attack, Japanese transit operators took measures and
initiated a protocol for emergency response (refer to the section “Case Studies of Contemporary
Terrorist Incidents”), but they still perceived it as an isolated incident. The event was
characterized by Japanese society at the time as an indiscriminate large-scale murder, not a
terrorist incident, said an official in the Transportation Bureau of the Tokyo Metropolitan
Government. According to another official in the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, it was not
until the World Trade Center bombing, when the definition of terrorism started being
discussed worldwide, that the Tokyo sarin attack came to be recognized by the Japanese as a
terrorist incident.

The Role of Government
Unlike the situation in France, where the national government plays a major role in the
issuance and enforcement of security plans, in the prioritization of security needs, and in
conducting safety audits of transit facilities, the national government in Japan seems to have a
much looser relationship with transit operators. Transit operators may receive, at times,
guidance from the national government on security issues, but this comes in the form of
suggestions rather than regulations. Ultimately, it falls upon the transit operators to decide
what security measures should be employed. According to Yukio Takagaki, Assistant Section
Chief in the Safety Section of the Tokyo Metro, transit operators
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...are contacted in advance by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport
and are asked about, for example, whether it is feasible to install English sentences
on electronic schedule boards at platforms. When the Ministry sends an official
guidance memo, usually, they contact transit operators to ask if their guidance is
realistic enough to be implemented; otherwise, they would end up issuing
directions that transit operators cannot follow. In this manner, we get to exchange
information with the government. In some cases, the police also send their
guidance through the Ministry.
Thus, for example, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport sent its most recent
guidance to public transportation operators on April 27, 2004. This involved thirty-two
sections covering aviation, railways, automobiles, buses, ships, ports, roads, rivers, and
construction sites. For each of these categories, there were several suggestions as to what
transportation agencies should do to improve security. Examples of such suggestions include
the posting of signs in English on trains and platforms and the issuance of announcements
from public speakers to passengers to raise their security awareness and cooperation. However,
the suggestions issued by the national government typically are not accompanied by financial
support for implementation. As one official of the Transportation Bureau exclaimed,
Basically, the national government wants us to implement their guidance at our
own expense. As for the police, they also issued a request to strengthen security in
our facility as of June 8, 2004. In this document, they used the expression,
“voluntary guarding,” which means that they suggest that we should voluntarily
intensify the guarding of our facility. As I said, there is neither funding nor
regulation attached to those requests. Therefore, there is no enforcement power.
The national government did provide, however, some funding for hiring private security
guards to patrol transit facilities.
Today the transit operators of Tokyo’s two main subway systems, the Tokyo Metro and the Toei
Subway,134 perceive terrorism as “a very serious threat” to their subway systems, says an
official of the Transportation Bureau of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. In the wake of
the attack against Iraq, the national government sent a note to transit operators warning them
to be on alert for suspicious persons and objects and asking them to increase surveillance of
their system. The number of security guards was increased in some stations, trash cans were
removed, and employees in supervising positions were asked to patrol the stations and check
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the way other employees work in the stations and on trains. For the first time in 2003, drills
designed for explosives and sarin were initiated in the Toei Subway.135

The Role of Transit Operators
The subway operators in Tokyo pursue some mutual collaboration, coordination, and
information exchange regarding security strategies against terrorism with the use of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons. They also keep in touch with police and fire authorities and
are informally exchanging information with other transit companies. This information is
particularly relevant for emergency response, rather than preparedness. According to an official
in the Subway and Streetcar Service Division of the Transportation Bureau, each of the railway
companies has its own traffic control office that is in charge of operations management. But
the traffic control office of the Transportation Bureau (which operates the Toei Subway) and
that of Tokyo Metro are connected, so that information on unusual incidents on both systems
is directly exchanged.
For Tokyo Metro, broad security directives and strategies are decided by the Board of
Directors, while smaller issues are discussed and decided upon by the company’s Safety Affairs
Division. The company is composed of five divisions,136 and all division chiefs have regular
meetings to discuss what security measures to employ in response to the security guidance
issued by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport. For the Toei Subway, the four
divisions of the Transportation Bureau are responsible for the inception and implementation of
security strategies.137 The Bureau has established a safety committee, which is composed of
the Director-General and the director of each division. According to an official of the Subway
and Streetcar Service Division of the Transportation Bureau, the committee holds meetings
four times a year to discuss security concerns and decide on security strategies and measures.

Security Strategies
The sarin attack of 1995 prompted Japanese transit operators to identify the need for two
different categories of antiterrorist measures: measures aimed at restraining terrorist activities
and preventing attacks, which include a mixture of surveillance, technology, information, and
design strategies; and measures aimed at emergency preparedness and disaster response. The
second category of measures initiated a disaster response protocol, which includes the
development of instructional manuals with detailed guidance for employees as to how to react
and respond in the case of a terrorist incident.138
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In terms of priorities, Japanese transit operators tend to favor policing and patrolling
strategies by private security guards and their staff, and surveillance with the help of security
cameras and CCTV technology, says an official from the Subway and Streetcar Service Division
of the Transportation Bureau. Following the sarin attack, both the Tokyo Metro and Toei
Bureau of Transportation contracted out policing to private security companies. Additional
patrols were added to the Toei Subway after the Japanese government announced its intention
to send a force to Iraq. In addition to the private guards, municipal police have been on patrol
in the most sensitive stations since the railway bombing in Madrid. These include terminal
stations, stations that have major civic and government buildings in close proximity, and
stations attracting large numbers of passengers. Transit officials reason that “our passengers
feel safer seeing our company making efforts for improving transit security. Patrolling has
allowed the main office employees to communicate with our customers, such as being asked
directions and getting to directly know the customers’ opinions on our subway services.”
The purpose of these patrols is to warn of suspicious persons and contain criminal acts. At the
same time, Japanese transit operators hope that potential terrorists can be dissuaded by the
presence of security guards. They argue that the increased level of policing on their transit
system has effectively minimized crime, but they are not as certain regarding its effect on
terrorist prevention. As an official from the Subway and Streetcar Service Division of the
Transportation Bureau stated, “It is really hard to claim that such patrolling efforts have paid
off and have prevented terrorism in our system.”

Figure 19 Monitoring Notice, Kiyosumi-Shirakawa Station, Tokyo Suburb
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Figure 20 Increased Security Notice, Kasumigaseki Station, Downtown Tokyo

Since the sarin attack, 2,200 security cameras have been installed at all stations. They are
placed at strategic points covering the different platform areas, ticket gates, and restroom
areas. Prior to the sarin attack, there existed only simple surveillance cameras without
videotaping functions. Transit authorities believe that such cameras can be very beneficial
against criminal acts. Indeed, installing security cameras has become the main crime
prevention strategy by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. They also believe that cameras
may have the potential to deter terrorists, since suspicious actions can be observed by the staff
in the controls and operation center. The station staff monitors camera images but cannot
monitor the screens every second. Other security hardware includes two metal detectors, one
in Kasumigaseki Station and the other in Ginza Station.
A third strategy is user outreach. Takagaki reasoned that,
The railway system is open to the general public. It is impossible to check every
person. Therefore, we have to take preventive measures by reaching out to our
passengers. We have made posters, placed stickers on train windows, and have
public announcements that ask passengers to report suspicious persons and objects
to station staff or the police. The warning note in Japanese and English is being run
on electronic information boards for train schedules at the platforms. With the
passengers’ cooperation, we can improve security in our system. Informing
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passengers will facilitate their cooperation when something happens. For example,
when we guide passengers to evacuate, informed customers will be more prepared
and less likely to be panicked, and they will be more cooperative with the station
employees.
Before the recent terrorist attacks in New York and Madrid, design strategies for security were
not on the agenda of Tokyo transit operators. According to an official from the Construction
and Maintenance Division of the Transportation Bureau, station planning and design in Japan
takes into consideration the safety, comfort, and convenience of passengers. However, in the
design of existing stations, safety considerations primarily have involved preventing accidents
and fires. Because of the low transit crime rates in Japan, operators did not perceive a major
need to incorporate CPTED elements in station design. According to officials from the
Transportation Bureau,
If anything, concerns about fires have greatly influenced the station design since it
is closed underground space. In general, the subway is not a place with high crime
rates in Japan. Drunk passengers and gropers have been our main concerns… It
does not mean that crime prevention is not considered at all in station design. It has
affected lighting and views in the stations to some degree. But crime prevention
was not our top priority in station design.
The recent terrorist events, however, have caused Japanese transit operators to reconsider their
attitude towards the role of design. In our interviews, they expressed a concern with dead
spaces and lack of visibility at stations. According to Transportation Bureau officials,
...there is not much flexibility in underground subway stations, and the available
space is highly limited. In the limited space, designers arrange platforms,
concourses, and station offices, trying to minimize dead spaces and obstructed
views. But some dead spaces cannot be avoided at certain locations. That is a
problem to be solved, but we do not create large dead spaces any more.
Similar views were expressed by Yukio Takagaki and Makoto Himeda, from the Tokyo Metro,
Safety Section:
We have made efforts to minimize dead space, especially around the places where
employees are stationed. Since subway stations are built underground, the space
arrangement is limited. Therefore, some dead spaces are necessarily generated, for
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example, when the station has entrances far away from ticket gates. But we place
security cameras and monitor those dead spaces.
According to Transportation Bureau officials, crime prevention through environmental design
has been increasingly incorporated in station design. For example, the walls of station elevators
are now constructed with translucent materials. Because elevators and escalators are often dead
spaces and difficult to watch by stationmasters, they are now equipped with surveillance
cameras. The newly opened Oedo Line has fewer station employees than other lines, but there
are more surveillance cameras monitoring dead spaces, and those images on the cameras are
checked in the monitor room.
Sweeping design changes are difficult and costly to implement in existing stations. Therefore,
only selected design and security measures are incorporated in the retrofit of existing stations,
such as the installation of security cameras and emergency buttons and securing and making
inaccessible to the public certain station areas (for example, storage spaces, basements,
electrical rooms). Renovation projects also include the construction of restroom areas away
from secluded station spaces, with wide, unobstructed entrances intended to be more inviting
for passengers.

Figure 21 CCTV Monitor, Kasumigaseki Station, Downtown Tokyo
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Figure 22 Emergency Button, Kasumigaseki Station, Downtown Tokyo

Figure 23 Restroom Entrance, Kasumigaseki Station, Downtown Tokyo
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Since February 2004 (when the Japanese government announced its intention to send some
troops to Iraq), trash cans have been removed from stations and subway trains.139 Authorities
have also removed all cigarette receptacles, since smoking has been prohibited in all stations.
According to Takagaki, this antiterrorist measure had a surprising effect. The system now has
much less trash, because the Japanese passengers take their trash home with them and do not
discard it in the trains and stations.
According to an official in the Rolling Stock and Electricity Division of the Transportation
Bureau,
We have also made train materials fireproof. We have installed a communication
system that enables a train crew or a stationmaster in the traffic control office to
talk to passengers over emergency phones. But all those things have been done in
preparation for accidents, not for terrorism. Maybe the only design change adopted
as part of an antiterrorism measure is the stickers put on the train doors that ask
passengers to report suspicious persons and objects to the station staff.
According to Makoto Himeda of the Tokyo Metro, the sarin attack prompted a few design
changes on train wagons. “Due to the increased use of air-conditioning, many of our train
windows used to be designed not to open, but we have installed train windows that can be
opened and shut more easily since we learned the importance of ventilation after responding to
the sarin attack.”
A Disaster Prevention Network has been established, and all the Tokyo Metro lines are now
divided into fifteen districts. All Tokyo Metro employees who work outside the train stations,
such as rolling stock, railroad, electronic line, and facility maintenance engineers, are assigned
to one of the fifteen districts near their workplace. In the case of a disaster at a station in their
district, these employees from outside have to come to support the station employees to
respond to the incident. The district assignment is designed to facilitate mutual support
among the districts. Our interviewees stressed the importance of coordination and information
sharing in the case of a terrorist attack, and Takagaki from the Tokyo Metro said:
We have learned the importance of sharing information. For immediate response to
an incident, it is most important that it is reported quickly as to what is happening
and where. The stationmaster works as the chief of the Incident Headquarters at the
station for response and recovery. The Incident Headquarters and the General
Control Office exchange the information. If it is a large accident, the Incident
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Headquarters is established in the General Control Office. The staff in the General
Control Office receives the accident information from the station employees and
provides response and recovery strategies to them.
The adjustment from the perception of a “safe society” to a “risk society” is slowly but surely
taking place in Tokyo, as in other cities. The importance of having a safe and secure transit
system was underlined by Yukio Takagaki.
Of course, it is costly to add security measures. However, we should take some
financial burden and invest in maintaining safe transit services for our customers.
Once something happens, we can easily lose trust from our customers. No matter
how hard we may work to maintain safety, only one accident can ruin trust and lose
customers. Thinking this way, we should be willing to invest in security and safety
to some degree.
An official from the Subway and Streetcar Service Division of the Transportation Bureau also
emphasized the challenges of striking a right balance between security and passenger
convenience, expressing the view that “subways should be easily accessible by passengers, as
long as they pay the fare. The passengers cannot be security-checked as they are at an airport or
seaport. If the same security level at those facilities were introduced into the subway system, it
would be just too inconvenient for the passengers. We have to strike a balance between
security and convenience.”
Another issue that troubles transit operators is finding the right balance between cost
effectiveness and adequate security. As explained by an official from the Subway and Streetcar
Service Division of the Transportation Bureau,
It is unrealistic to say that our security measures are perfect. As transit operators,
we have to do as much as we can to guard our system, but we cannot afford an extra
budget on security more than what we are implementing right now. We are
implementing our security measures to an extent in which the society feels that we
are doing as much as one transit operator can do to improve transit security. At the
same time, our budget is too limited to spend enormous amounts of money. Our
current security level is a product of balancing out those things.
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London
Because of the attacks of the Irish Republican Army over the last thirty years, the British have
had a long and intense experience dealing with terrorist attacks on their railway system. As a
result of this, they have developed a layered system of directives, security standards, and
procedures that far exceeds those encountered in the other countries included in this study. For
many years prior to 9/11, the British authorities put many strategies into action to prevent
terrorist events on what is perceived to be the most vulnerable part of their railway network,
the London Underground. The attack against the Tokyo Metro, and subsequently the 9/11
attack and the attacks on the Madrid and Moscow railway systems, made the British realize
that they had to deal with a different brand of terrorism than the one they were accustomed
to—one that involved coordinated attacks on a much larger scale and on multiple targets, and
which was carried out not by opportunist terrorists avoiding capture but by determined
individuals, who had meticulously planned their actions and who often did not care about
escape options.
First, the sarin attack against the Tokyo subway served as a wake-up call for the British
authorities in terms of their system’s vulnerability to massive chemical attacks. According to
Adrian Dwyer of the British Transport Police,
Tokyo impacted on the activities of the British Transport Police dramatically. You
have a system in Tokyo that is not dissimilar in many respects to the London
Underground, although cleaner and arguably more efficient. And it was very clear
that they got so many things wrong in their response because they weren’t
expecting what happened. They didn’t stop trains quickly; they didn’t stop people
moving ahead; they didn’t identify what had happened as an attack within the first
hour. They didn’t know it was a chemical agent called sarin until three hours after
the event. So we looked in detail at Tokyo. We had the Japanese railway persons
over here talking to us. We sent people out to Japan. A lot of contact was made
particularly with our colleagues over in the States looking at their interaction
because they’re much closer to the Japanese than we are. And I think it’s fair to say
again that for us there was a more dramatic change in the way we police the
railways following Tokyo than there was in the way we police the railways
following 9/11.
According to London Underground officials, even though the 9/11 events did not bring about
an immediate or dramatic change, they did result in a change in mindset about security
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among transit operators—the recognition that this is an international threat and there needs
to be a reevaluation of security procedures, more training on security awareness and
contingency planning, and even a closer collaboration with other countries and coordination
and help from the British government.
According to Graham Marshall, the security specialist of Network Rail, the infrastructure
manager of the railway responsible for all major stations in London:
Post-9/11, the thinking has moved more toward a terrorist base that does not
follow the norms we knew until then. As we saw in Madrid, there were extensive
civilian casualties. If we look at other parts of the world, we have terrorists that are
prepared to die. All of that brings a different dimension to it. And although for
probably about five years before 9/11, we were talking about and thinking about
the issues to deal with chemical, biological, and radiological terrorism, post-9/11
that has taken on a new energy because this weaponry may well be used by this type
of terrorists. We never really thought the Irish Republican terrorists were going to
get into these weapons. Whereas perhaps the more international type terrorists, the
more fundamentalist terrorists will perhaps be able to do so. 9/11 has injected a
new sense of urgency. 9/11 was a different scale of things, and subsequent to that
there has been more work about what we are calling catastrophic scale terrorism in
London and what role the railway industry could play in part of that response.

The Role of Government and Centralized Planning
Transit security in Great Britain includes a web of governmental agencies, which interact with
the police and the local transit operators to define the criteria for prevention planning and
emergency response. At the national level, the Rail Safety and Standards Board is a nonprofit
company responsible for setting safety standards, and the Department for Transport is the
agency that oversees the railway industry and mandates its security requirements. The
Department has a number of boards and committees. The most important for transit safety
and security is Transport Security, shortened to TRANSEC, which regulates airports, seaports,
and most recently (after 9/11) the rail transport industry in terms of security. TRANSEC is
responsible for a document called the National Railway Security Program (NRSP), which sets
out the minimum standards to which rail operators must adhere if they want to run a rail line.
Such standards include the layout and design of station facilities, and their equipment such as
type and location of lockers, bicycle-securing facilities, “litterbins” (that is, trash cans), and
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CCTV technology. TRANSEC also issues guidance to local authorities regarding the street
furniture and parking around the station. TRANSEC has regulatory powers and issues
recommendations on how security should be enacted. In certain instances, it also issues
statutory instructions, which relate to the operation of stations and have the force of law.
TRANSEC also has enforcement powers and employs inspectors to ensure that the statutes and
standards are being met by the railway companies. “Given the fragmentation of the former
National British Railway into a number of private companies, TRANSEC’s regulatory action
helps to make sure that common security standards are applied across the railway industry,”
said Adrian Dwyer of the British Transport Police.
In addition to the baseline security mandates, the government informs the transit operators
about the threat level, which defines the strategies to be followed. According to Graham
Marshall of Network Rail (the infrastructure manager of the railway in charge of the London
stations),
The government security services and TRANSEC give us the threat level and the
British Transport Police give us their steer on operational response. And depending
on what they tell us, we then determine what we are going to do. The transit
operator will reach an agreement with the transport security regulators as to what is
realistic according to the threat and risk level. We can vary what we do within
reason.
Another important contribution of the central government is in the area of funding. Despite
the fact that the railway operators are now private companies, they still receive significant
public subsidies for operation and security purposes. While in general railway companies are
supposed to cover expenses for security from their income, it is possible to make special cases
to the government for special funding to cover emergency services or specific security
equipment.
Another governmental body, this at the municipal level, is Transport for London (TfL), which
coordinates all the different modes of transportation in the greater London area. According to
Barrie Wickens, TfL and the London Resilience Team coordinate and facilitate the efforts of all
the disparate transportation agencies in emergency planning and disaster recovery. They
interact closely with the British Transport Police (BTP), the police force of the railways in
England, Scotland, and Wales. Dwyer says that BTP typically responds to incidents of a
security nature, but also gives advice and informational briefings to transit operators about the
implications of their security decisions. BTP has developed assessment procedures for
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unattended items, as well as a threat analysis process, to evaluate whether or not a phone call
threat should be taken seriously. According to officials from London Underground,
...our relationship with BTP is quite key, and it has probably been the cornerstone
of our response to deal with terrorism for the last thirty years. We pay for their
services, something in the region of thirty million pounds per year, and for that we
get a pretty good service.... The big advantage of having BTP is that they
understand the environment and the importance of not interrupting the service
unnecessarily, and so they’ve always got in their mind this balance between what is
a real threat and the fact that if we’ve got trains still in tunnels that creates
potentially a bigger risk for us. They work very closely with us if there is an item
that is identified as suspicious or they believe that it’s one that needs to be taken
seriously. BTP liaises closely with other police forces and emergency services. If
they get suspicious items they’ll make an assessment using X-ray or other
equipment. If they deem the item as explosive, they’ll call in the bomb squad. If
they think there’s a real terrorist incident, they will call the antiterrorist branch of
the metropolitan police.

The Role of Transit Operators
While the government provides the baseline mandates and security standards, different
transportation companies also develop an additional layer of security measures, based on advice
they pull in from TRANSEC, TfL, and BTP. While security on trains is the responsibility of
transit operators, security on the station is primarily the responsibility of Network Rail, the
infrastructure manager, which is responsible for all major railway stations in London. Twentysix private transit operators of passenger trains and some freight trains pay access fees to use
the lines maintained and secured by Network Rail. According to Graham Marshall of
Network Rail,
The transit operators expect Network Rail to deal with the security at the stations
and the infrastructure it controls. They are quite happy because they know that we
are going to do that. We would of course consult with them if what we would do
impacts on their operations. They will deal with the security on their trains and
depots if that’s appropriate to them.
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At the same time transit operators, like London Underground, have their own security
division, which provides advice to the management about the security of their system, oversees
the implementation of security standards, and at times develops better ways to meet them.
These multiple layers of agencies from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors that legislate,
regulate, implement, and police require a very significant level of coordination. This
interagency coordination received high marks by everyone interviewed. Graham Marshall of
Network Rail said,
...coordination is pretty good, actually, because there is usually one person in each
of the companies responsible for security and we get to know each other even
though it’s roughly 30 people… Inevitably, there are some issues and areas where
our business needs are slightly different and so one has to deal with that. But
actually, it’s a fairly cooperative process, with no frictions, and a good working
relationship. There are some times where TRANSEC would indicate that they want
to introduce some security instructions and the industry and operators will enter
into a dialogue about the practicality of that because you know clearly they are
coming from a perspective of saying “we really want to introduce these security
measures,” and we are coming from a perspective of “well how do we do that and
run a railway?” But I don’t think that is so much of a friction. I think it is a
practicality issue, one of pragmatism. And there is an acceptance that terrorism has
to be dealt with and threat levels have to be abided by and responded to. So I’ve
found that it’s always been a very close working relationship.
However, coordination and partnership require work and time investment. As the officials
from London Underground state,
A couple of things learned are through actual incidents in London, one of which is
that terrorism is not an opportunity for point gathering or for making out which
agency is the best. We all have to make our contribution. The other thing is that
partnership is not easy. You have to invest time, and emergencies are not the time
to meet your counterpart in other agencies. So that means you have to do drills and
exercises and more drills and more exercises, to not just know that they exist and
what the organization is, but to know who our colleagues are and what they look
like and coordinate with them and all these sorts of issues that take time and
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resources, but at the end of the day it makes that incident management run so
much more effectively and smoother.

Coordination with European Agencies
At the same time that the different British agencies coordinate with one another to tackle
issues of transit security, they are also recognizing that the threat is international, and hence
the collaboration and coordination should also be at a level that transcends national
boundaries. Like the French, who discussed the merits of a pan-European cooperation, the
British also stressed the importance of sharing information and knowledge about security with
their neighbors on the Continent. According to Graham Marshall,
There have been some well established links with continental Europe, and there are
a number of committees that a few of us go to that are related to railway security
across Europe. We share best practices and such on these issues, which is quite
effective. Different countries approach security in slightly different ways and the
threat to those countries is different. Some of them perceive themselves to be more
at risk than others. But there is a good relationship there. We have not had the
same collaboration with our American counterparts—not because there has been
any problem—it’s not just seen to be necessary at the moment to have that
relationship with American transport operators.

Security Strategies
The British make a distinction between “counterterrorism” and “resilience” and craft different
strategies to address each. They develop counterterrorist measures to try to prevent terrorist
acts on their railway systems and resilience measures to respond in an expedient and efficient
way if such acts occur. Our interviewees in Great Britain talked about an integration of
security strategies that include a mix of security technology, customer outreach, design, and
policing measures. As one official of the London Underground put it, “I don’t think one of
these four strategies sits out on its own. You’ve got to do each one. And you’ve got to have an
element of each one in terms of being able to combat terrorism or crime in general. One can’t
work in isolation.”
The London Underground vehicles and stations are equipped with an extensive system of over
6,000 CCTV cameras, some of which have been in place for twenty years and are being

Mineta Transportation Institute

Transit Security Strategies of International Agencies

165

upgraded or replaced. The British Transport Police advises railway operators in terms of what
sort of CCTV to install, where to locate it, where to view the system, how long to hold the
tapes, and who has access to them. Cameras in sensitive areas are connected to alarms, which
will go off in the case of an intrusion, and the CCTV will automatically switch to the
appropriate monitor. There are two distinct CCTV systems in the London railways: a CCTV
system that is in place for the safe running of the trains, so that the driver, for example, can see
whether the last set of doors are clear of the platform (known as Platform Train Interface—
PTI); and a CCTV system that is used to safely manage the station environment, but that also
has an additional crime prevention and detection role by using real-time monitoring and
recording capabilities. A significant number of these cameras are fed back to a central location
that is under both operational and police control.
In the early years, the system was placed as a deterrent to crime, and according to BTP, many
prosecutions of criminals have been successful primarily because of the quality of the CCTV
evidence that was presented. However, the TfL representative expressed some doubt about the
current effectiveness of the system against crime:
As a generality in the UK, we seem to be great believers in CCTV systems.
Personally, I think their value is often overstated, particularly in the media.
Criminals have reached a point where they have realized that most CCTV systems
are not monitored all the time. They also can disguise themselves. So the
probability is that there won’t be a rapid enforcement response if an incident
happens. I’m not talking about major incidents like bombs, but about basic crimes
like shoplifting, assaults, robberies, things like that.
In regards to CCTV’s effectiveness against transit terrorism, the British Transport Police
stated,
It’s a little more difficult to prove it has deterrent value. But what we can say is that
there is good circumstantial evidence that terrorists who do not want to get caught
go out of their way not to be seen by CCTV. That either means they do not carry
through their terrorist act at CTTV stations or they start doing things like putting
up their collars and pulling down baseball caps and actually drawing attention to
themselves as people who are trying to avoid CCTV. And that’s just as good as
actually putting up a flag and saying, “Hey, look at me.” You can certainly chart a
move away in terms of terrorist attacks from stations with CCTV to stations
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without CCTV. That could be coincidental, although I don’t think it is. But there’s
no way to prove it because the terrorists won’t tell us what influenced their
decision.
The difficulty of constant monitoring of the TV screens of the system by humans was
emphasized as a weakness of CCTV. Nevertheless, Marshall of Network Rail expressed his
conviction that surveillance technology will spread to “virtually every facet of [public] life in
the UK over the next 10 to 20 years,” because this intrusion of privacy for security reasons is
generally accepted by the British people.140
Other than the CCTV technology, transit operators in Great Britain are trying to keep abreast
with emerging new technologies that could help them identify the spread of chemical,
biological, nuclear, or radiological agent (CBNR) attacks on their system. Whereas bomb
explosions typically cover a relatively small geographic area, CBNR agents can spread quickly
through the tunnels of a railway system. Indeed, as in the other cities of our case studies,
transit operators seemed to be particularly concerned with CBNR attacks because of the
difficulty of detecting and responding to them in the railway network, and the agencies’
relative lack of experience in dealing with such attacks.
Policing by the trained officers of the BTP is considered absolutely essential for the safe and
secure operation of the railways in Great Britain, and for this reason the number of officers has
steadily increased in the last years. Currently, the London Underground commissions 530
dedicated officers, and this number will likely increase to 630 by the end of 2004. This is from
a total, nationwide force numbering some 3,000 officers. Interestingly, BTP is not an armed
police force. Dwyer said the British believe that having a force dedicated completely to transit
security is advantageous as it provides consistency across the system and familiarity on the part
of the officers with issues and concerns that may be unique to transit systems.
While the presence of dedicated police officers helps give transit passengers a perception of
protection, transit operators argue that they also rely on vigilance by their staff and customers.
Dressed in very visible blue uniforms, the staff often conducts station patrols and checks
station entrances. They are trained on how to deal with unattended bags and how to recognize
potential chemical and biological agents. Nevertheless, they are always instructed to call the
BTP for any incident that may require immediate response.
The transit operators value customer feedback and have launched information and outreach
campaigns to raise the vigilance of the public. Posters at the stations and stickers on train
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windows remind passengers to report any suspicious activity or unattended bag. Officials from
the London Underground described the importance of public participation:
We’ve got over three million customers who use our system every day and they are
very good at reporting things that are unusual and bringing them to our attention.
The community must help police itself; the police can’t do it all by themselves.
There are just not enough of them. We’ve been really careful about raising
awareness without raising fear, which is a thin line… In that sense, the public here
are well educated especially where you’ve got regular commuters. They understand
after all those years of IRA terrorism that they’ve got to be careful and alert and
raise the alarm. One of the difficulties from our part is not to keep on raising public
awareness too often or unduly because people will switch off. We haven’t reached
that point, fortunately.
Indeed, people are so vigilant and “raise the alarm” so frequently that the London
Underground has to deal with reports of about 10,000 unattended items every month.
In Great Britain, the strategy of using environmental design to design out crime and terrorism
in transit facilities emerged gradually in the last decade. According to Thom Rhys Jones,
Managing Director of Jefferson Sheard Architects, a London-based architectural firm that
specializes in public transportation facilities, security is one of the major factors considered in
the design of a railway station. As he argued, “the consequences of not designing for security
are overwhelmingly more dire than the consequences of maybe not achieving some of the other
factors such as good image or accessibility.” He distinguished between passive means of
security (for example, good sightlines, lighting, elimination of dead spaces) and active security
means, such as CCTV systems built into the design. Today, Barrie Wickens of TfL
characterizes design as the key criterion, explaining that:
...it’s much easier, quicker, and certainly cost effective to have a trained security
professional sit down with an architect or an engineer with the plans of whatever
type of structure it is and for that security specialist to say well “Why is that door
there?” “Does it have to be that way?” “What sort of glazing have you got there?”
“Don’t you think that would be better if it was laminated with bullet-resistance
glazing?” “Why do you have to have a glass roof?” If a bomb went off below that,
we know that fragmentation is the biggest killer, not necessarily the blast. There is
so much risk potential that you can design out.
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Some of the design measures that transit operators in Great Britain are focusing on include the
elimination of places where people can conceal explosives without being noticed. Vending
machines and telephone booths are built with sloping tops, so that nothing can be hidden on
top of them. Hiding places have been eliminated from the rolling stock. Trash cans have been
completely banned from the stations that TRANSEC perceives as the most vulnerable; at the
remaining stations, they have been replaced with receptacles that have a plastic ring holding a
bin of see-through plastic.
London Underground also tries to secure the in-between spaces—the walkways, the escalators,
the storage rooms, the power supply rooms—which often receive less attention from a
planning and design perspective than the platforms and entrances. Rooms with no public
access remain locked. For some public restrooms, the station management has just instituted
mechanically operated latches so that the staff know when someone wants to use them and
who is going in. Finally, the system does not have one centralized control room, but many
scattered in different places. According to London Underground officials, this is a security
measure, as terrorists cannot knock out with one blow all of London’s transport because it is
not all in one place.
The cost of retrofitting the subway stations of the London Underground was mentioned as a
major hurdle in the effort to design out terrorism. According to the London Underground
officials,
If you can make those design changes before the bricks and mortar, it saves a
fortune in monetary terms… The problem for us is that we have a system that’s 140
years old and of course it’s not just cut and cover like you have in places like New
York and Washington. But you’ve got deep-level tube, and the very nature of the
original design will give you places to conceal things. Working them out of the
system is always very difficult.
Additionally, many stations are built under historic buildings (or “listed” buildings as called
by the British), which makes a deep retrofit impossible.
In discussing the mix of security strategies that make up their arsenal against terrorists, our
interviewees in London did not fail to mention the many hurdles and challenges they have to
encounter. These include: the inherent vulnerability of a railway system, the balance between
security measures and passenger convenience, and the high costs of safety.
The BTP were the first to stress the challenges of securing an open mass transit system:
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There is an inherent vulnerability and if you want to run an open mass transit
system you live with the vulnerabilities and you probably tackle them through
intelligence. You have to take them out before they pose a threat. Once they are in
it, it’s probably going to be quite difficult to do anything about it. When I was in
Moscow back in March, and there you have a system where the Moscow metro has
loads of police, it has loads of armed militia, it has loads of dedicated security
guards guarding individual cross passages on the system, and yet they get suicide
bombers on the trains. Now if they can’t stop it, it seems unlikely that anyone else
is going to, to be honest. So if we’re looking at advances, I think probably what
we’re looking at are more strategic advances in terms of better intelligence and
stopping these people before they actually get in. The flip side of that of course is
that if they do get in and something happens, you should deal with it much more
effectively. One of our main concerns is that we don’t want to end up doing the
terrorists’ job for them by shutting the system unless you absolutely have to, or
maximizing the disruption over a larger area than is necessary. Therefore having a
system that rapidly proves it is all right again is actually as important as
establishing what has gone wrong.
The issue of striking the right kind of balance between adequate levels of security and
operational efficiency was emphasized by the officials of London Underground:
It’s very difficult to apply aviation-type controls to a rapid transit system. We’ve
got 250 access points just by stations alone. Let alone all the interchanges, that
probably brings us up to 1,000 or more. You can’t put those sorts of controls into
place in a railway system. It’s just not practical. So we have got measures in place
that are appropriate for the environment and for the type of system that we run, but
some of the things you can’t do. You don’t want people to have to wait too long in
the course of their travel.
For this reason transit operators reject at this time the idea of mass screening of passengers,
unless new sensing and radar technologies are developed.
Finally, there is the tension between what Graham Marshall of Network Rail called “the twin
demands of security and operating a railway.” Funding the security improvements is always an
issue for transit operators trying to run a profitable business. Striking the right balance
between what will make their customers feel protected and what they can afford paying for is a
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challenge. As one operator admitted, “As a security specialist, I could do a lot more but I’d
probably ruin the business.” As Marshall so poignantly stated,
You always have to find the right balance, and this balance probably is more than
the balance of money, the availability of funds to do these [security improvements].
It is about allowing people to go about their normal daily business using the
railway as part of that daily business. But in a way that brings the maximum
security. And that’s always a balance.

Madrid
Similar to the British, the Spaniards also have long experience with terrorism because of the
activities of the Basque autonomist organization ETA over the last four decades. Nevertheless,
as described in the previous section, Al Qaeda’s attack on the national commuter rail system
RENFE Cercanias in Madrid on March 11, 2004, took them by surprise. As a result of this
attack, the Spaniards now understand that the terrorist threat can be “general” and
“international” and can hit any train system in any country. Taking action to diffuse such a
threat and make passengers feel safe again has been the overriding consideration of the transit
operators in Madrid since the attack of 3/11. According to Manuel Rodriguez Simons,
Director of the Security and Civil Protection of RENFE, the largest railway company of Spain,
We know that the security is a parameter without which nothing can work. You
can have the cleanest trains in the world, you can have the most luminous stations
in the world, and you can have the most comfortable trains in the world, and you
can have the most punctual trains in the world. But when you go in a train and you
do not feel safe because there are people that produce insecurity, you’re not going to
use the train. So, we, not as department, but as the entire company, have a
philosophy. Security is a very important factor and it is necessary to take care of it.
You go to other cities that after certain hours, people do not use public transport
because they are afraid of what can happen. We do not want anyone to stop using
our trains because of their fear.
Similar views were expressed by Javier García Cadiñanos, Director of Security of Madrid’s
metro system.
When riders demand security, we need to give them security. Today, the first
demand of the citizen is security. You have to consider that there is a condition that
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must always be considered. There is a premise that is strictly fulfilled in all public
transportation—that security does not make public transportation work well. But
if the security does not work well, public transportation does not work well.
While Spanish transit operators perceive security as the overriding factor for the successful
operation of their system, they also believe that first and foremost it is the national
government that should have the onus of identifying and tackling security threats.

The Role of Governmental Agencies
The role of the government is to provide information to transit operators about security threats
as well as instigate regulations pertaining to security standards. According to RENFE officials,
the strategy of the rail companies is to follow the instructions given by the Ministry of
Defense, Ministry of Interior, and the police, and follow the preventative measures as part of a
national strategy and plan. Manuel L. Rodríguez Simons, Director of Security and Civil
Protection at RENFE says planning for stations and trains is, therefore, not completely in the
hands of transit operators, but RENFE and Metro Madrid can “count on the Security Forces
because they are really those who have the vision most adjusted to reality because they are
living this day to day and have the pertinent information.”
Another important actor in the security of the railway systems is the police force. RENFE has
its own force and receives assistance from Spain’s Civil Guard and National Police, while
Metro Madrid is protected by the municipal police. The police give the transit operators “the
most pertinent points and suspicions.” Transit operators immediately report to the police any
suspicious item or activity observed in their premises. Coordination between the
governmental, municipal, and transit agencies is very important; therefore, representatives
from each agency meet regularly to discuss security threats, measures, and strategies.
According to Rodríguez Simons, this close coordination was crucial in preventing another
fatal blow to RENFE, on April 1, 2004. On that date, a RENFE operator detected a suspicious
cable on a high velocity (AVE) train from Madrid to Seville. RENFE immediately notified the
Civil Guard, who discovered 12 kilograms of explosives and were able to deactivate the bomb.

Coordination of Transit Operators
The two major rail operators in Madrid are Metro Madrid and RENFE. At the moment,
transit operators in Spain are public sector companies.141 Each company has its security
department, which is responsible for the prevention of and response to criminal acts and
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accidents. Transit operators are coordinated by the CRTM, a public sector agency that
coordinates services, networks, and fares so as to offer consumers a consistent and high-quality
service.
Representatives of CRTM, RENFE, and Metro Madrid meet consistently to discuss common
security strategies. According to Rodríguez Simons of RENFE and García Cadiñanos of Metro
Madrid,
There is a great relationship between CRTM, RENFE, and Metro Madrid. We have
activities together and always join in the same strategies. We habitually act
together on requests to the administration. We not only have good relations with
departments of security similar to ours, but we have relations with other systems of
security—with other train and metro systems, other organizations; even if they’re
not train systems, they have common problems. For example, big commercial
centers, the highway transport system security, the telephone company. That is, we
have relations with the biggest users of security in the country. We have an
association in which we’re all members. We meet two times a month and we discuss
all the problems that we have and we look at all the solutions that each agency has
taken in security matters.

Security Strategies
The 3/11 terrorist attack on RENFE has resulted in increased security measures. Officials
claim that this is primarily a response to citizen demand, as surveys have shown them that
riders want more security on their system. At the same time, they emphasize that despite their
desire to be responsive to passenger requests, they want to also achieve the appropriate level of
security so that their systems do not turn into “armored bunkers.” Similar to other transit
operators in other countries, RENFE and Metro Madrid believe that the primary
responsibility of security lies with the government. As stated by Garcia Cadiñanos,
We in the Metro are going to continue increasing the security for attacks of all
types—from common delinquency to terrorism—with the measures that we can,
but we know that the way to fight terrorism is not through the metro security
service. It is through the security services of the state. It is the police with
information services that must prevent terrorist attacks. And we collaborate with
them, but we, for example, are not going to put explosive detectors in all the
entrances of the metro because it is impossible. We have thousands of people who
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enter the network, it would produce chaos in the city, and we cannot do this. No
metro in the world does this. Not even in a country that actually had more terrorist
attacks in their network, such as Moscow.
RENFE and Metro Madrid have retrofitted their stations with anti-intrusion and detection
systems and have added many more video and security cameras. Passengers embarking on the
high-speed (AVE) trains of RENFE have to enter a pre-embarking area with scanners, where
only passengers can pass. According to RENFE officials, “This is a great method from the
security point of view. And contrary to what we thought when we implemented this,
passengers appreciate it and understand it like another attribute—something good that makes
them feel more calm. It also seems that passengers consider this space as a luxury—nobody can
bother them, they have free air, etc.” This measure, which started in 1992, applies to the line
connecting Seville to Madrid, and Madrid to Leida, but it is in the plans to provide such preembarking spaces for many more lines.

Figure 24 Security Scanner, Atocha Station, Madrid

Public outreach focuses on the training of employees so that they know how to respond in
cases of emergency and how to protect the system more effectively. Unlike transit operators in
Great Britain who give a big emphasis on outreach campaigns with warning posters and
advice for the public, the Spaniards have not pursued such a policy, due to fear that they may
scare their passengers. According to RENFE officials, “We wanted the passengers to feel the
same as before March 11. A lot changed, but what we wanted was for the people not to
notice.”
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Police surveillance is a critical component of the security strategy. RENFE has contracted
private security officers who constantly monitor their facilities and watch over the passengers
and staff. In the first months after the 3/11 attack, the national police provided an additional
layer of surveillance at the stations. Similar to the situation in Tokyo, transit operators in Spain
have observed that this increased police presence has resulted in a considerable decrease in
crime at the stations and on trains.
The importance of design for station security was emphasized by officials at RENFE and
Metro Madrid.
Security is based on prevention, and prevention begins with design. A station
designed without security criteria in mind would be much more insecure and much
more expensive to protect. To feel safer and for a facility to be safer, you must count
on design elements. In the past, the stations were created with other criteria. For
example, we had many entrance points to bring citizens closer to the metro. Today,
things have changed. One hundred years later, the citizen does not care so much if
he walks along the street or inside the metro. What he does worry about is feeling
secure that nobody is going to rob or attack him.
Javier García Cadiñanos and Rodríguez Simons offered the following recommendations for the
design of new stations:
• Have one entrance point, if possible at the same level with the street, so that the rider does
not have to enter an access by stairs.
• Utilize central platforms instead of lateral platforms because the most risky elements are
the passageways. If you have a central platform where the train goes, you can avoid
passageways.
• Use transparent materials in station design; make platforms, waiting areas, halls, and
corridors as clear and transparent as possible.
• Construct footbridges and above-ground passageways so passengers can see and be seen.
• Install panoramic elevators (you should be able to see everything from inside).
• Eliminate dark zones; install good lighting.
• Eliminate long and winding corridors.
• Fit vending and automatic teller machines (ATMs) in specific niches of the wall with no
space on top or underneath, and supervise the recharge/reload area by CCTV.
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• Instead of having trains with several compartments, the wagons should be converted into
one long wagon.

Figure 25 Nooks and Crannies Offer Hiding Places, Madrid Metro

In contrast to the other systems of our study, the Spaniards do not think that the elimination
of trash cans from stations would help security. According to Jesus Rodriguez Molina of
CRTM, “If there is an attack like the one on 3/11, there is nothing about the trash cans that
would make a difference; the trash cans are an element of low importance. If somebody wants
to be a suicide bomber, trash can or no trash can [it’s] not going to do anything.”
The challenges that transit operators in other cities and countries had described were also
echoed in the responses of Spanish operators. For one, they were concerned with maintaining a
proper balance between safety and convenience. As RENFE officials pointed out,
When you have to pass from a scanner, this is an inconvenience. So what we try to
do is explain to the passenger that we know it’s an inconvenience, but at the same
time, communicate that it’s important for him, so that he feels more secure….If
you put more barriers, more barriers, more barriers, the more you put, the safer the
system, but it’s more uncomfortable for the passengers. That is the problem. The
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security is possible, it’s easy to put up several barriers. But, it is also necessary to
have limits.

Figure 26 Police at Central Madrid Station

The inherent vulnerability of an open system against terrorists who could attack suddenly,
anywhere, and with no regard for their own lives was also discussed. At least one Spaniard, the
Technical Director of Concorcio Transportes Madrid, appeared quite cynical about the
effectiveness of security measures. According to him, the best thing that measures can do is to
make passengers feel safe.
In the first place, unlike those politicians who guarantee security, from the point of
a technical person, I have to say that security does not exist. What does exist are
methods to lessen insecurity. You never know what’s going to happen and I’m
telling you this because when the politicians tell you that these methods will
guarantee our security, it’s all false. What we can do is implement some measures
that make us feel more secure and those measures depend on the costs….We can
implement the most methods possible and create a theater of security, but this does
not mean that anything is more secure in the face of terrorism. In its own quality,
inflicting pain is very easy and preventing pain is extremely hard. And in a public
mass transportation, like the one we provide, the only way to guarantee security in
the metro is to close the metro. Yes, they do things, they put into works projects of
putting in more CCTV and they’re developing ideas. But, all of this is because you
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have to do something to increase the feeling of security or diminish the feeling of
insecurity. We’re not convinced that the methods that we can adapt are going to do
anything against Islamic terrorism. To control everything is very complicated. We
have to be humble and attempt to improve other types of insecurity of aggressions,
theft, etc. If we speak about general security, yes we can do a lot. But regarding
terrorism, no. The security against terrorism makes more sense in the airport and
planes, because they have the luxury of time. Here, in this transportation, no.
The above attitude was, however, the exception rather than the norm. While most transit
operators we talked to readily admitted that they had no way of measuring the effectiveness of
their different security measures, they also believed that these measures did make things more
difficult for potential terrorists.

A Pan-European Collaboration: UITP
The events of 9/11 in New York and 3/11 in Madrid have triggered a new type of cooperation
among European operators, and the European community has become more active in the field
of security than before. The European transit officials in our interviews stressed the importance
of this pan-European collaboration in the fight against transit terrorism. In their view, such
collaboration is imperative because many trains transcend national borders, connecting cities
in different countries. The organization that works to promote this collaboration is the
International Union of Public Transport, which has its headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. The
European Union has allocated a significant budget for cooperation on issues of public transit,
and of course security has become a very important element in this cooperation. UITP has
regional offices in different parts of the world (but not in the United States), and members in
eighty different countries. Its members are public transport operators, transit authorities, and
bus and train manufacturers. One of their research projects, the Voyager Project, is financed by
the European Union and dedicated to developing future urban transport policies.
UITP has instituted setting primary guidelines, benchmarking, and recommendations for
coordinating security standards across the European Union.142 UITP also promotes and makes
known examples of security measures or new designs that have been most successful in
anticipating terrorist threats and minimizing the risk of terrorist attacks. UITP also
disseminates security information drawing from experiences in the United States and Japan. It
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also informs and contributes to projects such as Prismatica/Chromatica dedicated to
optimizing audio-video surveillance.
In early 2003, a subcommittee of the Voyager Project took on the task of creating policy for
transport security. So far UITP has established a platform for discussion and policy making,
creating a permanent security group of UITP members from different countries. It has also
signed a declaration emphasizing security issues in public transport. One of the declaration
requirements urges every transit operator to carry out a vulnerability analysis on their system.
According to Andrea Soehnchen, Project Manager of the Voyager Project,
UITP wants to work with the big operating companies who have resources
necessary to develop security guidelines, technologies, and methodologies that
could be used by smaller-scale operators who simply don’t have the resources to
start from scratch to redo everything. Something we have in mind could, for
instance, be like a checklist of weak points in infrastructure where you have to
think about. So this could be very helpful for small-scale operators.
The motivation for UITP activity around security is the realization that the terrorist threat is
international and that the public transport network is a very easy target for terrorists. While in
the past terrorism was considered a localized event, the events of 9/11 showed to the world
that the threat could touch everyone. Then the attacks in Madrid and Moscow demonstrated
that it could happen in Europe’s public transport. This has led to an increasing awareness of
European operators and by the European Union, which plans to invest significant funds in
assisting member states to carry out vulnerability analysis and inspections at stations.
UITP believes that the fight against terrorism will be much more effective if agencies across
countries join hands. “Preventing terrorist attacks costs a lot of money, so we need to work
together at the international level. We cannot work in an isolated way. Speaking of terrorists,
they collaborate. They have international networks of terrorism and we need to also have
international antiterrorism efforts. To inform each other about the threat as soon as there is a
risk is very important.” UITP hopes, therefore, for an interagency, interdepartmental, and
international dialogue around security to define a common understanding of security aspects,
and hopefully lead toward the adoption of common standards and common emergency plans in
the mass transit industry—an approach already followed by the airline industry. This is
certainly a challenge because different agencies are structured differently. In terms of policing,
for example, some operators have their own dedicated police, while others rely on municipal or
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even federal police. Since the fight against transit terrorism involves agencies at different
levels, a major concern, according to UITP, is to establish who is responsible for what and how
agencies can better support each other rather than compete. According to Mohamed Mezghani
of UITP:
What is important to remember is that public transport companies are responsible
for operations. They are not security agencies. So first they have to satisfy the
mobility needs of their citizens—of course, in a secure environment. But they are
not the security agencies and the responsibility of each one has to be defined very,
very clearly. The public authorities are responsible for security and if there is an
incident or attack, the public transport companies are responsible to restore traffic
as soon as possible. They should help the authorities organize the first aid in the
emergency situations, but they are not responsible to follow up the threat or to
investigate the terrorist threat, if we are speaking about terrorism. This is the task
of the public authorities and the security agencies. So having a discussion on who is
responsible for what is very important.
While coordination between the different agencies responsible for transit security is
imperative, UITP also stresses the importance of coordination and communication with the
press and other mass media. According to Mezghani:
The relationship with the media and the press is very important. How they report
on security problems and how they report on attacks, reasons of an attack, and
consequences of an attack is very important. We have to establish confident
relationships with the media and to communicate with them in a permanent way,
not only when there is a problem. If you take the example of Paris, they have
periodic meetings with the journalists to communicate about public transport, and
not only when there is a problem. I think this is very important to make them
better understand. Because if you only speak with them when there is a problem
then they don’t know your system, they focus only on the problem and don’t try to
understand what is happening and why you reacted in that way.
According to UITP, standardization would be helpful in emergency procedures, security
audits, announcements and signs, as well as design and materials. In Europe, there are a variety
of standards at the moment, which may create confusion to passengers. Coordination in staff
training would also be cost-effective, since agencies would not have to develop their own
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training programs, and which could take place in selected centralized locations and follow a
commonly adopted procedure. This would save money and also may lead to greater security.
As explained by Andrea Soehnchen, “If something were to happen in Paris, for example, they
could bring staff to help from other places and this staff would automatically know his place in
the whole system, in the information chain, in the reaction chain, and they could handle the
equipment.”
In summary, the message that UITP seeks to send to its members is that collaboration,
coordination, communication, and standardization of strategies, tools, and procedures are the
all-important attributes in the transit industry’s fight against terrorism.
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WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED, WHERE ARE WE HEADED?
You can have the cleanest trains in the world, you can have the most luminous stations in the
world, you can have the most comfortable stations in the world, and you can have the most
punctual trains in the world. But if you cannot step on a train without feeling safe, you are
not going to use that train.
—Madrid transit official following the March 11, 2004 attack

Overview: Public Transit in a Post-9/11, Post-Madrid, Post-London World
Public transit systems around the world have for decades served as a principal venue for
terrorist acts. While the most significant of these attacks—such as the sarin attack in Tokyo or
the bombing of the Paris Metro—garnered worldwide public attention during the 1990s,
popular and political response in the United States was generally muted. Perhaps this was
because attacks on U.S. transit systems were still quite rare; perhaps this was due to
Americans’ legendary parochialism; or perhaps it simply reflected wishful thinking. Whatever
the reasons for this indifference among many elected officials, it was not justified.
During the mid-1990s, four separate acts of terrorism and extreme violence on U.S. transit
and rail systems killed 14 and injured more than 1,000.143 While police and intelligence
officials who oversee transit properties grew much more vocal in the late-1990s in calling for
increased attention to the vulnerability of public transit systems to terrorist acts, the issue still
had not caught the attention of most transit passengers, voters, members of the media, or
elected officials.
This all changed, of course, on September 11, 2001. While the focus of the 9/11 attacks was
on a different part of the transportation system, the effects on the affected public transit
systems were dramatic and, in the case of New York, long-lasting. The vulnerability of open,
accessible public transit systems and their passengers to terrorist acts was cast in sharpest
possible relief. Concern over the vulnerability of transit systems has been heightened further
by the more recent, deadly March 11, 2004, attacks on commuter rail trains in Madrid, Spain,
and the July 2005 attacks on the London Underground and bus system. The London attacks in
particular dominated news coverage for at least a week and raised popular concern over transit
terrorism in the United States, such that transit security in the United States is now widely
viewed as an important public policy issue.
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The attention and subsequent fear generated by these attacks clearly motivated policymakers
into action. Indeed, one of the more sobering lessons from this research is that significant
system- or industrywide changes in security planning have often required either prolonged
exposure to lower-scale attacks (such as those perpetrated by the IRA against transit systems in
greater London) or a mass casualty event (such as in Tokyo or Madrid). Absent such events,
concern, even repeated, dire warnings by vigilant police and intelligence officials, have too
often gone unheeded by many elected officials.
Research on transit security in the United States has mushroomed since 9/11; this study is part
of that new wave of research. This study contributes to our understanding of transit security in
several ways. Perhaps most important, we employ a wide array of approaches and methods to
examine a complicated issue: How are transit managers around the United States and around
the world working to better protect their systems and passengers from terrorist attacks? To
address this question we have pursued a multipronged research approach.
First, we reviewed and synthesized nearly all previously published research on transit terrorism
and updated previous efforts to systematically chronicle previous terrorist attacks on transit
systems around the globe.
• We complemented these detailed case studies and interviews with a comprehensive survey
of 113 of the largest transit operators in the United States regarding prior threats and
attacks, past and current security planning and policing efforts, and approaches to four
security strategies—policing, technology/hardware, public education/outreach, and crime
prevention through environmental design (CPTED).
• We conducted detailed interviews with federal officials here in the United States
responsible for overseeing transit security, and with transit industry representatives both
here and abroad to learn about efforts to coordinate and finance transit security planning.
• We conducted detailed case studies of terrorist attacks on transit systems in London (prior
to July 2005), Madrid, New York, Paris, Tokyo, and Washington, D.C. These case studies
involved reviews of documentary evidence and other written materials, in-depth interviews
with transit officials and other key stakeholders, and physical inspections of the systems
and sites of the attacks.
Thus, our multipronged research approach is both domestic and international, as well as
qualitative and quantitative, all in an effort to increase the reliability of our findings on this
complex issue.
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A second distinguishing feature of this research reflects the experience and expertise of the
research team. We are scholars of architecture and urban design, civil and transportation
engineering, and transportation and urban planning, and not intelligence, policing, or
security. We have, therefore, approached this research from the perspective of the people who
finance, design, build, operate, and use public transit systems, rather than from the
perspective of those who police them.
For example, the role of system design in transit security has received far less attention in most
previous research on transit security than policing or surveillance. A specific focus of this work
is on system design. We conducted inspections of transit stations in each of the systems
studied, and we collected detailed information on attitudes toward and applications of crime
prevention through environmental design (CPTED) strategies in our survey of U.S. transit
operators.
A third and final distinguishing feature of this research is that it updates the findings and
conclusions of many previous studies in this fast moving and rapidly evolving literature. We
found from our survey, for example, that security planning efforts have progressed
significantly at U.S. transit systems since a 2002 U.S. GAO survey of transit operators was
published in 2003.
Given this overview of our research, the next section provides a synthesis and discussion of
twelve principal findings from the study.

Findings: A Dozen Lessons Learned
1. Public transit systems are open, dynamic, and inherently vulnerable to terrorist
attacks; they simply cannot be closed and secured like other parts of the
transportation system.
Public transit systems are a central part of urban life. They assemble strangers from diverse
economic, social, ethnic, and religious backgrounds and convey them though a wide array of
neighborhoods and districts. They are, by definition, open, dynamic systems that cannot be
closed and regulated like the air transport system.144 Such sentiments were expressed
repeatedly by the hundreds of people interviewed and surveyed for this research. Not
surprisingly, most of the transit managers and security officials who responded to our survey
viewed their transit systems as “very vulnerable” to terrorist attacks.
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While public officials understandably call for efforts to make transit systems 100 percent safe,
it is simply impossible to secure the thousands of bus stops, hundreds of miles of bus routes,
many dozens of miles of rail rights-of-way, and the hundreds of stations used daily by millions
of passengers in most large metropolitan areas. The challenge is especially daunting given a
growing wave of suicide bombers who are willing to risk capture or death to execute an attack.
According to an official interviewed in Madrid, “I have to say that security does not exist.
What does exist are methods to lessen insecurity. You never know what is going to happen. I
am telling you this because when the politicians tell you that these methods will guarantee our
security, it is all false.”
Said another Madrid official, “You should accept that there is an inherent vulnerability to the
system, and if you want to run an open mass transit system you live with the vulnerabilities
and try to tackle them through intelligence and stopping these people before they actually get
in.”
Such sentiments raise legitimate, and perhaps troubling, questions about whether transit
security planning efforts are perceived by transit officials as more symbolically effective (at
creating a sense of safety among the public) than substantively effective (in reducing the
likelihood and/or magnitude of a terrorist attack). At the very least, they reflect the daunting
challenges to security planning for open, accessible transit systems.
2. The threat of transit terrorism is probably not universal; most attacks in the
developed world have been on the largest systems in the largest cities.
While the chronology of terrorist attacks on transit systems reviewed in the second section,
“Securing Urban Rail Transit Systems against Terrorism: A Review of the Literature,” and in
“Appendix A: Chronology of Terrorist Events,” documents hundreds of incidents occurring
over many decades, the deadliest and most politically influential of these have occurred on the
largest transit systems in the most politically and economically powerful world cities, such as
London, Madrid, Moscow, New York, Paris, and Tokyo. This suggests that efforts to combat
transit terrorism should be focused on cities and transit systems where the likelihood and
potential effects of terrorism are greatest.
This observed asymmetry of risk likely reflects both the symbolic importance of particular
world cities, and the fact that transit use tends to be concentrated in the largest and most
densely developed metropolitan areas. As noted in the section “Securing Transit Systems in the
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Post-9/11 Era: A Survey of U.S. Transit Operators,” the ten largest U.S. transit systems
(operating in nine metropolitan areas) carried 65 percent of all transit trips reported to the
Federal Transit Administration for 2002, while the rest of the transit systems carry the
remaining 35 percent. Thirty-nine percent of all 2002 U.S. transit trips occurred in one
metropolitan area, New York, and 31 percent of all U.S. transit trips were carried by just one
system, the New York MTA.145
While the most dramatic attacks have occurred mostly on major systems in world cities, this
does not mean, of course, that local bus service or smaller cities are safe from attack. In the
developing world, terrorist attacks on transit are more likely to occur on buses than on trains.
Further, as noted in the sections “Securing Urban Rail Transit Systems against Terrorism: A
Review of the Literature,” and “Institutional Responses to Increasing Transit Security Threats:
Interviews with Key U.S. Stakeholders,” security experts report that some terrorists have on
occasion chosen to attack unexpected targets in order to elevate fear and anxiety among the
general population. But while smaller U.S. cities—like Oklahoma City—are clearly not safe
from terrorist attacks, the very small role played by public transit in these cities (where the
mode share of trips can dip below 1 percent) suggests that they are a far less likely venue for an
attack than larger cities where the role and visibility of public transit are proportionally much
greater.
3. The asymmetry of transit terrorism risk is at odds with a political system of public
finance that favors distributing funding somewhat equally across jurisdictions.
Given the observed asymmetry of risk, how should security resources be deployed? If strategic
transit security policies start from the premise that attacks will inevitably occur, then
“success” is not elimination of all attacks, but preventing and/or minimizing the most
damaging attacks—which are most likely and most deadly on the largest transit systems.
While focusing security efforts on large transit systems in New York, Washington, D.C., and
Los Angeles, for example, may motivate terrorists to shift their focus to smaller systems and
smaller cities, such a shift could be viewed as evidence of success in securing the most
symbolically significant and attractive targets.
However, there is a strong tendency in the public finance of transportation, and indeed in most
realms of public finance, to distribute funding widely among political districts and
jurisdictions. This helps to explain why federal per-rider subsidies tend to be far higher in
places like Chapel Hill, North Carolina, than in places like New York City. This natural
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tendency to spread out money evenly does not square with the asymmetry of transit systems’
risk of terrorist attack and may undermine the effectiveness of federal and state transit security
policies and programs. Thus, despite New York’s domination of U.S. public transit patronage,
it is unlikely that the U.S. Congress—comprising entirely geographically based
representatives concerned with the distribution of resources among their competing
jurisdictions—will see fit to devote a third or more of all federal transit security resources to
the New York metropolitan area.
4. Transit managers are struggling to balance the costs and (uncertain) benefits of
increased security against the costs and (certain) benefits of attracting passengers.
Transit managers are in the business of attracting and conveying paying customers. They
endeavor to provide safe, fast, and reliable service at a reasonable price, but transit systems
worldwide have struggled in a losing, century-long battle with private vehicles for market
share in urban travel—especially in most U.S. cities. Thus, from the perspective of transit
system planners and managers, safety and security are important, albeit intermediate, means
to the end goal of carrying passengers. As one transit industry official put it, “What’s
important to remember is that public transport companies are responsible for satisfying the
mobility needs of citizens. They are not security agencies.”
With respect to the sometimes competing objectives of maximizing security versus
maximizing ridership, one London interviewee noted,
Our primary function is to get loads of people to use trains. Security, I would
suggest, is still seen as a secondary but integral function. So you won’t have the
world’s most secure station built, but you’ll have the world’s most cost-effective
station built with security enhancements.
Calls for increased attention to security have come in recent years from passengers, the media,
local officials, and state and federal governments. With respect to the latter, mandates for
regular and comprehensive security planning, more formalized safety and emergency response
procedures, increased policing and surveillance, and so on, were criticized by many of the
transit officials we interviewed (both domestic and internationally) as unfunded mandates that
strain already depleted transit system budgets. Indeed, the need for increased security funding
was the central finding of the 2003 GAO study of transit security in the United States, and
such calls for increased funding were echoed in this research.
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According to one transit official interviewed, transit terrorism is a tremendous burden for
agencies because they “have to be lucky all the time, while the terrorists only have to be lucky
once.” Regarding the need for public subsidies to support security expenditures, another
interviewee noted, “In the end public transport is a business… There comes a point at which
the businessman will say that the security measures will cost him more than the revenues. The
key issue for addressing risk is to get things down to ‘ALARP’ as we call it, ‘as low as
reasonably practical.’”
In addition to concerns over the costs of security programs that many of those surveyed and
interviewed see as tangential to the central goals of transit agencies, many of those surveyed
and interviewed also expressed concerns over the uncertain nature of the risks and the
uncertain effectiveness of increased security expenditures. “How,” several of those interviewed
asked, “should systems evaluate costs and benefits in such uncertain environments?” Further,
what techniques or approaches offer systems the most security bang for the buck? In response
to such questions, the transit systems examined for this study have pursued an array of ways to
prioritize expenditures on security:
• customizing security measures based on a detailed evaluation of risk for each site (Paris).
• assessing risks based on station location, sociodemographics of the region, and delinquency
rates of surrounding population (Madrid).146
• focusing efforts on terminal stations, the most heavily patronized stations, and stations near
government buildings (Tokyo).
• giving top priority to securing sites with concentrations of hazardous materials (Paris).
• conducting public surveys of riders’ perceptions and concerns to help prioritize needs
(Madrid).
5. Given the varying roles and mandates of agencies of the central government
(ministries, federal agencies, and so on), intelligence services, police agencies, and
transit operators on matters of security, close coordination and cooperation are
critical to effective transit security planning.
Many of our interviewees spoke of the need for a multilayered and multipronged system of
security in which various agencies play very different roles. Many transit officials with whom
we spoke suggested that interagency cooperation is common to the industry, which bodes well
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for increased coordination with police and security agencies in the years ahead. One U.S.
transit industry representative put it this way:
The transit industry, because it’s public, is very mutually supportive. Transit
agencies aren’t in competition with each other. In fact, we have a long history of
aiding one another with training programs. Even if you’ve hired a consultant to
help you with a program, we’ve seen people really sharing that program or that
information. One of the roles that [the American Public Transportation
Association] plays [is that] we’re a conduit for the sharing of a lot of that
information.
Many of those interviewed emphasized the importance of clearly defining roles and
responsibilities among actors. Several also stressed the need for frequent and regular
interaction among agencies to share information and agree on common strategies and tactics.
Concluded one London interviewee,
Partnership is not easy. You have to invest time, and emergencies are not the time
to meet your counterpart in different agencies... Resilience is about coordinating
and facilitating efforts of all the disparate, separate agencies to ensure better quality
of performance, aiding and leading to a more effective prevention or recovery than
might otherwise be the case.
Finally, several of the transit officials interviewed noted that the American Public Transit
Association (APTA), the leading U.S. transit industry organization, has come to play an
increasingly central security coordinating and information-brokering role, and, in doing so,
has come to more closely resemble the activities of the International Union of Public Transport
(UITP) outside of the United States.
6. An important benefit of improved coordination is standardization of emergency
training, security audits, and disaster preparedness procedures, and the issuance of
common guidelines about security.
While the airline industry has adopted common international security standards and
procedures, many other modes—and in particular public transit—have not done so. For
example, several of our European interviewees noted that while many EU member countries
have developed highly integrated international passenger rail service, similarly integrated
systems of rail security have been slow in coming.
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Likewise, while the many transit agencies typically operating in larger metropolitan areas have
developed reciprocal integrated fare and passenger information protocols, efforts to integrate
and standardize security practices and procedures among transit systems within metropolitan
areas and between them are relatively new.
Such standardization can be particularly helpful to smaller transit operators that do not have
the resources to independently develop security standards and procedures. For example,
standardizing safety guidelines and signage, the structure and content of security
announcements, and the marking of emergency exits on trains and in stations can all help
passengers avoid confusion in times of emergency. Likewise, standardizing security training of
personnel—drivers, supervisors, and managers—can improve coordination with police, fire,
and intelligence officials in times of emergency. Many of the respondents from U.S. transit
agencies surveyed for this research noted that, under the guidance of the federal government,
standardized security plans and training programs were being integrated into already
established emergency response training programs traditionally aimed at responding to
personal and property crime and smaller-scale emergencies.
7. Despite significant progress in increasing coordination between transit and
police/intelligence agencies, however, much work remains.
Despite significant and ongoing efforts to improve the coordination and cooperation between
the many, largely independent transit agencies operating in large U.S. metropolitan areas,
seamless integration of routes, schedules, and fares has long proven elusive. Given the widely
divergent goals and objectives of public transit and police/intelligence agencies, the challenges
to increased coordination and cooperation are even greater.
Perhaps the greatest challenge to improved coordination identified in this study concerns
ambiguity and uncertainty over lines of authority and responsibility. Put simply, it is not
always clear who is responsible for what. Said one European transit industry representative we
interviewed,
The public authorities are responsible for security. If there is a terrorist incident or
attack, the transit authorities are responsible to restore traffic as soon as possible.
They [the transit agencies] should also help the public authorities to organize first
aid and emergency response, but they are not responsible to follow up the threat or
to investigate the threat.
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Despite the many challenges, nearly everyone queried agreed that increased coordination was
needed. Such coordination could take many forms: (1) coordination between neighboring
transit agencies; (2) coordination among local, state, and federal law enforcement officials; (3)
information sharing with the media and the public; (4) the improved dissemination of best
practices in security planning; (5) consistent emergency response procedures and protocols; (6)
improved integration of different security-related technologies; and (7) increased international
cooperation in sharing information and best practices. With regard to the latter, one official
interviewed noted, “The threat is international and the way you need to deal with it is an
international effort,” although several other interviewees cautioned that while international
threats call for international collaboration, security measures should not be applied equally in
all places; they should be customized according to local organizational/governmental
structures, transit system size, age, and characteristics, and the specifics of local cultures and
norms.
8. Passenger education and outreach is a challenge; informed passengers can increase
surveillance and safety, fearful passengers may stop using public transit.
While most of the officials surveyed and interviewed agreed that public education and
outreach had become an important part of transit security planning, respondents were in
general more ambivalent about education and outreach than about policing, technologies, or
crime prevention through environmental design. In particular, many cited the challenge of
raising awareness without raising fear. One of the officials we interviewed in Madrid said that
their goal following the March 11, 2004, attacks was to augment feelings of security and
diminish feelings of insecurity: “The methods we chose and implemented after the March
attack were not so much about combating terrorism; rather they were used to help riders
recover a feeling of security.”
While our interviews suggest that passenger outreach efforts on security have been more
common outside the United States, nearly all those to whom we spoke agreed that it is a
delicate balance between creating a perception of excessive, pervasive security (which is both
costly and can incite fear among passengers) and too little security (which can promote a sense
of danger and unchecked lawlessness). Said one transit industry official, “You have to reassure
but not scare off passengers, because if you exceed a certain level [of police activity] it might
be considered that you are in a very insecure place.”
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Enlisting the public’s help in security surveillance can be effective, but entails risks. Excessive
marketing of vigilance can create an environment of paranoia, where everything and everyone
can be viewed as potential threats. Such paranoia can suppress ridership while overwhelming
transit officials with security tips, and panicked passengers can compound damage after an
attack.
Further, a strong emphasis on police and public surveillance can lead to social profiling, and
with it losses of privacy and civil rights. Said one interviewee,
Here [in Spain] there would be a lot of problems and it wouldn’t be convenient to
start screening passengers. People will not accept being identified, profiled, and
searched, even if it is a random manner, because when you select, you elect and you
have to do this with a certain objective and clear parameters. You will be accused of
discrimination because this is labeling, marking people with certain physical
features.
9. The role of crime prevention through environmental design in security planning is
waxing.
Most of our survey and interview respondents were familiar with the concept of crime
prevention through environmental design (CPTED), and most viewed CPTED—which
considers how the physical design of spaces can affect both the likelihood and impact of
criminal or terrorist activity—as an important longer-term strategy to address both crime and
terrorism on transit systems. According to the respondents to our survey, CPTED was given
much less weight in security planning prior to 9/11. Since 9/11, however, over 80 percent of
the respondents now believe that CPTED is a somewhat or very effective strategy in
preventing terrorist attacks. This ranking of effectiveness is similar to both policing and
security hardware and technology strategies, and well ahead of public education and outreach.
According to one of our interviewees in Madrid, “Security is based on prevention, and
prevention begins with design. A station designed without security criteria would be much
more insecure and expensive to protect.”
While the potential effectiveness of CPTED was widely touted by those queried, many also
noted that design is a longer-term strategy. CPTED strategies can be cost-effectively
incorporated into new stations and terminals, such as in the new Météor and Eole Lines in
Paris, the new Line 11 in Madrid, and the new Bilbao subway in Spain. On the other hand,
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most interviewees thought retrofitting old stations to be extremely costly for the most part.
Concluded one interviewee regarding the retrofit of older stations, “The best you can do is to
use some passive methods such as mirrors, cameras, and increased lighting.”
Even among officials interviewed who work primarily in policing and security, knowledge of
and enthusiasm for CPTED principles was widespread. For example, one London transit police
official said,
If you take a station like Baker Street, it’s a very dark [and listed as a historically
significant] building so there are limitations on what can be done to change the
appearance and structure. Not very much can be done at all. We’d like better
lighting, more CCTV (closed-circuit television). We’d like cleaner lines—any
vending machines that are brought in, we’d like them to have sloping tops so
nothing can be put on top of them. We’d like them to be totally accessible or
totally enclosed so they’re easy to search or impossible to put something in. We
look at tamper-evident seals [on entryways to areas closed to the public], which
can’t be physically locked. When it comes to new stations, bigger, brighter areas,
clear sight lines, certainly those are the kinds of things that we would seek to
influence.
10. Since 9/11, transit agencies are more likely to adopt comprehensive, multipronged
approaches to security planning than in years past.
Our survey and interviews focused in detail on four types of security strategies—policing,
technology, education and outreach, and CPTED. We found that attention to all these
strategies has increased since 9/11, and over half of the respondents now view all four
strategies as central or significant parts of security planning efforts.
Prior to 9/11, most of the respondents to our national survey of large transit operators
emphasized policing and hardware/technology in security planning and placed far less stock in
either public education or CPTED. While the survey respondents believed that the
importance of policing and hardware/technology increased after 9/11, their assessments of the
importance of public education and, especially, CPTED increased even more.
This broad support for all four security strategies reflects a consensus among those surveyed
and interviewed regarding the need for a comprehensive, multipronged approach to transit
security planning. Several interviews cautioned against becoming too reliant on just one or
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two strategies. As one of our London interviewees noted, “Each one [strategy] on its own can’t
work in isolation. I don’t think that one of them sits out on its own. You’ve got to do each one.
And you’ve got to have an element of each one in terms of being able to combat terrorism or
crime in general.”
11. The public transit industry is vulnerable to security policies or programs that
reduce the speed, comfort, or convenience of transit, and may benefit significantly
from policies that increase the attractiveness of transit.
Despite significant public investments over the past three decades, public transit systems
around the United States continue to lose market share to private vehicles. Many transit
systems have made important strides in increasing the comfort, safety, and convenience of
using transit, but matching the speed and flexibility of private autos remains a challenge.
Transit security policies and programs that increase the hassle of, or delays in, riding buses and
trains may significantly undermine an already vulnerable and distressed industry. For example,
the random bag and parcel inspections instituted on the New York City transit system
following the July 2005 attacks on the London public transit systems added stress and delays
to travel on the United States’ most heavily patronized transit system—stress and delays that
inevitably make traveling by other modes relatively more attractive.
Many of the transit system managers interviewed for this study expressed concerns than new
security measures should enhance the perceived safety and attractiveness of their systems and
not add to delays, inconvenience, or perceptions of heightened risk. The importance of
creating safe, attractive systems for passengers, report some transit officials queried, is
sometimes lost on security officials; as one interviewee from London stated prior to the July
2005 attacks,
It’s trying to balance providing maximum security while still providing the kind of
service people expect. People still want to go from point A to point B as fast as
possible. They don’t want to be delayed, even for security reasons. So that’s the
balance...it’s still a struggle...I think that is something that in the future has to
evolve, to where you have that perfect balance where you can say, “I think we’re
providing as much security as we can,” but it’s also seamless to the customer so you
don’t have an operational slowdown.
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12. Given the uncertain effectiveness of antitransit terrorism efforts, the most tangible
benefits of increased attention to and spending on transit security may be a
reduction in transit-related personal and property crimes.
Terrorist attacks on transit systems in the United States and abroad have increased in recent
years in both frequency and severity. Likewise, public and political concern over the issue has
skyrocketed since 9/11. The fact remains, however, that transit patrons remain far more likely
to be victimized by personal crime than a terrorist act.
According to Federal Transit Administration data, an average of 279 people have been killed
on or by public transit each year over the past decade. In addition, an annual average of 18,784
people have been injured on or by public transit over the same period. Crime ostensibly
unrelated to transit use—such as being robbed and killed while waiting at a bus stop—would
push those figures far higher. This means that, between September 11, 2001, and August 11,
2005, more than 1,100 people have been killed on or by public transit, and more than 75,000
have been injured on or by transit in the United States.147
Further, studies have repeatedly shown that fear of crime is a significant deterrent to transit
use for many people.148 So while political attention and public resources are currently focused
on transit terrorism, reductions of personal and property crimes on public transit systems
could prove to be a significant collateral benefit of safer, more secure public transit systems.
In both our review of the research literature and in several of our interviews were repeated
suggestions for a “dual-use strategy,” whereby antiterrorism measures may be effective in
reducing transit crime. Coincident with new security measures on the Tokyo Metro, both
robberies and thefts are down substantially. Likewise, fewer crimes were reported in the period
following the implementation of random parcel inspections in Madrid.
Such complementary benefits, however, are not assured without careful attention to
congruency between anticrime and antiterrorism measures. Some of those interviewed
suggested that anticrime and antiterrorism efforts are not always reciprocal and
complementary. “By preparing your system to react to terrorist attacks, you also prepare it to
react to different types of crime… But the other way around is not always true” (Madrid
transit official).
However, others argued that anticrime and antiterrorism efforts worked very much hand-inhand. Said one London transit security official,
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It’s easier for a terrorist to operate in an environment that is disorderly, that does
not give the appearance that someone is in charge, the area does not look secure.
Actually taking care of the little things, and insuring that there is order and
maintenance, sends a signal that it’s hard to operate illegally or carry out an attack
in this environment. There’s a deterrent effect.

Postscript
Whether these findings are discouraging or heartening depends on one’s perspective. The
stakes are high, the risks uncertain, and the solutions unclear. The July 2005 subway and bus
attacks in London offer a sobering reminder that transit systems remain inherently vulnerable
to terrorist actions, even on systems where security and vigilance have been the modus
operandi for decades. While public transit systems are likely to remain attractive and
vulnerable targets for terrorists, U.S. transit systems are today better coordinated, policed,
monitored, and designed, and staff and passengers are better informed and prepared than just a
few years ago. How effective these efforts will be (or have already been) in deterring or
minimizing a terrorist attack is unclear. What is clear, however, is that crimes of all types—
political, personal, and property—drive riders away from transit systems. So if the recent rise
in transit security planning deters a major terrorist attack, or simply the activities of a lone
pickpocket, the transit industry will be better off as a result.
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198

ID

Terrorist Event Description

Source

A female suicide bomber set off a powerful
homemade bomb outside a Moscow subway
station Tuesday evening, shooting metal
shrapnel through a crowd of commuters and
killing at least 10 people. Suicide bomber turned
away from the subway station after seeing police
officers checking documents at the entrance.

http://
www.washingtonpos
t.com/wp-dyn/
articles/A493762004Aug31
.html

Moscow

Suicide bombing kills
10 outside Moscow
subway

2 7-Apr-04

Thailand

Songkhla
Province

Two bomb blasts on
Bomb
southern Thailand rails

Train

Above

75

3

First bomb exploded in station. Killed one child
and injured 37 others. Evidence indicates that
the bomb was put in a suitcase and left at an
information counter on the platform. Police
report having found evidence of C-4 explosives.
A third explosion (second was at a hotel)
occurred on Saturday night at a gas plant next to
the railway station in Songkla province. The blast
derailed a train running from Yala to Bangkok.
Authorities haven’t ruled out that the explosion
might have been accidental.

http://
www.irrawaddy.org/
news/2001/april7.html

3 2-Apr-04

Spain

Madrid

Guard finds bomb on
high-speed train line
tracks

Train

Above

0

0

Bomb-disposal experts alerted by a railway
employee found 22-24 pounds of dynamite
under the rail line about 40 miles south of
Madrid on the rail line running to Seville.
Explosives were connected to a detonator with a
430-foot cable.

http://
www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2004/04/03/
world/main610143
.shtml

4 12-Mar-04 Greece

Serres

Greek train bomb plot Sabotage Train
thwarted: Five
propane rail cars
crossing Bulgarian
border were rigged to
explode

Above

0

0 Bulgarian
Mafia

Five train cars due to transport propane were
rigged with a large quantity of explosives. Train
was traveling from Bulgaria to Thessalonica.

http://
www.freerepublic.co
m/focus/f-news/
1096423/posts

5 11-Mar-04 Spain

Madrid

Simultaneous
explosions kill 191,
injure 1,800

Train

Above

1,800

Ten near-simultaneous explosions during rush
hour on 4 separate trains. Backpack bombs

Various

6 6-Feb-04

Russia

Moscow

Suicide bomber blows Bomb
up a subway car in the
Moscow metro during
rush hour

Train

Below

100

Russia, Moscow: a suicide bomber blew himself
up on a Green Line Subway train during morning
rush hour. The bomb equivalent in force to 9-11
pounds of TNT, made of ammonia saltpeter and
aluminum powder, exploded in a tunnel
between Avtozavodskaya station and
Paveletskaya station; 41 people died, and more
than 100 were injured.

http://
www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2004/02/06/
world/main598471
.shtml

7 5-Feb-04

Russia

Moscow

A bomb blast in
Bomb
Moscow’s
Byelorusskaya subway
station injures 15
people

Station

Below

15

A bomb blast in Moscow’s Byelorusskaya
subway station injures 15 people. The bomb was
probably meant to explode after a train arrived
on the platform to cause more casualties.

http://
www.cnn.com/
2001/WORLD/
europe/02/06/
russia.explosion/

Bomb

Bomb

Station
Above
Perimeter

10 Islambouli
Brigades

191

41 Chechen
rebels

0
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Date

Country

City/Region

Event Summary

Device

Facility

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

Responsible
Party

Source

Police foiled a plot to detonate two powerful
bombs aboard a train headed to busy Madrid
railway station on Christmas Eve. One of the
two 25-kilo (55-pound) bombs was found on
Wednesday on the train traveling from the
Basque city San Sebastian to Madrid, but police
stopped the train in the northern city of Burgos,
evacuated it and removed the bomb. One of the
two detainees was found carrying a similar bomb
before it could be planted on the train. Both
bombs were hidden in suitcases or knapsacks.
The one found on the train was timed to go off
just before 4 p.m. (1500 GMT) at Madrid’s
Chamartin Station.

http://
www.aljazeerah.info/
News%20archives/
2003%20News%20
archives/December/
24%20n/Police%
20thwart%20Basqu
e%20plot%20for%
20Christmas%20Ev
e%20train%20bom
bing.htm

The 10-kg bomb detonated as the train was
pulling into Yessen-tuki Station, on a line that
had been bombed just three months ago.
Surviving passengers said a woman detonated
the bomb (suicide), thought to have been in a
bag packed with bolts and other metal objects.

http://
www.channel4.com/
news/2003/12/
week_1/
05_russia.html

8 24-Dec-03 Spain

Madrid

Police thwart Basque Bomb
plot for Christmas Eve
train bombing

Train

Above

0

9 5-Dec-03

Southern
Russia

Suicide bombing of a
commuter train in
southern Russia.

Bomb

Train

Above

150

1 27-Sep-03 Ethiopia
0

Adiquala

A bomb kills two and Bomb
injures nine on a
passenger train
traveling from Djibouti
to Ethiopia

Train

Above

9

2

The bomb exploded under a seat when the train
was near the town of Adiquala, about 190
kilometers (115 miles) from the border with
Djibouti.

http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/
hi/world/africa/
3144190.stm

1 8-Jul-02
1

Yala Province

Two injured in
southern Thai train
bomb explosion

Bomb

Train

Above

2

0

The two injured--a railway policeman and a
security officer--were inspecting the train after it
had reached the final stop. They found a box left
in the last car and were trying to examine it
when it blew up, the railway officials said.

http://
www.nationmultim
edia.com/
page.arcview.
php3?clid=2&id=6
2373&usrsess=1

Bombay

Eleven people were
killed in a bomb
explosion on a
commuter train.

Bomb

Train (in
station)

Above

50

11

Land mine attack by
rebels on a passenger
train kills 100, injures
150

Landmine Train

Above

152

146 UNITA
(National
Union for Total
Independence
of Angola)

60

Russia

Thailand

1 14-Mar-03 India
2

1 10-Aug-01 Angola
3

0 ETA

44 Chechen
rebels

Blast hit carriage reserved for women
http://
passengers. The explosion happened in the busy news.bbc.co.uk/2/
Mulund Station during the evening rush hour.
hi/south_asia/
2848123.stm
Train was carrying civilian passengers when it
was derailed by a landmine and then attacked by
UNITA rebels. Train was 150 km southeast of the
capital Luanda as the train headed for the town
of Dondo.

http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/
hi/world/africa/
1489317.stm

9 Abu Sayyaf

Bomb on light rail train explodes as it enters
Blumentritt Station

Jenkins

Manila

Bomb kills nine on
metro

Bomb

Station

1 16-Dec-00 Russia
5

Moscow

Bomb threat against
Moscow metro

Threat

Station

Below

0

0

Bomb threat forces closing of Dmitrovskaya
Station

Jenkins

1 26-Oct-00 India
6

Punjab

Bomb on passenger
train kills one

Bomb

Train

Above

30

1

Bomb explodes on train

Jenkins

Bomb threat halts
Amtrak train

Threat

Train

Above

0

0

Bomb threat forces the evacuation of an Amtrak Jenkins
train

1 20-Oct-00 United
7
States

199

1 30-Dec-00 Philippines
4
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Date

Country

City/Region

1 17-Oct-00 United
8
Kingdom

Event Summary
Train accident raises
terrorism concerns

Device

Facility

Sabotage Line

0

Explosives found in Kazansky Station lost
luggage office

Jenkins

Below

8 Chechens

Bomb explodes in underground passage

Jenkins

Train

Above

12 ULFA
(Liberation
Front of
Assam)

Bomb explodes on passenger train

Jenkins

Station

Below

9

0

Bomb explodes in underground station

Jenkins

Above

40

0

Damaged track causes derailment

Jenkins

0

0 Chechens

Bomb plot for Kursky and Volgograd stations
foiled

Jenkins

0 IRA

Bomb found and detonated in an Underground
station

Jenkins

2 10-Aug-00 Russia
0

Moscow

Explosives found in
Moscow railway
station

Bomb

Station

Bomb kills eight in
underground passage

Bomb
Bomb

Russia

2 31-Jul-00
2

India

Assam

Bomb on passenger
train kills 12

2 27-Jul-00
3

Germany

Düsseldorf

Bomb
Bomb explodes at
entrance to Düsseldorf
Underground

2 24-Jul-00
4

Ukraine

2 20-Jul-00
5

Russia

2 19-Jul-00
6

Above

36
0

10 Kashmiri
Extremists

Passenger train
derailed

Sabotage Line

Moscow

Terrorist plots failed

Bomb

Station

United
Kingdom

London

Bomb threats disrupt
Underground

Threat

Station

Below

0

2 16-Jul-00
7

Pakistan

Hyderabad

Bomb on train kills
nine

Bomb

Train

Above

35

9

Bomb explodes on train just outside of
Hyderabad

Jenkins

2 30-Jun-00
8

United
Kingdom

Belfast-Dublin

Rail line linking Belfast Bomb
and Dublin bombed

Line

Above

0

0

Bombing of tracks

Jenkins

2 23-Jun-00
9

Latvia

Riga

Group threatens a war Bomb
of the rails

Line

Above

Bomb damages tracks

Jenkins

3 13-Jun-00
0

United
Kingdom

Coventry

Vandals attack
commuter train

Sabotage Line

Above

0

0

Equipment placed on track in an attempt to
derail train

Jenkins

3 12-Jun-00
1

United
Kingdom

Daventry

Vandals attempt to
Sabotage Line
derail high-speed train

Above

0

0

Equipment placed on track in an attempt to
derail train

Jenkins

3 7-Jun-00
2

Philippines

Manila

Bomb found on
Manila Metro

Below

0

0

Bomb found and detonated in Manila metro

Jenkins

3 3-May-00
3

Russia

St. Petersburg

Bomb threats delay
Threat
trains in St. Petersburg

0

0

Bomb threat delays several trains

Jenkins

3 18-Apr-00
4

Belgium

Bomb

Fighters of
Democratic
Latvia

Three boys cause
trains to derail, killing
one

Sabotage Line

Above

22

1

Train derailed

Jenkins

3 28-Mar-00 Brazil
5

Sao Paulo

Angry commuters set
fire to train

Fire

Train

Above

0

0

Commuter set fire to train after it broke down

Jenkins

3 21-Mar-00 India
6

Bombay

Bomb injures four on
commuter train

Bomb

Train

Above

4

0

Bomb exploded on local commuter train

Jenkins
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Jenkins

Train

4

Source

Bomb explodes on express train

Bomb on train kills 10 Bomb

35

Terrorist Event Description

Jenkins

Uttar Pradesh

Above

Responsible
Party

High-speed train derails

1 14-Aug-00 India
9

2 8-Aug-00
1

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

200

ID

ID

Date

Country

City/Region

Event Summary

Device

Facility

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

Responsible
Party

Terrorist Event Description

Source

Pakistan

Hyderabad

Bomb on train kills five Bomb

Train

44

5

Bomb explodes on passenger train after it left
Hyderabad Station.

3 26-Jan-00
8

India

Bombay

Explosive device
found on Mumbai
train

Bomb

Train

1

0

Small bomb in a clock found on a train exploded Jenkins

3 19-Jan-00
9

India

Assam

Bomb derails train

Bomb

Line

4 6-Jan-00
0

India

Old Delhi

Bomb injures 12 at rail Bomb
station

Station

12

0

A bomb in a suitcase was placed under a seat in Jenkins
the railway station and exploded.

4 27-Dec-99 Japan
1

Tokyo

Bomb explodes at
train station

Station

1

0

Bomb explodes in locker at Urawa train station

Jenkins

4 26-Dec-99 Japan
2

Narita

Fires on three trains to Fire
Narita

Train

0

0

Arsonists set fire to express trains

Jenkins

4 24-Dec-99 Japan
3

Osaka

Bomb found in trash
bag on bullet train

Bomb

Train

0

0

Bomb found in trash bag of train

Jenkins

4 1-Dec-99
4

Hyderabad

Fifteen-pound bomb
found on main track

Bomb

Station

0

0

Bomb found at Kotori railway station and
defused

Jenkins

4 11-Nov-99 India
5

JammuKashmir

Thirteen killed in
bomb explosion on
train

Bomb

Train

Above

50

13

Bomb explodes on express train

Jenkins

4 4-Nov-99
6

Muridke

Bombs kill one

Bomb

Station

Above

3

1

Bomb explodes near a railway station

Jenkins

4 20-Oct-99 Brazil
7

Sao Paulo

Bomb explodes on
Bomb
commuter train in Sao
Paulo

Train

7

0

Bomb explodes on a commuter train

Jenkins

4 17-Aug-99 Russia
8

North
Caucasus

Attempted bombing
of passenger train

Bomb

Train

0

0

Man stopped while boarding a train with a
bomb

Jenkins

4 16-Aug-99 India
9

Calcutta

Explosives found at
railway station

Bomb

Station

0

0

Explosive found in rail station

Jenkins

Bomb

Train

Above

5

0

Bomb caused freight train derailment

Jenkins

Above

0

0 ULFA
(Liberation
Front of
Assam)

Bomb destroys bridge

Jenkins

3

0

Bomb explodes in station

Jenkins

Pakistan

Pakistan

Bomb

Above

Above

Above

ULFA
(Liberation
Front of
Assam)

Bomb explodes on track causing derailment of
freight train

Jenkins

Jenkins

India

Bomb derails train in
northeast

5 7-Aug-99
1

India

Bomb damages bridge Bomb
just ahead of
passenger train

Bridge

5 6-Jul-99
2

Australia

Sydney

Bomb explodes at
commuter railway
station

Bomb

Station

Colombo

Bomb found on rail
line

Bomb

Line

Above

0

0 LTTE (Tamil
Tigers)

Bomb found on tracks and disarmed

Jenkins

Three rail sabotage
incidents

Sabotage Line

Above

0

0 Friends of the
Railways

Tracks tampered with

Jenkins

5 17-Mar-99 Sri Lanka
3
5 19-Dec-98 Germany
4

201

5 9-Aug-99
0
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3 6-Feb-00
7

Date

Country

City/Region

5 18-Dec-98 Germany
5
5 10-Nov-98 Mexico
6

Chihuahua

5 10-Nov-98 Colombia
7

Event Summary

Device

Facility

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

Responsible
Party

Terrorist Event Description

Source

Three rail sabotage
incidents

Sabotage Line

Above

0

0 Friends of the
Railways

Tracks tampered with

Jenkins

Gunmen attack train,
killing one

Gun

Train

Above

3

1

Gunmen attack passenger train

Jenkins

Guerrillas dynamite
railroad track

Bomb

Line

Above

0

0 FARC
Tracks bombed
(Revolutionary
Armed Forces
of Columbia)

Station

Jenkins

Brazzaville

Several killed at rail
station

Attack occurred at Goma Tsese Station, killing
several

Jenkins

5 19-Sep-98 Russia
9

Moscow

Bomb threat at St.
Petersburg railway
station

Threat

Station

Below

0

0

Bomb threat forces evacuation of Moskovsky
Station

Jenkins

6 28-Jul-98
0

Bosnia

Sarajevo

Bomb explodes on
Sarajevo trolley

Bomb

Train

Above

0

0

Bomb explodes on trolley

Jenkins

6 27-Jul-98
1

Germany

Bomb threats disrupt Threat
Deutsche Bahn service

Station

0

0

Bomb threats force evacuation of several
stations

Jenkins

6 25-Jun-98
2

India

Train derailed in
Kashmir

Bomb

Line

23

0 Kashmiri
Extremists

Bomb explodes on rail line causing passenger
train to derail

Jenkins

6 24-Jun-98
3

India

Assam separatists
detonate bomb in
railway station

Bomb

Station

80

9 ULFA
(Liberation
Front of
Assam)

6 1-May-98
4

Japan

Unidentified saboteurs Sabotage Line
strike high-speed
bullet train tracks

Above

0

0 Kakumaruha

Below

0

0 Aum Shinrikyo Man threatened to release gas on Moscow
metro

Jenkins

Jenkins

Saboteurs removed bolts from high-speed rail
track, but it was discovered before train passed

Jenkins

6 19-Mar-98 Russia
5

Moscow

Poison gas attack
threatened

Threat

6 10-Mar-98 Pakistan
6

Lahore

Bomb on commuter
train kills eight

Bomb

Train

Above

34

8

Bomb explodes on a commuter train

Jenkins

6 8-Mar-98
7

Pakistan

Punjab

Bomb in Punjab kills
seven

Bomb

Train

Above

35

7

Bomb explodes on express train

Jenkins

6 3-Mar-98
8

Germany

Antinuclear activists
sabotage railway
cables

Sabotage Infrastructure

Above

0

0 antinuclear
activists

Power lines downed serving the track

Jenkins

Bomb

Above

25

18

Bomb exploded on a commuter train

Jenkins

5

0

Bomb explodes at a café near the central train
station

Jenkins
Jenkins

6 23-Feb-98 Algeria
9

Algiers

Bomb kills 18 on
commuter train

Train

7 15-Jan-98
0

Belgium

Antwerp

Bomb injures five near Bomb
central train station

Station

7 12-Jan-98
1

Russia

Moscow

Gunmen open fire on
tram

Gun

Train

Above

3

1

Man opened fire on a crowded tram

7 1-Jan-98
2

Russia

Moscow

Bomb injures three in
subway station

Bomb

Station

Below

3

0

Bomb explodes in Tretyakovskaya Metro Station Jenkins
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5 28-Sep-98 Congo
8

Above
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ID

ID

Date

Country

City/Region

7 30-Dec-97 Turkey
3
7 6-Dec-97
4

India

7 14-Nov-97 Tajkistan
5
7 1-Oct-97
6

Bomb on commuter
train injures six

Device
Bomb

Facility

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

Station

6

Tamil Nadu

Three bombs on trains Bomb
kill 11

Train

Above

54

Dushanbe

Bomb destroys
railroad tracks on
bridge

Bomb

Bridge

Above

0

Three bombs on train

Bomb

Train

Above

2

Bomb explodes on
passenger train

Bomb

Train

India

7 28-Sep-97 Georgia
7

Event Summary

Zugdidi

0

Terrorist Event Description
Bomb explodes under a seat in Bakirkoy Station

11 Islamic
Three bombs explode on separate passenger
Defense Force trains
0

30 Kashmiri
Extremists

Bomb explodes on bridge

Source
Jenkins
Jenkins
Jenkins

Three bombs explode on New Delhi to Amristar Jenkins
train

1

0

Bomb explodes on train

Jenkins

Antinuclear protestors Fire
sabotage railway

Line

Above

0

0 antinuclear
activists

Demonstrators set fire to railway

Jenkins

Mineta Transportation Institute

Venezuela

Caracas

Explosive device in
Caracas subway
station

Bomb

Station

Below

0

0

Small bomb found in subway and deactivated

Jenkins

8 9-Sep-97
0

Russia

Moscow

Bomb threat on
Moscow Metro

Threat

Station

Below

0

0

Inactive grenade found in Komsomolskaya
Metro after a bomb threat

Jenkins

8 7-Sep-97
1

India

JammuKashmir

Passenger train
damaged by bomb

Bomb

Line

Above

5

0 Kashmiri
Extremists

Remote control bomb explodes on track as
passenger train passes

Jenkins

8 21-Aug-97 Czech
2
Republic

Prague

Bomb threat to
Prague metro

Threat

Below

0

0

Bomb threat halted service for hours on metro
line

Jenkins

8 4-Aug-97
3

India

Bangalore

Bomb explodes in
passenger train

Bomb

Train

Above

15

0

Explosion on train

Jenkins

8 4-Aug-97
4

India

New Delhi

Train sabotage injures Sabotage Train
ten

Above

10

0

Train derailed

Jenkins

8 8-Jul-97
5

India

Punjab

Bomb on train kills 36 Bomb

Train

Above

70

Bomb planted under the floor of a passenger
train

Jenkins

8 1-Jul-97
6

Hungary

Kelei

Firebomb thrown at
railway station in
Budapest

Fire

Station

8 26-Jun-97
7

Algeria

al-Harrach

Bomb explodes on a
train

Bomb

Train

8 11-Jun-97
8

India

Raya Morh

Bomb explodes on
train track in JammuKashmir

Bomb

Line

8 4-Jun-97
9

India

Hyderabad

Naxalites damage
railway in Andrah
Pradesh

Sabotage Line

9 21-May-97 Thailand
0

Narathiwat

Bomb destroys train
track in Narathiwat
province

Bomb

Bridge

9 21-Apr-97
1

London

Bomb threats strand
commuters

Threat

Station

United
Kingdom

36 Sikh
separatists

0

0

Firebomb thrown at station, setting fire to a shop Jenkins

Above

40

0

Bomb in coach explodes

Jenkins

Above

0

0

Bomb on tracks damages cargo train

Jenkins

0

0 Naxalites

Sabotage of train and station

Jenkins

Above

0

0

Bomb destroys part of track on bridge

Jenkins

Below

0

0 IRA

Bomb threats at several stations cause
evacuations.

Jenkins

203

7 9-Sep-97
9
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7 20-Sep-97 Germany
8

Responsible
Party

Date

Country

City/Region

Event Summary

Device

Facility

United
Kingdom

Leeds

Two explosions and
bomb threats cause
rush hour havoc

Bomb

Station

9 8-Apr-97
3

Spain

Alsasua

Disturbances in
Basque region, attack
on train

Bomb

Train

9 25-Mar-97 Turkey
4

Istanbul

Twelve-pound bomb
rendered safe in
subway

Bomb

Station

9 14-Mar-97 India
5

Jalandhar

Bomb in Punjab
injures at least six

Bomb

Train

Responsible
Party

Terrorist Event Description

Source

0

0 IRA

Bombs at Leeds and Doncaster stations

Jenkins

Above

0

0 Basque
Separatist
Movement
(ETA)

Firebombs thrown at passing train

Jenkins

Below

0

0

Bomb found and rendered safe in Aksaray
Station

Jenkins

10

7

Bomb explodes in train after it left New Delhi
station

Jenkins

Mineta Transportation Institute

9 25-Feb-97 Germany
6

Saboteurs attack train Sabotage Line
lines

Above

0

0 antinuclear
activists

Power lines downed serving the track

Jenkins

9 14-Feb-97 Germany
7

Rails sabotaged

Sabotage Line

Above

0

0 antinuclear
activists

Power lines downed serving the track

Jenkins

9 21-Jan-97
8

Turkey

Istanbul

Bomb in Istanbul
rendered safe

Bomb

Station

0

0

Bomb found by a bank cash machine in Sirkeci
Station

Jenkins

9 17-Jan-97
9

Russia

Moscow

Bomb threat in two
train stations

Threat

Station

0

0

Threats closed Kazansky and Kursky stations

Jenkins

1 17-Jan-97
0
0

Germany

Pylon damages train
in extortion attempt

Sabotage Infrastructure

0

0

A pylon was sabotaged and fell onto an empty
train

Jenkins

1 16-Jan-97
0
1

Russia

Dagestan

Chechen rebels attack
train

1 Chechens

Rebels attacked a passenger train

Jenkins

1 2-Jan-97
0
2

India

Goreswar

Bomb on railroad
bridge in Assam state

1 31-Dec-96 India
0
3

Assam

Bomb on passenger
train kills at least 50
people; bombed
bridge may be linked

1 23-Dec-96 France
0
4

Marseilles

Bomb rendered safe in Bomb
Marseilles

Station

1 5-Dec-96
0
5

India

JammuKashmir

Bombs rendered safe
along train track in
Jammu-Kashmir

Bomb

Line

1 4-Dec-96
0
6

France

Paris

Bomb at Paris RER
station kills two
people, injures 83

Bomb

1 2-Dec-96
0
7

India

JammuKashmir

Twelve killed, 37
injured on train blast
in Punjab

Bomb

Above

Train

Above

Bomb

Bridge

Above

Bomb

Train

Above

0

0 Bodo militants Bomb destroys bridge

Jenkins

160 Bodo militants Bomb explodes on train

Jenkins

0

0

Bomb left in a plastic bag in front of a post office Jenkins
near St. Charles train station

Above

0

0

Bomb disabled on track

Station

Below

83

Train

Above

37

2 GIA (Armed
A propane canister packed with projectiles
Islamic Group) exploded in a rail car as it pulled into Port Royal
RER station.
12

Bomb explodes in sleeper car

Jenkins

Jenkins

Jenkins
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9 18-Apr-97
2

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground
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ID

ID

Date

Country

City/Region

Event Summary

Device

Facility

Tokyo

Gas attack on Tokyo
train

Chemical Train

1 4-Nov-96
0
9

Pakistan

Punjab

Explosion on
passenger train kills
five people

Bomb

Train

1 31-Oct-96 Australia
1
0

Sydney

Bomb in toilet of
Sydney subway
station

Bomb

1 28-Oct-96 Algeria
1
1

Baba Ali

Train bombing kills
eight and injures at
least 30

Bomb

1 24-Oct-96 Germany
1
2

Railways sabotaged

1 14-Oct-96 Hong Kong
1
3

Responsible
Party

Terrorist Event Description

Source

0

0

Teenagers sprayed an unknown gas on a
commuter line, causing irritation to and
suspending service.

Jenkins

Above

20

5

Bomb in toilet compartment exploded

Jenkins

Station

Below

0

0

Bomb explodes in the men’s toilet of St. James
Jenkins
Cityrail subway station. Officials closed all toilets

Line

Above

30

Sabotage Infrastructure

Above

Anonymous threat of
gas attack on Hong
Kong subway

Threat

1 30-Sep-96 United
1
Kingdom
4

IRA had planned
Chunnel blackout

Threat

Infrastructure

1 14-Aug-96 South Africa
1
5

Bombing at Pretoria’s
Properitas railway
station

Bomb

8 GIA (Armed
Bomb under tracks explodes as passenger train
Islamic Group) passed

Jenkins

1

0 antinuclear
activists

Jenkins

Below

0

0 Aum Shinrikyo Threat to gas subway network

Jenkins

Below

0

0 IRA

Plan foiled to blow up electricity to the Channel
Tunnel

Jenkins

Station

0

0

Bombing at Pretoria’s Properitas railway station

Jenkins

9

0

Bomb explodes in train stopped at Trubnaya
Station

Jenkins

0

0 GIA (Armed
Bomb on track causes derailment
Islamic Group)

Jenkins

0

0

Two bombs were found on trains

Jenkins

Bombs explode in two separate train
compartments

Jenkins

Jenkins

Power lines downed serving the track

1 13-Aug-96 Russia
1
6

Trubnaa

Bomb on VolgogradAstrakhan train

Bomb

Train

1 12-Aug-96 Algeria
1
7

Naciria

Train derailed by
Muslim militants

Bomb

Line

1 6-Aug-96
1
8

Russia

Astrakhan

Bomb found on train

Bomb

Train

1 25-Jul-96
1
9

Sri Lanka

Colombo

At least 70 killed, 200 Bomb
injured in train blast

Train

Above

200

1 21-Jun-96
2
0

Ethiopia

Dire Dawa

Train bomb kills one,
injures five

Bomb

Train

Above

5

1

Bomb explodes on train

1 12-Jun-96
2
1

Russia

Moscow

Subway bomb blast
kills four, injures 12

Bomb

Train

Below

12

4

Bomb attached to the bottom of a seat explodes Jenkins
in a subway car near Tulskaya Station

Yangon

Nine killed in train
attack

Bomb

Train

Above

7

9 KNU (Karen
National
Union)

Bomb explodes under train

1 23-May-96 Myanmar
2
2

Above

70 Tamil Exiles
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1 19-Nov-96 Japan
0
8

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

Jenkins
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Date

Country

1 30-Apr-96
2
3

Germany

1 15-Apr-96
2
4

Greece

City/Region

Event Summary

Device

Facility

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

Responsible
Party

Terrorist Event Description

Source

Threat

Line

Above

0

0 antinuclear
activists

A fake bomb was found after a bomb threat

Jenkins

Salonika

Bomb explodes in
empty train car

Bomb

Train

Above

0

0

Bomb on empty train

Jenkins

1 28-Mar-96 South Africa
2
5

Umlazi

Three killed, five
wounded when
gunmen fire on train

Gun

Train

Above

5

3

Gunmen open fire on train

Jenkins

1 13-Mar-96 Algeria
2
6

Oran

GIA train bombing
kills 12

Bomb

Line

Above

20

1 22-Feb-96 Greece
2
7

Thessoloniki

Bomb destroys train

Bomb

Station

Above

0

1 12-Feb-96 United
2
Kingdom
8

Docklands

IRA bomb blast kills
two, injures 100 in
London

Bomb

Bridge

Above

100

1 26-Jan-96
2
9

Asyut

One person wounded Gun
in train attack

Train

Above

Another attack on
tourist train

Gun

Train

Subway token booth
set on fire, clerk
seriously injured

Fire

al-Gama’a members
fire on tourist train
Farshut

1 17-Oct-95 France
3
4

12 GIA (Armed
Bomb explodes on tracks under a train
Islamic Group)

Jenkins

0

Bomb explodes in a train at the rail station

Jenkins

2 IRA

Bomb explodes under a bridge

Jenkins

1

0 al-Gamya
al-Islamiya

Gunmen open fire on train

Jenkins

Above

0

0 al-Gamya
al-Islamiya

Gunmen open fire on train

Jenkins

Station

Below

1

0

Attackers sprayed flammable liquid in token
booth and ignited

Jenkins

Gun

Train

Above

1

1 al-Gamya
al-Islamiya

Gunmen open fire on train

Jenkins

Islamic extremists fire
on train

Gun

Train

Above

2

0 al-Gamya
al-Islamiya

Gunmen open fire on train

Jenkins

Paris

GIA bomb blast in
central Paris, 24 hurt

Bomb

Line

Below

24

0 GIA (Armed
Bomb explodes on subway line in the tunnel
Jenkins
Islamic Group) between Musée d’Orsay and St. Michel stations

1 10-Oct-95 United
3
States
5

Arizona

Terrorist sabotage
possible in Amtrak
derailment

Sabotage Line

Above

65

1 Sons of the
Gestapo

1 9-Oct-95
3
6

Paris

Two GIA bomb
attacks over the
weekend

Bomb

Station

Above

13

0 GIA (Armed
Bomb found and detonated outside of the
Islamic Group) Maison Blanche metro station

Jenkins

Algiers

Railway bomb kill five, Bomb
injures 11

Train

Above

11

5

Jenkins

Egypt

1 30-Nov-95 Egypt
3
0
1 27-Nov-95 United
3
States
1

New York City

1 18-Nov-95 Egypt
3
2
1 9-Nov-95
3
3

Egypt

France

1 28-Sep-95 Algeria
3
7

Tracks were sabotaged, causing a derailment of
the Amtrak line

Bomb explodes under a locomotive

Jenkins
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High-speed train link
closed after bomb
threat
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ID

ID

Date

Country

City/Region

Event Summary

Device

Facility

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

Responsible
Party

Terrorist Event Description

Source

Lyon

Unexploded bomb
found on train

Bomb

Train

1 18-Aug-95 France
3
9

Paris

Bombing near Arc de
Triomphe injures 17

Bomb

Station

Above

17

1 14-Aug-95 Switzerland
4
0

Bern

Arsonists hit French
TGV train

Fire

Train

Above

0

1 27-Jul-95
4
1

France

Paris

Bombing on Paris
Bomb
commuter rail line kills
8

Train

Below

80

1 12-Jul-95
4
2

South Africa

Two killed in train
station explosion

Station

Above

1 5-Jul-95
4
3

Japan

Cyanide devices found Chemical Station
in subway

Below

0

0 Aum Shinrikyo Two chemical release devices were found in the
subway system, one in the Kayabacho Station
women’s toilet and one in the men’s toilet of
Shinjuku Station. Devices designed to release
cyanide gas.

Jenkins

1 27-Jun-95
4
4

Cambodia

Khmer Rouge blow up Bomb
northwest rail link

Above

0

0 Khmer Rouge

Guerrillas destroyed rail link

Jenkins

1 7-Jun-95
4
5

Chile

Santiago

Groups threaten sarin
attack

Threat

Below

0

0

Threats of sarin release in the subway system of Jenkins
Santiago

1 5-May-95
4
6

Japan

Tokyo

Another attempted
poison gas attack on
subway

Chemical Station

Below

0

0 Aum Shinrikyo Chemicals to make hydrogen cyanide were left
in the men’s toilet of Shinjuku Station. It was
found before the chemicals could mix and
spread through the ventilation system

1 19-Apr-95
4
7

Japan

Yokohama

Mystery gas detected
in Yokohama

Chemical Station

Below

200

0

Strange gas found in Yokohama Station, causing Jenkins
eye and throat irritation

1 18-Apr-95
4
8

Sweden

Stockholm

Bomb found on
Stockholm subway

Bomb

Below

0

0

Crude bomb found in Hotorget subway station

1 20-Mar-95 Japan
4
9

Tokyo

Sarin nerve gas in
Tokyo subway

Chemical Train

Below

5000

1 27-Feb-95 India
5
0

Assam

Bomb on train kills 27 Bomb

Train

Above

30

27 National
Socialist
Council of
Nagaland

Gunmen open fire on
train

Train

Above

6

0 al-Gamya
al-Islamiya

Egypt

Gun

Line

Station

Jenkins

0 GIA (Armed
Bomb explodes in trash can outside the Charles
Islamic Group) de Gaulle Metro station

Jenkins

0

Jenkins

Arsonists firebomb and empty train

8 GIA (Armed
A propane canister packed with projectiles
Islamic Group) exploded in a rail car as it pulled into St. Michel
Station.

Jenkins

2

Jenkins

A mine explodes in a train station

Jenkins

Jenkins

Jenkins
12 Aum Shinrikyo Five subway lines were contaminated by sarin
gas. Gas spread throughout system as trains
continued to run after the incident was detected.
Two bombs exploded in a passenger train

Jenkins

Gunmen fire on train

Jenkins

207

1 12-Jan-95
5
1

Tokyo

Bomb

GIA (Armed
Bomb found on railway line
Islamic Group)
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1 26-Aug-95 France
3
8

Date

Facility

Responsible
Party

Terrorist Event Description

Source

1 21-Dec-94 United
5
States
2

New York City

Bomb explodes on
subway

Bomb

Train

Below

48

0

Bomb explodes in subway car

Jenkins

1 15-Dec-94 United
5
States
3

New York City

Bomb explodes on
subway

Bomb

Train

Below

2

0

Bomb explodes in subway car

Jenkins

Explosion demolishes
bridge

Bomb

Bridge

Above

0

0

Bridge bombed

Jenkins

Train

Above

15

6 Khmer Rouge

Bomb hidden in a vegetable basket explodes on Jenkins
a train

Above

0

0 Khmer Rouge

Guerrillas bomb bridges

Jenkins

Above

2

0 al-Gamya
al-Islamiya

Gunmen fire on train

Jenkins

2

0 UVF (Ulster
Volunteer
Force)

Small bomb explodes under seat as train arrives
in Dublin

Jenkins

0

0

Five unexploded bombs found in the bathrooms Jenkins
of a train

9 Khmer Rouge

Guerrillas attack train and take passengers
hostage

Jenkins

0

0

Bomb found on train

Jenkins

0

0 IRA

Bomb safely detonated in Kent Station

Jenkins

2 Naxalites

Bomb explodes on train as it leaves Rajnandgaon Jenkins
Station

Mineta Transportation Institute

1 31-Oct-94 Cambodia
5
5

Battambang

Six die, 15 hurt in
bomb attack on train

Bomb

1 10-Oct-94 Cambodia
5
6

Battambang

Khmer Rouge
sabotage key railway
line

Sabotage Bridge

1 28-Sep-94 Egypt
5
7

Malawi

Gunmen attack tourist Gun
train

Train

1 13-Sep-94 Ireland
5
8

Dublin

UVF bombs BelfastDublin train

Bomb

Train

1 6-Sep-94
5
9

India

Allahabad

Bombs found on
express train in Uttar
Pradesh

Bomb

Train

Above

1 28-Jul-94
6
0

Cambodia

Kampong
Trach

One hundred held
after Khmer Rouge
ambush train

Hijack

Train

Above

1 26-Jul-94
6
1

Israel

Tel Aviv

Bomb found on train

Bomb

Train

Above

1 6-Jun-94
6
2

United
Kingdom

Kent

Bomb discovered at a
railway station

Bomb

Station

1 6-Jun-94
6
3

India

Rajnandgaon

Bomb on train kills
two

Bomb

Train

Above

25

1 23-May-94 Egypt
6
4

Manfalout

Gunmen fire on tourist Gun
train

Train

Above

1

0 al-Gamya
al-Islamiya

Gunmen fire on train

Jenkins

1 3-May-94
6
5

Caracas

Bomb on Caracas
Metro wounds five

Station

Below

5

0 Urban
Commando
Union of the
Popular
Resistance
Front

Leaflet scattering bomb explodes in metro train
as it stopped at Parque del Este Station

Jenkins

Venezuela

Bomb
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Lithuania

Device

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

City/Region

1 8-Nov-94
5
4

Country
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ID

ID

Date

Country

City/Region

Event Summary

Device

Facility

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

Thailand

Nakhon Sri
Thammarat

Bomb kills three at
southern railway
station

Bomb

Station

1 18-Apr-94
6
7

Egypt

Abu Tig

Gunmen fire on train
near Asyut

Gun

Train

Above

1 14-Apr-94
6
8

Russia

Dagestan

Train blast kills four in Bomb
south

Station

Above

1 30-Mar-94 Thailand
6
9

Sungai Kolo

Train derails after
explosion

Line

Above

1 21-Mar-94 Algeria
7
0

Boumerdes

Gunmen hold up train Hijack
in tunnel

Train

Below

Subway bombed

Train

Below

1 19-Mar-94 Azerbaijan
7
1

Bomb

Bomb

22

0

0

Terrorist Event Description

Source

3

Grenade explodes at a station restaurant after a
man left a parcel

Jenkins

0 al-Gamya
al-Islamiya

Gunmen fire on train

Jenkins

4

Bomb explodes in train at Dagestanskiye Ogni
Station

Jenkins

Bomb explodes under track causing derailment

Jenkins

Train hijacked in a tunnel and set on fire

Jenkins

0

Bomb exploded under the seat of the first car in Jenkins
a subway train

1 15-Mar-94 United
7
Kingdom
2

Kent

IRA bomb found near Bomb
rail line

Line

Above

0

0 IRA

Bomb found near rail line

Jenkins

1 8-Mar-94
7
3

Thailand

Hat Yai

Bomb damages train
in south

Bomb

Train

Above

0

0

Bomb explodes on tracks under a train

Jenkins

1 7-Mar-94
7
4

Egypt

Sanabu

Trains attacked in
Upper Egypt

Gun

Train

Above

12

0 al-Gamya
al-Islamiya

Train fired upon

Jenkins

1 24-Feb-94 Egypt
7
5

Asyut

Bomb on train
wounds six tourists
and five Egyptians

Bomb

Train

Above

11

0 al-Gamya
al-Islamiya

Bomb in luggage rack explodes as train left
station

Jenkins

1 23-Feb-94 Cambodia
7
6

Pursat

Khmer Rouge attacks
train

Train

Above

8

3 Khmer Rouge

Guerrillas attack train

Jenkins

1 22-Feb-94 Egypt
7
7

Asyut

Militants attack luxury Gun
train

Train

Above

4

0 al-Gamya
al-Islamiya

Gunmen fire on train

Jenkins

1 14-Feb-94 Turkey
7
8

Istanbul

Bomb in Istanbul train Bomb
station

Station

Above

26

1 24-Jan-94
7
9

India

Hardwar

Six injured in Uttar
Pradesh train blasts

Bomb

Train

Above

1 20-Dec-93 Italy
8
0

Florence

Small bomb explodes
on railway

Bomb

Station

5 PKK (Kurdish A bomb exploded in a trash can in a suburban
Workers Party) train station

Jenkins

6

0

Bomb explodes on express train

Jenkins

1

0

Bomb explodes at station

Jenkins
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1 25-Apr-94
6
6

Responsible
Party
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Date

Country

City/Region

Event Summary

Device

Facility

Woking

Blast disrupts rail
traffic

Bomb

Line

1 6-Dec-93
8
2

Hyderabad

Train blast kills one,
injures 22

Bomb

Train

1 29-Oct-93 India
8
3

Bombay

Fifteen injured in
Bombay train blast

Bomb

Station

1 13-Oct-93 Thailand
8
4

Khok Pho

Homemade bomb on
railway track

Bomb

Line

1 8-Oct-93
8
5

Germany

Saarbruecken

Bombing at train
station

Bomb

Station

1 2-Oct-93
8
6

United
Kingdom

London

Three bombs explode Bomb
in North London

Station

1 21-Sep-93 Italy
8
7

Rome

Explosives found
Bomb
aboard Palermo-Turin
overnight train

Train

1 30-Aug-93 Egypt
8
8

Ismailiya

Three time bombs
defused in Ismailiya

Bomb

Infrastructure

1 24-Aug-93 Thailand
8
9

Muslim separatists
attack train

Rocket/
Gun

1 16-Aug-93 Cambodia
9
0

Two killed in Khmer
Rouge train ambush

India

Above

Terrorist Event Description

Source

0 IRA

Bomb explodes on tracks

Jenkins

22

1

Bomb explodes on express train

Jenkins

15

0

Bomb explodes on train when it arrived to
Matunga Station

Jenkins

0

0 PULO (Patani
United
Liberation
Organization)

Bomb found under railroad tracks

Jenkins

1

0 RZ
Bombing at main train station
(Revolutionary
Cells)

Jenkins

0

0 IRA

Bomb explodes opposite a railway station

Jenkins

0

0

Bomb found in lavatory of train at Ostiense
Station

Jenkins

Above

0

0

Bombs defused on footbridge serving train
stations

Jenkins

Train

Above

7

2 PULO (Patani
United
Liberation
Organization)

Militants attack train

Jenkins

Rocket/
Gun

Train

Above

5

2 Khmer Rouge

Guerrillas ambush train

Jenkins

10 Khmer Rouge

Mines stopped train and attackers fired upon
train

Jenkins

Above

Above

0

Responsible
Party

1 4-Aug-93
9
1

Cambodia

Kampot

Railway line
ambushed

Gun/
Bomb

Train

Above

30

1 15-Jul-93
9
2

United
Kingdom

Belfast

Bombing at Central
Station in Belfast

Bomb

Station

Above

0

0 IRA

Bomb explodes in front of Central Belfast Station Jenkins

1 14-Jul-93
9
3

Russia

Vladikavkaz

Explosion derails
Caucasus train

Bomb

Line

Above

0

0 Ossetian
Separatists

Bomb explodes on rail line causing freight train
derailment

1 1-Jul-93
9
4

Angola

Huila

At least 19 die in
railway attack

Bomb

Train

Above

2

19 UNITA
Mine on tracks hits passenger train
(National
Union for Total
Independence
of Angola)

Jenkins

Jenkins
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1 14-Dec-93 United
8
Kingdom
1

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground
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ID

ID

Date

1 7-Jun-93
9
5

Country

Event Summary

Device

Facility

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

Responsible
Party

Bomb explodes in empty car at station

Source

Train

Above

0

1 27-May-93 Angola
9
6

Huila

Rebels attack train,
100 dead

Train

Above

100

1 25-May-93 Egypt
9
7

Cairo

Bomb found in
subway

Bomb

Station

Below

0

0 al-Gamya
al-Islamiya

Bomb found on the tracks at al-Marj subway
station and deactivated

1 24-May-93 Egypt
9
8

Cairo

Bomb near Cairo train Bomb
station

Station

Above

20

7 al-Gamya
al-Islamiya

Car bomb explodes outside of Masr train station Jenkins

1 12-May-93 Philippines
9
9

Manila

Rail bombings in
metro Manila

Bomb

Station

Above

23

Khmer Rouge attack
train

Gun/
Bomb

Train

Above

80

100 UNITA
Rebels attacked a passenger train
(National
Union for Total
Independence
of Angola)

Abu Sayyaf

13 Khmer Rouge

Bombs explode on commuter trains and in the
train terminal in Pasay City

Jenkins

Jenkins

Jenkins

Jenkins

Guerrillas bombed a train and opened fire on the Jenkins
occupants

2 26-Mar-93 Mexico
0
1

Guadalajara

Blast at Guadalajara
station

Bomb

Station

1

2 22-Mar-93 India
0
2

Calcutta

Railway terminus blast Bomb
in Calcutta

Station

12

1

A man was carrying a suitcase that detonated as Jenkins
he got off of the train

2 16-Mar-93 Egypt
0
3

Abu Tig

Bombs found on train Bomb

Train

0

0

A suitcase full of explosives found on train

Jenkins

2 12-Mar-93 India
0
4

Bombay

Bomb blasts in
Victoria railway
station

Bomb

Station

Series of bombs explode throughout Bombay

Jenkins

2 1-Mar-93
0
5

Gudermes

Baku-bound train
bombing kills 13

Bomb

Train

Above

12

Bomb explodes in passenger train

Jenkins

2 11-Feb-93 Myanmar
0
6

Ye

Rebels blow up train,
nine dead

Bomb

Train

Above

18

9 New Mon
State Party

Cargo train bombed

Jenkins

2 4-Feb-93
0
7

United
Kingdom

London

Bomb explodes on
train

Bomb

Station

Below

0

0 PIRA

Bomb in Kensington Tube station explodes after Jenkins
evacuation

2 3-Feb-93
0
8

United
Kingdom

Train

Above

0

0 IRA

Train evacuated before a bomb exploded

Russia

IRA bombs London to Bomb
Kent train

Above

A guard was injured when he picked up a
package in the station

13

Jenkins
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Two blasts in Bombay, Bomb
security concerns

Cambodia

0

Terrorist Event Description

Bombay

2 6-May-93
0
0

India

City/Region

Jenkins

211

Date

Country

City/Region

Event Summary

Device

Facility

London

IRA bombs
Hampstead tube

Bomb

Station

2 18-Dec-92 India
1
0

Borivli

Four injured in
Bombay train blast

Bomb

Train

2 9-Dec-92
1
1

United
Kingdom

London

PIRA bomb subway
station

Bomb

Station

2 1-Dec-92
1
2

Brazil

Rio de Janeiro

Bomb in Rio’s train
station

Bomb

Station

2 26-Oct-92 Turkey
1
3

Tatvan-Elazig

Passenger train hits
PKK mine, plunges
into river

Bomb

Train

2 22-Oct-92 United
1
States
4

Chicago

Hand grenade
discovered at a rail
platform

Bomb

Station

2 22-Oct-92 United
1
Kingdom
5

London

IRA bombs London
rail lines

Bomb

Line

2 21-Oct-92 United
1
Kingdom
6

London

PIRA bomb railway

Bomb

2 20-Oct-92 United
1
Kingdom
7

Belfast

2 14-Oct-92 India
1
8

Assam

Below

0

Responsible
Party

0 IRA

4

PIRA

2

Above

3

0

Terrorist Event Description

Source

Bomb explodes at Hampstead Station

Jenkins

Bomb explodes in train

Jenkins

Bomb detonated near Woodside Park subway
station

Jenkins

Bomb carried into the central railway station in a Jenkins
bag and detonated

47 PKK (Kurdish Train hit a mine, derailing it into a river
Workers Party)

Jenkins

0

0

Grenade found at a station

Jenkins

Above

3

0 IRA

Bombing of track as passenger train passed

Jenkins

Line

Above

0

0 PIRA

Bombing on tracks

Jenkins

IRA bombs train line in Bomb
Belfast

Line

Above

0

0 IRA

Bombing on tracks

Jenkins

Train bombing in
Assam kills 25

Bomb

Train

Above

50

Bomb explodes on
train in Dayrut

Bomb

Train

Bomb

Station

2 6-Oct-92
1
9

Egypt

2 2-Oct-92
2
0

Turkey

Istanbul

Bomb at Istanbul’s
train station

2 1-Sep-92
2
1

Turkey

Mus

PKK derails passenger
train

2 28-Aug-92 United
2
Kingdom
2

Belfast

IRA bomb hits Belfast
train

2 28-Aug-92 United
Kingdom
2
3

London

IRA bomb threat halts Threat
London trains

Bomb

10

25 BSF (Bodo
Two bombs exploded in separate compartments Jenkins
Security Force) of a passenger train
3 al-Gamya alIslamiya

Bomb explodes in train

Jenkins

0

0

Bomb explodes in empty car at station

Jenkins

Train

Above

4

0 PKK (Kurdish Train derailed
Workers Party)

Jenkins

Station

Above

0

0 IRA

Bomb left in car as station was evacuated

Jenkins

0

0 IRA

Bomb threat causes evacuation

Jenkins
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2 23-Dec-92 United
0
Kingdom
9

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

212

ID

ID

Date

Country

City/Region

Event Summary

Device

Facility

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

Responsible
Party

Terrorist Event Description

Source

Karachi

Trains searched for
bombs

Threat

Train

Above

0

0

Bomb threat forces evacuation

Jenkins

2 19-Aug-92 South Africa
2
5

Soweto

Soweto train attack,
one dead

Gun

Train

Above

5

1

Gunman opened fire in train

Jenkins

2 28-Jul-92
2
6

Argentina

Villa
Gobernador
Galvez

Bomb defused on
Mitre rail line

Bomb

Line

Above

0

0

Bomb defused on tracks

Jenkins

2 11-Jun-92
2
7

United
Kingdom

London

London Tube hit by
IRA bomb hoaxes

Threat

Below

0

0 IRA

Threats to Underground

Jenkins

2 21-May-92 Russia
2
8

St. Petersburg

Terrorists bomb
railroad station

Bomb

Station

Above

12

1 Palestinian
militants

Bomb placed in trash can near ticket office

Jenkins

2 8-May-92
2
9

United
Kingdom

London

Victoria Station in
Threat
London evacuated for
bomb search

Station

Above

0

0 IRA

Victoria Station evacuated due to threat

Jenkins

2 29-Apr-92
3
0

Pakistan

Hyderabad

Ten die in Sind train
attack

Rocket/
Gun

Train

Above

30

10

Rockets and small arms fire on passenger train

Jenkins

2 17-Apr-92
3
1

Malaysia

Sedenak

Rail lines sabotaged

Sabotage Line

Above

0

0

Saboteurs damaged tracks

Jenkins

2 3-Apr-92
3
2

Kenya

Nairobi

Explosion at train
station

Bomb

Station

Above

0

0

Bomb in unused toilet near main station

Jenkins

2 2-Apr-92
3
3

Peru

Puno

SL attacks train near
Bolivia border

Train

Above

4

1 Shining Path

Terrorists attack train near Bolivia

Jenkins

2 1-Apr-92
3
4

Argentina

Buenos Aires

Bomb on train line

Bomb

Line

Above

0

0 Striking Rail
workers

Bombing on tracks

Jenkins

2 26-Mar-92 Greece
3
5

Athens

Bombs hit train
carrying BMW cars

Bomb

Train

Above

0

0 November 17

Bomb explodes in Ath Rendis train station,
damaging shipments of BMW’s

Jenkins

2 10-Mar-92 United
3
Kingdom
6

London

Bombing near train
station

Bomb

Line

0

0 IRA

Bomb exploded on the tracks near Wandsworth Jenkins
Common Station, disrupting rail service

2 2-Mar-92
3
7

United
Kingdom

London

Three IRA bombs over Bomb
weekend

Station

0

0 IRA

Bomb found on the tracks at White Hart Lane
Station

Jenkins

2 1-Mar-92
3
8

United
Kingdom

Bomb hoaxes delay
peace trains

Train

0

0 IRA

Bomb threats on tracks

Jenkins

Threat

Above
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2 19-Aug-92 Pakistan
2
4

213

Date

Country

City/Region

Event Summary

London

At least 25 wounded
in London subway
blast

2 8-Feb-92
4
0

India

Narwana

2 7-Feb-92
4
1

United
Kingdom

2 30-Jan-92
4
2

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

Mineta Transportation Institute

Station

Below

28

Six die, 50 hurt in train Bomb
blast

Train

Above

6

London

Incendiary device on
east London track

Line

Below

0

United
Kingdom

London

Unexploded firebomb Fire

Train

Below

2 29-Jan-92
4
3

United
Kingdom

Belfast

IRA bomb causes
Belfast train chaos

Bomb

Station

2 18-Jan-92
4
4

India

Samana

Bomb derails train

Bomb

Station

Above

7

2 6-Jan-92
4
5

Italy

Leece

Time bomb aimed at
mass casualty
explodes

Bomb

Line

Above

0

2 28-Dec-91 United
4
Kingdom
6

Belfast-Dublin

IRA bombs railroad to Bomb
end ceasefire

Line

Above

2 23-Dec-91 United
4
Kingdom
7

London

Incendiary devices
discovered on
commuter train

Fire

Train

2 16-Dec-91 United
4
Kingdom
8

London

Bomb explodes at rail
station

Bomb

Station

2 11-Nov-91 India
4
9

Kalyan

Bomb blast on train
near Bombay

Bomb

2 5-Nov-91
5
0

Johannesburg

Bomb damages
railway line as strike
continues

Bomb

Soweto

South Africa

2 24-Oct-91 South Africa
5
1

Bomb

Facility

Responsible
Party

Source

Bomb exploded in the toilet of the London
Bridge subway station.

Jenkins

Bomb on train

Jenkins

0 IRA

Incendiary device ignited on the subway tracks
at Barking

Jenkins

0

0 IRA

Firebomb found under seat of subway car

Jenkins

0

0 IRA

Bombing on tracks near central station

Jenkins

Bombing at Golwar railway station causes
derailment

Jenkins

0

Bombing on tracks just before passenger train
arrived

Jenkins

0

0 IRA

Bombing on tracks

Jenkins

0

0 PIRA

Incendiary devices found hidden on commuter
train

Jenkins

Above

0

0 PIRA

Bombing near Clapham Junction Station

Jenkins

Train

Above

60

12

Bombing in train as it pulled into a station

Jenkins

Line

Above

0

0

Bombing on tracks

Jenkins

Train attack in Soweto Gun

Train

Above

36

9

Gunmen attack commuter train

Jenkins

3

0 Sikh
separatists

Train attacked

Jenkins

1 Sikh
separatists

Train attacked

Jenkins

Fire

2 9-Sep-91
5
2

India

Goodwill Train
attacked again

Train

Above

2 6-Sep-91
5
3

India

Goodwill Train
Attacked

Train

Above

0 IRA

Terrorist Event Description

50 Sikh
separatists

Sikh
separatists

Appendix A: Chronology of Terrorist Events

2 28-Feb-92 United
3
Kingdom
9

Device
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ID

ID

Date

Country

2 29-Aug-91 United
5
Kingdom
4

City/Region

Device

Facility

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

Responsible
Party

Terrorist Event Description

Source

Three bombs found in Bomb
subway car

Train

Below

0

0 PIRA

Incendiary devices found under seats of subway Jenkins
train

2 17-Aug-91 Spain
5
5

Bomb explodes on
Madrid-Irun railway
track

Bomb

Line

Above

0

0 Basque
Separatist
Movement
(ETA)

Bomb knocks over electric pylon causing it to fall Jenkins
across the tracks and collide with freight train

2 31-Jul-91
5
6

Passenger train
bombed

Bomb

Train

Above

16

Soviet Union Moscow-Baku

Lima

Australia

14

Shining Path

Bomb concealed in a briefcase and left in a
reserved compartment exploded

Jenkins

Torched railroad station

Jenkins

Mineta Transportation Institute

Shining Path torches a Fire
railroad station

Station

Bomb threat on
subway station

Threat

Station

Below

0

0

Threat of bombing on subway stations

Jenkins

2 25-Feb-91 United
5
Kingdom
9

St. Albans

PIRA suspected in
railway bombing

Bomb

Line

Above

0

0 PIRA

Bombing on tracks

Jenkins

2 18-Feb-91 United
6
Kingdom
0

London

PIRA claim
responsibility for
explosions

Bomb

Station

Below

43

1 PIRA

Victoria and Paddington stations bombed, one
on a scaffolding and the other in a trash can

Jenkins

2 9-Feb-91
6
1

Austria

Innsbruck

Stretch of track
bombed

Bomb

Line

Above

0

0

Track bombed because it is used by U.S. military Jenkins

2 3-Dec-90
6
2

France

Three incendiary
Fire
devices went off along
railway line

Line

Above

2 3-Nov-90
6
3

South Africa

Bloernfontein

Two explosions cause
railway damage

Bomb

Line

Above

0

0

Bombing on tracks

Jenkins

2 20-Aug-90 Spain
6
4

Leon

Railroad tracks near
Leon bombed

Bomb

Line

Above

0

0 Basque
Separatist
Movement
(ETA)

Bombing on tracks

Jenkins

2 15-Aug-90 United
6
Kingdom
5

Belfast-Dublin

Army defuse bomb

Bomb

Line

Above

0

0 IRA

Bomb defused on tracks

Jenkins

Bombs explode

Jenkins

2 15-Aug-90 Spain
6
6
2 6-May-90
6
7

Pakistan

Jenkins

Two bomb explosions Bomb

Lahore

Bomb explodes on
express train

Bomb

Basque
Separatist
Movement
(ETA)
Train

Above

35

11 Afghan Agents Express train bombed
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2 29-May-91 Peru
5
7
2 1-Mar-91
5
8

London

Event Summary

Jenkins
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Date

Country

City/Region

2 14-Sep-89 Spain
6
8

Event Summary

Device

Facility

France-Spain railway
bombed

Bomb

Line

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground
Above

0

India

Assam

Bombing kills eight
people

Bomb

Station

2 30-Jun-89
7
0

France

Paris-Madrid

Bomb explodes on
railway line

Bomb

Line

Above

2 26-Jun-89
7
1

China

Explosion on train kills Bomb
20 people

Train

Above

11

2 2-Jun-89
7
2

Thailand/
Malaysia

Bomb explodes as
train passes by

Bomb

Line

Above

3

2 26-Apr-89
7
3

Czechoslovakia

Bomb explodes on
international express
train

Bomb

Train

Above

2 19-Apr-89
7
4

India

Jhansi

Train derails killing at
least 67 people

Sabotage Line

2 9-Apr-89
7
5

Spain

Cioridia

Bombs explode at
railroad tracks in
Navarre region

Bomb

2 1-Dec-88
7
6

Peru

Cuzco-Machu
Picchu

Guerrillas sabotage a
VIP tourist train

Sabotage Train

2 14-Oct-88 Sri Lanka
7
7

Kadugannawa

Bomb destroys part of Bomb
railway station

2 4-Sep-88
7
8

Pakistan

Karachi

Bomb explodes at
train station

2 3-Sep-88
7
9

Pakistan

IslamabadPeshawar

2 19-Jul-88
8
0

Peru

Chosica-Lima

2 27-Apr-88
8
1

Germany

Narathiwat

22

0 Basque
Separatist
Movement
(ETA)

Terrorist Event Description
Bombing on tracks

8 Bodo militants Bomb explodes in Kokrajhar Railroad station

Jenkins

Jenkins

Bombing on tracks

Jenkins

Dynamite placed in wash basin of train

Jenkins

0 Pulo Pattini

A remote control bomb derails train

Jenkins

0

0

Bombing on train

Jenkins

Above

137

67

Express train derailed

Jenkins

Above

0

0 Basque
Separatist
Movement
(ETA)

Bombings target rail power lines

Jenkins

Above

9

2 Sendero
Luminoso

Train sabotaged

Jenkins

Station

Above

0

0 Sinhalese
People’s
Liberation
Front

Bomb explodes in station

Jenkins

Bomb

Station

Above

5

0

Bomb explodes at Karachi train station

Jenkins

Bomb goes off on
train

Bomb

Train

Above

13

3

Bomb explodes on train

Jenkins

Bombing on railway
track

Bomb

Line

Above

0

0

Bomb explodes on tracks

Jenkins

U.S. military train
damaged by blast

Bomb

Train

Above

1

0 PFLP-GC

Bomb explodes on tracks as military train passed Jenkins

Infrastructure

Iparretarak

Source

20
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2 20-Jul-89
6
9

Responsible
Party

216

ID

ID

Date

2 11-Apr-88
8
2

Country
Pakistan

2 1988-1989 United
8
Kingdom
3

City/Region

Event Summary

Device

Facility

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

Peshawar

Bomb explodes on
train

Bomb

Train

Above

3

Belfast-Dublin

More than 60
bombings disrupt rail
service

Bomb

Line

Above

Train

Above

71

22

Responsible
Party

2

IRA

Terrorist Event Description

Source

Bomb explodes on train

Jenkins

Between 1988 and 1989, more than 60
bombings on the Belfast-Dublin line

Jenkins

Train attacked by guerrillas

Jenkins

Attack on train kills 22
people

2 22-Dec-87 Pakistan
8
5

Bomb discovered on
railroad track

Bomb

Line

Above

0

0

Bomb found on tracks and disarmed

Jenkins

0 IRA

Bomb explodes next to track as freight train
passed

Jenkins

0

Bomb explodes at a station

Jenkins

0 PFLP-GC

Bomb explodes on tracks, damaging freight train Jenkins

6

Bomb explodes in a trash can on a railroad
platform and by a kiosk just outside of a station

Jenkins

0 Sikh
separatists

Bomb found in crowded station waiting room

Jenkins

2 27-Nov-87 United
Kingdom
8
6

Belfast-Dublin

Bomb disrupts rail
service

Bomb

Line

Above

0

2 26-Sep-87 Brazil
8
7

Rio de Janeiro

Homemade bomb
injures 11 people

Bomb

Station

Above

11

Bomb goes off on
railroad tracks

Bomb

Line

Above

0

2 1-Sep-87
8
8

Germany

2 5-Jul-87
8
9

Pakistan

Lahore

Three bombings in
Lahore

Bomb

Station

50

2 15-Apr-87
9
0

India

New Delhi

Police defuse bomb

Bomb

Station

0

Madras

Bombing under
railway bridge

Bomb

Bridge

U.S. passenger train
sabotaged

2 15-Mar-87 India
9
1
2 15-Feb-87 Germany
9
2

Above

150

Sabotage Infrastructure

Above

0

0

Overhead cables disabled

Jenkins

Above

0

0 IRA

Bomb derails freight train

Jenkins

Bomb on train explodes at station

Jenkins

Bombing on tracks

Jenkins

2 27-Oct-86 United
9
Kingdom
3

Belfast-Dublin

Bombing derails
freight train

Bomb

Line

2 20-Oct-86 Pakistan
9
4

Peshawar

Explosion injures two
people

Bomb

Station

2 30-Sep-86 Peru
9
5

Lima

Three bombings

Bomb

Line

25 Tamil Exiles

2

Above

1

0

Bomb explodes on bridge as train passed over it Jenkins
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2 31-Dec-87 Mozambique
8
4
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Date

2 4-Sep-86
9
6

Country

Event Summary

Device

Facility

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

Bomb planted on
subway train

Bomb

Train

Below

0

2 15-May-86 Bangladesh
9
7

Bheramara

Train sabotaged; 25
people killed

Sabotage Train

Above

45

2 21-Mar-86 France
9
8

Paris

Bomb defused in
commuter train in
Paris

Bomb

Train

2 18-Mar-86 France
9
9

Paris

High-speed train
bombed

Bomb

Train

Japan

Punjab

Bombing on train kills Bomb
2, injures 18

Train

3 13-Aug-85 Chile
0
2

Santiago

Two bombs explode

Bomb

Station

Suspected train
sabotage kills 58
people

Sabotage Train

Geneva

Explosion at Geneva
railway station

Bomb

Toronto

Threats by ASALA to
bomb city’s subway
system

Threat

Bomb

Mozambique

3 3-Jun-85
0
4

Switzerland

3 26-Mar-85 Canada
0
5

Above

Radical leftists cut
Sabotage Infracommunication cables
structure

3 25-Nov-85 India
0
1

3 2-Aug-85
0
3

0

3 25-Jan-85
0
6

South
Maputo
Africa /
Mozambique

Bomb severs rail
bridge

3 20-Jan-85
0
7

Sri Lanka

Guerrillas attack train, Gun/
killing 36 people
Bomb

MankulamMurukandy

Above

Above

Above

Train

Above

Terrorist Event Description

0 CSPPA (The
Bomb failed to explode on subway
Committee of
Solidarity with
the Arab and
Middle East
Political
Prisoners)
25 Marxist
Sarbahara

Express train derailed

Source
Jenkins

Jenkins

0 CSPPA (The
Bomb found and defused on a commuter line
Committee of
Solidarity with
the Arab and
Middle East
Political
Prisoners)

Jenkins

10

0 Islamic Jihad

High-speed train bombed

Jenkins

0

0 Middle Core
Faction

Cut communication lines, disrupting operations

Jenkins

2 Sikh
separatists

Bomb on a train

Jenkins

1

0

Bombs explode in Valparaiso and Valencia
stations

Jenkins

160

58

Sabotage on train

Jenkins

Martyrs of
Tel Al-Zaltar

Bombing of the Geneva Railway station

Jenkins

ASALA
(Armenian
Secret Army
for the
Liberation of
Armenia)

Threats to Toronto’s subway system

Jenkins

Bomb explodes on bridge

Jenkins

Bomb explodes, stopping train, and terrorists
began firing on train

Jenkins

18

Station

Bridge

Responsible
Party

0

0

36 Tarnil
Separatists
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Paris

3 1-Dec-85
0
0

France

City/Region
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ID

ID

Date

Country

City/Region

Event Summary

Device

Facility

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

FlorenceBologna

Train bombing kills at
least 15 people

Bomb

Train

3 1-Sep-84
0
9

Montreal

Bomb explodes in
Montreal main
railroad station

Bomb

Station

29

3 19-Aug-84 France
1
0

Grenoble

M-5 group bombs
Bomb
Grenoble train station

Station

3 13-Aug-84 France
1
1

Lyons

Bomb explodes in
railway station in
Lyons

Station

3 26-Apr-84
1
2

India

Punjab

Bombs exploded
Bomb
along northern railway
sections

Line

3 15-Apr-84
1
3

India

Punjab

Multiple arson attacks Fire

Station

Canada

3 15-Feb-84 France
1
4

Bomb

Basques sabotage
Paris-Madrid Express
train

Sabotage Line

Below

80

Jenkins

3

Bomb in Montreal main railroad station

Jenkins

0

0 M-5

Bomb in Grenoble station

Jenkins

0

0 ASALA
(Armenian
Secret Army
for the
Liberation of
Armenia)

Bomb in locker of Central Railway Station in
Lyons

Jenkins

Sikh
separatists

Bombings on railway line

Jenkins

Dashmesh
Regiment

Group torched 37 stations in Punjab

Jenkins

0 Basque
Separatist
Movement
(ETA)

Line sabotaged, causing derailment

Jenkins

6 Ilyich Ramirez
Sanchez AKA
Carlos

Bomb explodes in Marseilles Station and aboard Jenkins
a train, killing six and injuring scores more

0 Sikh
separatists

Bomb thrown onto a crowded platform of the
main station

Jenkins

0

0 ASALA
(Armenian
Secret Army
for the
Liberation of
Armenia)

Threat evacuates Perrache Station

Jenkins

0 IRA

Bomb explodes on freight line

Jenkins

5

Explosives on train

Jenkins

0 IRA

Bomb damages Portadown Station

Jenkins

Above

Above

0

Marseilles

Bombs in Marseilles
railroad station killed
six people

Bomb

Station

3 14-Sep-83 India
1
6

New Delhi

Bomb thrown at
crowded platform
injures 19

Bomb

Station

3 28-Jul-83
1
7

Lyons

ASALA threats against Threat
French government

Station

3 11-Aug-82 United
1
Kingdom
8

Armagh
County,
No. Ireland

Bombing at railroad

Bomb

Line

Above

0

3 29-Mar-82 France
1
9

Paris-Toulouse

Bomb exploded on
train, killing five
passengers

Bomb

Train

Above

27

3 14-Feb-82 United
Kingdom
2
0

Portadown

Bomb damages rail
station

Bomb

Station

Above

0

Above

Source

Bomb explodes on a train in the Direttissima
tunnel

3 31-Dec-83 France
1
5

France

15 Neo-fascist
terrorist

Terrorist Event Description

19
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3 24-Dec-84 Italy
0
8

Responsible
Party

219

Date

Country

City/Region

Event Summary

Device

Facility

3 18-Nov-81 France
2
1

Paris

Bomb threat at Paris
Gare du Nord

Threat

Station

3 16-Nov-81 France
2
2

Paris

Bomb in train station

Bomb

Station

3 5-Nov-81
2
3

Paris

Bomb explodes in
train station

Bomb

Time bombs on rail
line defused

France

Responsible
Party

Terrorist Event Description

Source

Mineta Transportation Institute

0

0 Orly
Organization

Bomb threat at Gare du Nord

Jenkins

Above

2

0 Orly
Organization

Bomb in locker of Gare de l’Est terminal

Jenkins

Station

Below

1

0 Orly
Organization

Bomb in locker in underground section of Gare
de Lyon Station

Jenkins

Bomb

Line

Above

0

0 Red Army
Faction

Bomb defused on tracks at U.S. Base

Jenkins

Bomb

Line

Above

Bombs on rail line

Jenkins

Line

Above

Station

Above

3 6-Aug-81
2
5

United
Kingdom

Belfast-Dublin

Bombings at several
locations

IRA

3 31-Jul-81
2
6

Pakistan

Karach-Lahore

Train derailed

3 22-Jul-81
2
7

Switzerland

Geneva

Bombs in Geneva
railway station

Bomb

3 18-Jul-81
2
8

India

Dangarva

Train sabotaged, 35
people killed

Sabotage Train

Above

3 29-Jun-81
2
9

South Africa

Natal

Bomb explodes on
Richards Bay rail line

Bomb

Line

Above

0

3 27-Jan-81
3
0

United
Kingdom

Belfast-Dublin

Bombings on BelfastDublin rail line

Bomb

Line

Above

3 21-Dec-80 United
3
States
1

New York City

Pipe bombs in
Pennsylvania Station,
New York City

Bomb

Station

3 21-Oct-80 Switzerland
3
2

Paris-Interlaken Attempted bombing
of train

Bomb

Train

3 2-Aug-80
3
3

Italy

Bologna

Bologna train station
bombed

Bomb

3 10-Jun-80
3
4

Cambodia

BattanbangPhnom Panh

Train attack results in
at least 150 deaths

3 26-Apr-80
3
5

France

Paris-Moscow

Right-wing group
attacks train

30 Anti-Muslim
group
4

0 Ninth of June
Organization

Train carrying Muslims during Ramadan derailed Jenkins

Two bombs left in lockers explode in main
Geneva rail station

Jenkins

Derailment

Jenkins

0 ANC

Explosion on Richards Bay rail line, closing
freight service

Jenkins

0

0 IRA

Explosion on rail line, closing service

Jenkins

0

0 Puerto Rican
Armed
Resistance
(RAP)

Pipe bombs in locker explode, no injuries

Jenkins

Above

0

0 October 3
Organization

Bomb placed on train and failed to explode

Jenkins

Station

Above

200

Station bombing

Jenkins

Gun/
Bomb

Train

Above

250

Stopped train with a bomb or missile and
opened fire when train stopped

Jenkins

Fire

Train

Above

35

84

150 Khmer Rouge

National Youth Molotov cocktails thrown at Paris-Moscow
Front
express train

Jenkins
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3 16-Sep-81 Germany
2
4

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground
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ID

ID

Date

Country

City/Region

Event Summary

3 2-Nov-79
3
6

Israel

Tel Aviv

3 2-Jul-79
3
7

France

St. Jean de Luz Train attacked

3 4-Mar-79
3
8

Israel

Jerusalem-Tel
Aviv
Paris

Facility

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

Basque
Separatist
Movement
(ETA)

Terrorists fire on train

Jenkins

Line

Above

Palestinian
Military

Bomb explodes on a track, derailing a train

Jenkins

Bomb

Station

Above

Corsican
National
Liberation
Front

Bomb explodes at Villepinte railway station

Jenkins

Bomb aboard train
from West Germany

Bomb

Train

Above

Bomb found on West German railways train,
intentionally detonated

Jenkins

Spiefeld

Bomb aboard train

Bomb

Train

Above

Bomb explodes in express train lavatory

Jenkins

3 23-May-77 Netherlands
4
2

Groningen

South Moluccan
Hijack
terrorists seize express
train

Train

Above

2 Free South
Moluccan
Youths

Fifty-six people taken hostage before police
raided and killed two terrorists

Jenkins

3 9-Mar-77
4
3

Egypt

Al-Alamein

Police arrest five
bombing suspects

Bomb

Line

Above

Libyan
Intelligence
Service

3 14-Aug-76 Egypt
4
4

Alexandria

Bomb on train kills
eight passengers

Bomb

Train

Above

59

3 18-Mar-76 United
Kingdom
4
5

London

Subway station
bombing

Bomb

Station

Below

1

IRA

3 15-Mar-76 United
4
Kingdom
6

London

Explosive on subway

Bomb

Train

Below

1

2 IRA

3 4-Mar-76
4
7

United
Kingdom

London

IRA bomb explodes
on commuter train

Bomb

Train

Above

3 12-Feb-76 United
4
Kingdom
8

London

IRA bomb defused

Bomb

Station

Below

3 2-Dec-75
4
9

Beilen

Armed extremists kill
passengers and take
hostage on train

Hijack

Train

Above

Mineta Transportation Institute

Austria

Netherlands

Gun

Train

Rail service suspended Bomb

Bombs explode in
Christmas attack

0

2

8 Libyan
Intelligence
Service

Jenkins

Time bomb

Jenkins

Wood Green Station

Jenkins

West Ham Station

Jenkins

IRA

Minutes after Cannon Street Station

Jenkins

IRA

Oxford Circus Station

Jenkins

3 Free South
Moluccan
Youths
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Above

3 4-Dec-77
4
1

Above

Source
Jenkins

Yugoslavia

Train

Terrorist Event Description
Bomb explodes under train

3 5-Dec-77
4
0

Bomb

Responsible
Party
Palestinian
Military

3 26-Dec-77 France
3
9

Passenger train
explosion

Device

Jenkins
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Date

Country

City/Region

Event Summary

Device

Facility

Above/
Below Injuries Fatalities
Ground

United
Kingdom

London

Bomb explosion kills
Bomb
one person, injures 20

Station

Above

20

3 4-Aug-74
5
1

Italy

FlorenceBologna

Train bombing kills 12 Bomb
people, injures 48

Train

Below

48

3 17-Apr-74
5
2

Austria

Vienna

Bomb threat on train
bound for Rome

Threat

Train

Above

3 6-Apr-74
5
3

United
Kingdom

Birmingham

Bombing in railway
station, shops

Bomb

Station

3 8-Sep-73
5
4

United
Kingdom

London

Bombing at Victoria
Station

Bomb

Station

3 8-Sep-73
5
5

United
Kingdom

London

Bombing at King’s
Cross and Euston
stations

Bomb

Station

3 27-Jan-72
5
6

Austria

Vienna-Zagreb Croatian terrorists
bomb train

Bomb

Train

Above

1 IRA

12 Right Wing
Extremists

Terrorist Event Description

Source
Jenkins

Jenkins

Justice
Guerrillas

Jenkins

IRA

Jenkins

4

IRA

Jenkins

13

IRA

Jenkins

Croatian

Jenkins

6
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3 9-Oct-75
5
0

Responsible
Party

222

ID

Appendix B: Respondent Titles
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APPENDIX B: RESPONDENT TITLES
Administrative, Management, Director, Chief Positions
Administrative Analyst
Administrative Officer
Administrator
Assistant Director
Assistant General Manager
Chief
Chief of Staff
Chief Operating Officer
Director
Executive Director
General Manager
Public Transportation Administrator
Public Transportation Director
Superintendent
Transit Administration Manager
Transit Director
Transit Service Manager
Transportation Coordinator
Transportation Director
Operations/Maintenance
Assistant General Manager, Operations
Deputy Chief of Operations
Director of Operations
Director of Operations & Maintenance
Director of Transit Operations
Maintenance Manager
Maintenance Superintendent
Manager of Operations
Manager of Operations Support
Operations & Grants Manager

1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
5
7
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
32
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
15

Other
Chief Engineer
Consultant
Director of Customer & Community Services
Director, Service Development
Facilities & Procurement Director
Information Systems Manager
Manager of Special Projects
Manager, Central Communications
Project Manager, Technical
Senior Deputy General Counsel
Special Projects Coordinator
Transit Planner
Transportation & Parking Director
Transportation Planner
VP Legal Affairs

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
16

Security, Safety, Risk, Emergency Preparedness
AGM Public & Operation Safety
Chief of Police/Director of Security
Chief of Protective Services
Chief of Security
Chief Safety/Security Officer
Deputy Director of Safety
Director of Safety
Director of Safety & Training
Director of Safety & Security
Director of Security
Director of Transportation/Safety & Security
Director Risk Management & Security
Director, Security Programs
Emergency Preparedness Manager
Homeland Security Officer/Manager
Interim Risk Manager
Lieutenant-Commander Emergency Preparedness
Lieutenant
Manager of Safety & Instruction
Manager of Safety & Security
Manager of Security
Manager Protective Services
Manager Public Safety
Manager Safety & Training
Manager, Health, Safety & Environmental
Operations Safety & Security Coordinator
Police Officer
Risk Management Analyst
Risk Manager
Safety & Security Officer
Safety, Training & Security Coordinator
Security Coordinator
Security Superintendent
Senior Security Engineer
Supervisor of Risk Management
Transit Safety Supervisor
VP Safety
VP Safety & Security

Mineta Transportation Institute

1
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
4
2
1
4
2
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
51

224
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APPENDIX C: SUMMARY OF CPTED STRATEGIES FOR SYSTEM
COMPONENTS
CPTED Strategies for Platforms
Most respondents mentioned lighting as the primary CPTED strategy for platforms. Good
visibility (uninterrupted lines of sight) is considered essential, which includes keeping
platforms clear of obstacles (some do not permit trash receptacles, pay phones, or newspaper
boxes) and eliminating hidden corners and dead areas. Control over ingress and egress by
limiting foot access paths is suggested. Security cameras were also mentioned by a number of
respondents.
CPTED Strategies for Entrances and Exits
Cameras, lighting, electronic control, good visibility with clear sight lines (predominant use
of glass and natural light around entrances), limited number of entrances and exits, proper
alignment of walls and doors to minimize hiding places.
CPTED Strategies for Elevators
Cameras, emergency telephones, lighting, clear lines of sight, glass or clear material for shaft
and cab.
CPTED Strategies for Escalators
Lighting, clear lines of sight, monitored by security personnel.
CPTED Strategies for Restrooms
Cameras, lighting, curved entrances with no exterior doors, clear sight paths to entrance and
exit, located where staff can monitor entrances.

Mineta Transportation Institute
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CPTED Strategies for Trash Cans
Containers can be see-through and/or bomb (explosive) resistant, and they are often relocated
away from benches and loading areas, or eliminated completely in high-density areas.
CPTED Strategies for Pathways
Lighting, clear lines of sight, kept clear of debris and obstacles (vegetation), minimal
landscaping, common access.
CPTED Strategies for Parking Lots
Cameras, lighting, fencing, limited (controlled) access points, security guards, clear lines of
sight with visibility from street, low landscaping, emergency phones.
CPTED Strategies for Vehicles
Cameras, emergency (panic) alarms, public information signage, low platform buses with large
windows, parked in secure spaces with clear lines of sight, vandal- and graffiti-proof interiors.
CPTED Strategies for Vending Machines
Machines are placed in form-fitting recessed alcoves to limit side and back access and to allow
them to be gated if needed. They can be relocated away from restrooms and other areas of
congregation, and monitored with cameras and alarms.
CPTED Strategies for Gates
Cameras, lighting, electronic access control (card readers), security personnel, good signage,
configure location of gates to be able to close off sections of station.

Mineta Transportation Institute
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APPENDIX D: SURVEY INSTRUMENT

TRANSIT SECURITY SURVEY

CODEBOOK

Survey Content by Camille Fink
Codebook/Coding by Norman Wong
UCLA Institute of Transportation Studies
www.its.ucla.edu/security

Mineta Transportation Institute
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Transit Security Online Survey Instructions
You have been selected by your general manager as a key staff person
knowledgable about security issues at your agency. We are asking for your help
in conducting a comparative study of domestic and international transit security
strategies.
This questionnaire will not take long for you to complete. It should take
approximately 30 minutes to complete the questionnaire if your agency does not
provide rail service and approximately 40 minutes if your agency does provide
rail service.
You can log off and return to the questionnaire at any time using your username
and password. Each page of the survey is saved when you click "Next." If you
click "Logoff" all changes to that page will be lost so if you choose to logoff, we
suggest that you do so immediately after clicking "Next". Also, please DO NOT
press Return/Enter at anytime. Doing so will log you out of the survey.
When you have completed the entire questionnaire, you will have the following
options:
1. You can save and check over your answers by clicking on "Return to
Start."
2. You can save what you have entered so far and return later to complete
and submit the survey by clicking on "Save."
3. Or you can finalize and submit the survey by clicking on "Finalize
Survey." When you click on "Finalize Survey" your responses will be
recorded and you will no longer be able to change your answers.
If you are not sure about an answer to a particular question, please select the
“Don’t know/Not sure” option to return to it at a later time or tell us who we should
contact for more information at the end of the survey. All responses in this survey
will be remain confidential unless you specify otherwise.
If you have any questions about this survey, please contact Camille Fink at
UCLA at 310.903.3278 or its@spa.ucla.edu.
For questions regarding the website, please contact Norman Wong at
310.903.3278 or nwong@ucla.edu.
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Please use the following definitions for terms used throughout this survey:
x

Terrorism: “The unlawful use of force or violence committed by a group(s)
of two or more individuals, against persons or property to intimidate or
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social objectives.” (FBI)

x

Multi-modal transfer facility: A station, terminal, or facility with two or
more public transit modes (transit modes typically include bus rapid transit,
commuter rail, dial-a-ride, express bus, light-rail transit, local bus, and
subway) where public transit passengers transfer from one transit vehicle
to another during the course of their journey.
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We begin this survey by asking you a series of general questions
about the transportation modes your agency operates and features
of your systems.
Q1. Which modes of transportation does your agency provide (either directly or
by contract)? (Please check ALL that apply)
(a) Commuter Rail
(b) Heavy Rail
(c) Light Rail
(d) Bus
(e) Ferry
(f) Paratransit
Other:

Next
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Q2. Does your rail system have the following types of stations? (Please
check ALL that apply)
(a) Elevated
(b) Below-ground/subway
(c) At grade
(n) Don't know/Not sure



Q3_1. What is the name of the busiest station in your system (i.e., the station
with the most boardings and alightings)?
(n) Don't know/Not Sure



Q3_2. What year was this station built?
(n) Don't know/Not sure



Q3_3. Does your bus service operate out of an enclosed bus terminal or
multi-modal transfer facility?
(a) Yes
(b) No
(n) Don't know/Not sure

Now we would like to ask you about threat and vulnerability
assessments at your agency. This series of questions will help us
understand how and why different agencies assess threats and
vulnerabilities in their systems.


Q4. Has your agency ever conducted threat and vulnerability assessments of
its key infrastructure (e.g., stations, tracks, vehicles, power stations, rights-ofway, bridges, tunnels, yards and shops, control centers, etc.)?
(a) Yes, comprehensive (covering all elements of the system)
(b) Yes, moderate (covering most elements of the system)
(c) Yes, partial (covering some elements of the system)
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Page 2

(d) No
(n) Don't know/Not sure


If you answered "No" in the previous question, why has your agency not
conducted a threat and vulnerability assessment?

Back

Next
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Q5. How often does your agency conduct threat and vulnerability
assessments?
(a) More than once a year
(b) Once a year
(c) Once every 2 years
(d) Once every 3 years
(e) Other (Please specify)

Q5_Text

(n) Don't know/Not sure


Q6. What year was the most recent threat and vulnerability assessment
conducted?
Q6_Text



(year)

(n) Don't know/Not sure

Q7. What was the purpose of this most recent threat and vulnerability
assessment? (Please check ALL that apply)
(a) To assess terrorism-related vulnerabilities
(b) To assess natural disaster-related vulnerabilities (e.g. earthquake,
flood, hurricane)
(c) To assess crime-related vulnerabilities
(d) Other (Please describe below)
(n) Don't know/Not sure
Other:



Q7_1. How did your agency use the results of this threat and vulnerability
assessment? (Please check ALL that apply)
(a) To identify effective security technology and procedures
(b) To support preparation of budgets
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(c) To support decision-making at the executive level
(d) To fulfill the requirements of the System Security Program Plan and/or
the State Safety Oversight Program
(e) To apply for Urban Area Security Intiative grants
(f) To support FTA's security outreach and technical assistance program
(g) Other (Please describe below)
(h) We have not yet used this threat and vulnerability assessment
(n) Don't know/Not sure
Other:



Q8. Who conducted this threat and vulnerability assessment? (Please check
ALL that apply)
(a) In-house team
(b) Sheriff's or police department
(c) Contracted security consultants
(d) Contracted other consultants (Please specify below)
(e) Other: (Please explain below)
(n) Don't know/Not sure
Other:



Other than threat and vulnerability assessments, how does your agency seek
to identify and assess security vulnerabilities in your transit system?

Back

Next
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This next section asks about general security strategies at your
agency.
Logout

Transit security strategies can be grouped into four general categories:
x
x
x
x


policing
public education and user outreach
security hardware and technology
environmental design strategies

How important were each of these strategies in your agency's security
planning before September 11th, 2001?
(c) Part
(a)
of
(b)
(d) Not
Central
(n) Don't
security
Significant,
a part of
to
know/Not
planning,
but not
security
security
Sure
but a
central
planning
planning
minor
part
Q10A. Policing
Q10B. Public
Education/User
Outreach
Q10C. Security
Hardware/Technology
Q10D.
Environmental Design
Strategies



Did the emphasis on each of these strategies change in your agency after
September 11th, 2001?
(c) Part
(a)
of
(b)
(d) Not
Central
(n) Don't
security
Significant,
a part of
to
know/Not
planning,
but not
security
security
Sure
but a
central
planning
planning
minor
part
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Q11A. Policing
Q11B. Public
Education/User
Outreach
Q11C. Security
Hardware/Technology
Q11D.
Environmental Design
Strategies
[Q11_1x appears for each Q10a not equal to Q11a]


You indicated a change in your agency's emphasis to the following strategies
before and after September 11th. Please indicate how they have changed:
Policing

Public Education/User Outreach

Security Hardware/Technology

Environmental Design Strategies



Q12. In general, how does your agency tend to consider anti-terrorism and
anti-crime strategies?
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(a) The strategies (anti-terrorism and anti-crime) are considered
completely separate from one another
(b) The strategies partly overlap with one another
(c) Both sets of strategies are generally considered hand-in-hand
(n) Don't know/Not sure
Comments:

Back

Next
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Who provides policing for your system? (Total must equal 100%)

Sworn transit law enforcement

%

Non-sworn transit police (i.e. private
security)

%

Contracted local police

%

Dedicated bureau of local law enforcement

%

No formal security, rely exclusively on local
law enforcement

%

Other (please describe below)

%

TOTAL

%

Q13. If you indicated "Other", please specify:
(n) Don't know/Not sure


Q14. How many full-time equivalent (FTE) security/police personnel does
your agency contract for or employ?
(n) Don't know/Not sure



Q14_1. In your view, how effective do you think policing strategies are in
preparing for terrorist attacks on your system?
(a) Very effective
(b) Somewhat effective
(c) Not effective at all
(n) Don't know/Not sure
Back

Next
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Q15. Do you have an information and outreach strategy to educate transit
riders about general emergency and safety issues?
(a) Yes, we have an extensive information and outreach strategy
(b) Yes, we have a modest information and outreach strategy
(c) No, we do not have an information and outreach strategy
(n) Don't know/Not sure
If you selected "yes", please describe this information and outreach strategy



Q16. Do you have an information and outreach strategy to educate transit
riders specifically about dealing with terrorist attacks?
(a) Yes, we have an extensive information and outreach strategy
(b) Yes, we have a modest information and outreach strategy
(c) No, we do not have an information and outreach strategy
(n) Don't know/Not sure
If you selected "yes", please describe this information and outreach strategy



Q18. In your view, how effective do you think information and outreach
strategies are in preparing for terrorist attacks on your system?
(a) Very effective
(b) Somewhat effective
(c) Not effective at all
(n) Don't know/Not sure
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Next we would like to ask you about the security hardware and
technology strategies your agency uses.
Logout



Which of the following security hardware strategies does your agency employ
in your system? You may also write in your own security hardware strategy in
the boxes provided.

(0) Not
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (n) Don't
in our
1
2
3
4
5
know/Not sure
system
Q19A. Closed-circuit (CCTV)
cameras
Q19B. Emergency telephones
Q19C. Emergency
alert/notification systems on
transit vehicles
Q19D. Personnel radio
communications systems
Q19E. Public address system
Q19F. Chemical/biological (C/B)
sensors
Q19G. Reversible fans
Q19H. Metal detectors at
entrance and exit points
Q19I. Intrusion detection systems
(e.g., at tunnel entrances)
Q19J. Automatic track and signal
monitoring systems
Q19K. GPS locators
Q19L. Electronic access control
Q19M. Portable explosive
detection equipment
Other 1
Other 2
Other 3

Q19N_Text
Q19O_Text
Q19P_Text
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Q20. In your view, how effective do you think security and hardware are in
preparing for terrorist attacks on your system?
(a) Very effective
(b) Somewhat effective
(c) Not effective at all
(n) Don't know/Not sure
Back

Next
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The last set of strategies we would like to ask you about are the
environmental design strategies your agency uses.
Logout



Q21. The term “crime prevention through environmental design” (CPTED)
can mean different things to different people. How would you define this
term?
(a) I am familiar with the term and I would define it as:
(b) I have heard the term, but I'm not certain what it means.
(n) Don't know/Not sure.



Q22. Does your agency currently use CPTED strategies in its security
planning?
(a) Yes, we have an extensive CPTED strategy program
(b) Yes, we have a moderate CPTED strategy program
(c) No, we do not have a CPTED strategy program
(n) Don't know/Not sure
[Q22A and Q23 appear IF Q22 = a or b]



Q22A. In your view, how important are CPTED strategies in your agency's
overall security planning?
(a) Very important
(b) Somewhat important
(c) Not important at all
(n) Don't know/Not sure



Q23. For which components of your system's stations/bus terminal(s) has
your agency used CPTED strategies? (Please check ALL that apply)
(a) Platforms
(b) Entrances and exits
(c) Elevators
(d) Escalators
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(e) Restrooms
(f) Trash cans
(g) Pathways
(h) Parking lots
(i) Vehicles
(j) Vending machines
(k) Gates
(l) Other
(n) Don't know/Not sure
If you indicated "Other" above, please specify:

Back

Next
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The last set of strategies we would like to ask you about are the
environmental design strategies your agency uses.
Logout

[Q23x appears FOR EACH option selected (a-l) in Q23]


You indicated the following components in your system. Please describe the
CPTED strategies used in each component.
Platforms

Entrances and Exits

Elevators

Escalators

Restrooms

Trash cans

Pathways

Parking lots
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Vehicles

Vending Machines

Gates

blah



Previously, you listed one or more CPTED security strategies used by your
system. Please list and rank the one, two, or three strategies that you believe
provide the most "bang for the buck" in terms of transit security.
Example

1. Most "bang for the buck"

2. Second most "bang for the buck"

3. Third most "bang for the buck"
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Comments

[Q24_1 for Rail only]


Q24_1. For which components of your rail system has your agency used
CPTED strategies? (Please check ALL that apply)
(a) Tracks
(b) Station Tunnels
(c) Control Center(s)
(d) Maintenance Facilities (yards and shops)
(e) Traction Power Stations and Distribution
(f) Other
(n) Don't know/Not sure
If you indicated "Other" above, please specify:



Q25. In your view, how effective do you think CPTED strategies are in
preventing for terrorist attacks on your system?
(a) Very effective
(b) Somewhat effective
(c) Not effective at all
(n) Don't know/Not sure



Q26. Does your agency have CPTED guidelines in place?
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(a) Yes
(b) No
(n) Don't know/Not sure
[Q26A appears IF Q26 = a]


Q26A. If yes, how were these guidelines developed?
(a) In-house team
(b) Sheriff's or police department
(c) Contracted security consultants
(d) Other (please specify below)
(n) Don't know/Not sure
If you chose "Other", please explain:

[Q26B appears IF Q26A = a]


Q26B. Which department in your agency led the development of these
guidelines?
(n) Don't know/Not sure
Back

Next
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[This page is rail/agencies with multi-modal transfer facility only]

This next section asks about past incidents experienced on your
system and perceived threats.
Logout



Q27. To your knowledge, has your rail system ever experienced any of the
following incidents?
(a) Identification of explosive device on system
(b) Detonation of explosive device on system
(c) Use of arson/incendiary devices on system
(d) Identification of chemical or biological contaminants on system
(e) Identification of nuclear device or radiological contaminants on system
(f) Vehicle hijacking
(g) Hostage/barricade situation
(h) Employee sabotage
(i) Breach of essential computer/software systems
(j) Shooting incident with multiple victims
(l) Other (please specify)
(k) None of the above
(n) Don’t know/Not sure
If you indicated "Other", please specify:

Back

Next
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The last set of strategies we would like to ask you about are the
environmental design strategies your agency uses.
Logout

[Q27x_A thru Q27x_D appears for each incident indicated in Q27 (a-l) and only
for Rail/Agencies with multi-modal transfer facility]


You indicated the following incidents. For each incident, please answer the
following questions.

Identification of explosive device on system
1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last
Q27A (a) Don't know/Not sure

decade?

2. What was the year of the most recent incident?
Q27A (b)Don't know/Not sure
3. Q27A_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system?
(Please check ALL that apply)
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle
(c) On the tracks
(d) Other
Q27A (c) Don't know/Not sure
4. Briefly describe the incident:

Q27A (d)Don't
know/Not sure
Detonation of explosive device on system
1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last
Q27B (a) Don't know/Not sure

decade?

2. What was the year of the most recent incident?
Q27B (b) Don't know/Not sure
3. Q27B_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system?
(Please check ALL that apply)
(a) At a station
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(b) On a vehicle
(c) On the tracks
(d) Other
Q27B (c) Don't know/Not sure
4. Briefly describe the incident:

Q27B (d) Don't
know/Not sure
Use of arson/incendiary devices on system
1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last
Q27C (a) Don't know/Not sure

decade?

2. What was the year of the most recent incident?
Q27C (b) Don't know/Not sure
3. Q27C_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system?
(Please check ALL that apply)
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle
(c) On the tracks
(d) Other
Q27C (c) Don't know/Not sure
4. Briefly describe the incident:

Q27C (d)
Don't know/Not sure
Identification of chemical or biological contaminants on system
1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last
decade?

Q27D (a) Don't know/Not sure

2. What was the year of the most recent incident?
Q27D (b) Don't know/Not sure
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3. Q27D_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system?
(Please check ALL that apply)
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle
(c) On the tracks
(d) Other
Q27D (c) Don't know/Not sure
4. Briefly describe the incident:

Q27D (d) Don't
know/Not sure
Identification of nuclear device or radiological contaminants on system
1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last
Q27E (a) Don't know/Not sure

decade?

2. What was the year of the most recent incident?
Q27E (b) Don't know/Not sure
3. Q27E_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system?
(Please check ALL that apply)
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle
(c) On the tracks
(d) Other
Q27E (c) Don't know/Not sure
4. Briefly describe the incident:

Q27E (d) Don't
know/Not sure
Vehicle hijacking
1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last
decade?

Q27F (a) Don't know/Not sure
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2. What was the year of the most recent incident?
Q27F (b) Don't know/Not sure
3. Q27F_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system?
(Please check ALL that apply)
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle
(c) On the tracks
(d) Other
Q27F (c) Don't know/Not sure
4. Briefly describe the incident:

Q27F (d) Don't
know/Not sure
Hostage/barricade situation
1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last
Q27G (a) Don't know/Not sure

decade?

2. What was the year of the most recent incident?
Q27G (b) Don't know/Not sure
3. Q27G_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system?
(Please check ALL that apply)
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle
(c) On the tracks
(d) Other
Q27G (c) Don't know/Not sure
4. Briefly describe the incident:

Q27G (d) Don't
know/Not sure
Employee sabotage
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1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last
decade?

Q27H (a) Don't know/Not sure

2. What was the year of the most recent incident?
Q27H (b) Don't know/Not sure
3. Q27H_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system?
(Please check ALL that apply)
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle
(c) On the tracks
(d) Other
Q27H (c) Don't know/Not sure
4. Briefly describe the incident:

Q27H (d) Don't
know/Not sure
Breach of essential computer/software systems
1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last
decade?

Q27I (a) Don't know/Not sure

2. What was the year of the most recent incident?
Q27I (b) Don't know/Not sure
3. Q27I_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system?
(Please check ALL that apply)
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle
(c) On the tracks
(d) Other
Q27I (c) Don't know/Not sure
4. Briefly describe the incident:

Q27I (d) Don't
know/Not sure
Shooting incident with multiple victims
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1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last
Q27J (a) Don't know/Not sure

decade?

2. What was the year of the most recent incident?
Q27J (b) Don't know/Not sure
3. Q27J_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system?
(Please check ALL that apply)
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle
(c) On the tracks
(d) Other
Q27J (c) Don't know/Not sure
4. Briefly describe the incident:

Q27J (d) Don't
know/Not sure
Other
1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last
Q27K (a) Don't know/Not sure

decade?

2. What was the year of the most recent incident?
Q27K (b) Don't know/Not sure
3. Q27K_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system?
(Please check ALL that apply)
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle
(c) On the tracks
(d) Other
Q27K (c) Don't know/Not sure
4. Briefly describe the incident:

Q27K (d) Don't
know/Not sure
[End Rail/Agencies with multi-modal transfer facilities question block]
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Q27_bomb. How many credible threats (e.g. bomb, chemical, biological, fire
attacks, etc) has your agency had in the last year?
(n) Don't know/Not sure

[Q28x appears for each option selected in Q1 (a-g)]


In your view, how vulnerable to terrorist attack is each of the modes in your
system?

(n) Don't
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
know/Not
1 2 3 4 5
sure
Q28A. Commuter rail
Q28B. Heavy rail
Q28C. Light rail
Q28D. Bus
Q28E. Ferry
Q28F. Paratransit
Q28G. [OTHER]


In your view, how vulnerable to terrorist attack is each of these rail system
components in your system?

(0)
(n) Don't
Does (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
know/Not
not 1 2 3 4 5
sure
apply
Q29A. Rail stations
Q29B. Multi-modal terminals
(e.g. bus and rail stations)
Q29C. Bridges/tunnels
Q29D. Tracks and rail lines
Q29E. Vehicles
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Thank you for completing the survey!
You now have three ways to proceed:
1. You can check over your answers by clicking on "Return to Start."
2. You can save what you have entered so far and return later to complete
and submit the survey by clicking on "Save."
3. Or you can finalize and submit the survey by clicking on "Finalize
Survey." (When you click on "Finalize Survey" your responses will be
recorded and you will no longer be able to change your answers.)
If you indicated "Don't know/Not sure" for any of the questions or you think that
someone else in your organization could add additional information to this nearly
completed survey, please indicate their name(s) and contact information below
and click on "Save" or "Finalize Survey."
Thanks again for your time and attention.

Back

Return to Start

Save

Finalize Survey

Reset
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TRANSIT SECURITY SURVEY NEW USER
REGISTRATION FORM
Transit Agency Information
Transit Agency Name
AGENCY
Agency City
AGENCYCITY

Agency State
AGENCYSTATE

Mailing Address
MAILING1
MAILING2
City
CITY

State
STATE

Zip
ZIP

Personal Information
(Individual filling out the survey)
First Name
FIRSTNAME

Last Name
LASTNAME

Title
TITLE
Email
EMAIL
Telephone Number (xxx-xxx-xxxx)
PHONE
Choose a username (10 characters or
less)
USERNAME
Choose a password (10 characters or
less)
PASSWORD
Confirm password
PASSWORD
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Data Dictionary for Misc. Fields
USERID:

Primary key internal to Access Db

TOTALLOGINS:

Total number of logins to survey

LASTIP:

Last IP address of User

LASTBROWSER: Identifies browser of user
LASTLOGIN:

Date/time of last login

HASRAIL:

Checkbox specifies whether transit agency indicated rail

LASTPAGE:

Last page user was on before logging out

DONE:

Checkbox specifies whether user clicked “Finalize Survey”
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No CPTED/Has Rail
Login

Page 10

Has Rail

Pages 5…7

No CPTED
No threat
assessment
Pages 1-2

Page 8

Page 9

Final

Has CPTED
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Has Rail

No Rail

Has threat assessment
Page 11
No CPTED/No Rail
Page 3
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AIA

American Institute of Architects

ALAMYS

Latin American Association of Underground Networks and Subways

ALARP

As low as reasonably practical

APTA

American Public Transportation Association

ATM

Automated teller machine

AVE

Alta Velocidad Española (Spain’s high-speed rail system)

BART

Bay Area Rapid Transit

BTP

British Transport Police

Caltrans

California Department of Transportation

CBNR

Chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological agents

CCTV

Closed-circuit television

CD-ROM

Compact disc read-only memory

CERTU

Centre d’Études sur les Reseaux de Transport et l’Urbanisme (France’s Ministry of
Transportation)

CODATU

Cooperation for the Continuing Development of Urban and Suburban
Transportation

CPTED

Crime prevention through environmental design

CRTM

Consorcio Regional de Transportes de Madrid

CTAA

Community Transportation Association of America

DOT

Department of Transportation

DHS

Department of Homeland Security

Eole

Est-Ouest Liaison Express. A rail line that will link the east and west suburbs of
Paris.

ETA

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, a Basque paramilitary terrorist group. Initials translate to
“Basque Country and Liberty.”
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EU

European Union

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

FRA

Federal Railroad Administration

FTA

Federal Transit Administration

GAO

Government Accountability Office; previously called General Accounting Office

GIA

Armed Islamic Group (responsible for bombings in Paris)

GSA

General Services Administration

IED

Improvised explosive device

ISAC

Information Sharing Analysis Center

IRA

Irish Republican Army

IRT

Interborough Rapid Transit

IT

Information Technology

MARC

Maryland Rail Commuter

MARTA

Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority

MBTA

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

Météor

Métro Est-Ouest Rapide, a new subway line in Paris

MTA

Metropolitan Transportation Authority (New York City)

NCPC

National Capital Planning Commission

New Jersey
Barrier

A tapered concrete barrier that is used in many narrow highway medians to
prevent vehicle crossovers into oncoming traffic.

NRSP

National Railway Security Program

NYCTA

New York City Transit Authority

NYPD

New York Police Department

OSS

Office of Safety and Security
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PATH

Port Authority Trans-Hudson (a subsidiary of the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey)

PIRA

Provincial Irish Republican Army

PRESS

Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards

PROTECT

Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancements for Chemical/
Biological Terrorism in Subways

PTS

Public transit security

RATP

Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens, Paris’ transit system

RENFE

La Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Españoles (National Network of the Spanish
Railways)

RER

Réseau Express Régional, a part of Paris’ transit system

RTP

Regional Transport Police

SCP

Situational crime prevention

SEPP

Security and Emergency Preparedness Program

SEPTA

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Agency

SNCF

Societe National des Chemins de Fer Francais (French Railways)

SPIE

International Society of Optical Engineering

ST-ISAC

Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center

TfL

Transport for London

TRANSEC

Transportation Security (part of the United Kingdom’s Department for Transport)

TSA

Transportation Security Administration

UCR

Uniform Crime Reporting

UITP

International Union of Public Transport

VTA

Valley Transportation Authority

WMATA

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

Mineta Transportation Institute

272

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Mineta Transportation Institute

Bibliography

273

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abkowitz, Mark D. Transportation Risk Management: A New Paradigm. Knoxville, TN:
Southeastern Transportation Center, 2002.
Adduci, Robert, Annabelle Boyd, and Jim Canton. Handbook for Transit Safety and Security
Certification. Washington, D.C.: Federal Transit Administration, Office of Safety and
Security, 2002.
Alternative Technologies for the Destruction of Chemical Agents and Munitions. National Research
Council. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1993.
American Institute of Architects. Security Planning and Design: A Guide for Architects and
Building Design Professionals. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2003.
American Public Transportation Association. “Transit Agency Data.” American Public
Transportation Association 2004 [cited 2004]. Available from http://www.apta.com/
research/stats/.
The Appleton Inquiry Report. London: Crown Copyright, Health and Safety Executive, 1992.
Atlas, Randall. “Is There a Difference in Designing for Crime or Terrorism?” CPTED Training
Convention, 1999.
———. “Designing Against Terror: Site Security Planning and Design Criteria.” In
Architectural Graphic Standards, edited by C.G. Ramsey et al. New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 2002.
Balog, John N. Transit System Security Program Planning Guide. Washington, D.C.: Federal
Transit Administration, 1997.
Balog, John N., Annabelle Boyd, and Jim Caton. Public Transportation System Security and
Emergency Preparedness Guide. Washington, D.C.: Federal Transit Administration, 2003.
Balog, John N., Matthew G. Devost, and John P. Sullivan. Public Transportation Security: Volume
1: Communication of Threats: A Guide. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press,
2002.
Balog, John N., Bernard C. Doyle, and Anne N. Schwarz. Transit Security Procedures Guide.
Washington, D.C.: Federal Transit Administration, Office of Technical Assistance and
Safety, 1994.

Mineta Transportation Institute

274

Bibliography

Barron, James. “Chaos Follows Blast in Lower Manhattan.” The New York Times, December 22,
1994.
Boyd, Annabelle. Transit Security Handbook. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 1998.
Boyd, Annabelle, M. Patricia Maier, and Jim Caton. Critical Incident Management Guidelines.
Washington, D.C.: Federal Transit Administration, 1998.
Boyd, Annabelle, M. Patricia Maier, and Patricia J. Kenney. Perspectives on Transit Security in the
1990s: Strategies for Success. Washington, D.C.: Federal Transit Administration,
Research and Special Programs Administration, 1996.
Boyd, Annabelle, and John P. Sullivan. “Emergency Preparedness for Transit Terrorism.” In
TCRP Synthesis 27. Washington, D.C.: National Research Council, 1997.
———. “Emergency Preparedness for Transit Terrorism.” TR News, 2000.
Carter, Mark R., et al. Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and
Operations, the Pentagon and the National Capitol Region—September 11, 2001.
Washington, D.C.: Federal Highway Administration—ITS Joint Program Office,
2002.
Clarke, Ronald V. “Situational Crime Prevention: Its Theoretical Basis and Practical Scope.” In
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, edited by Michael Tonry and Norvall Morris.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.
———. “Situational Crime Prevention: Its Achievements and Challenges.” In Crime and
Justice: A Review of Research, edited by Michael Tonry and Norvall Morris. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1995.
Coogan, Tim P. The IRA: A History. New York: Random House Value Publishing, 1995.
Crowe, Timothy D. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and Space Management
Concepts. London: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1991.
Crowe, Timothy D., and Diane L. Zahm. “Crime Prevention Through Environmental
Design.” Land Development 14:22-27, 1194.
DeBlasio, Allen J., et al. Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and
Operations, New York City—September 11, 2001. Washington, D.C.: Federal Highway
Administration—ITS Joint Program Office, 2002.

Mineta Transportation Institute

Bibliography

275

Defence Canada. R & D for Defence Canada. Accessed March 12, 2003, www.suffield.
drdc-rddc.gc.ca/Meetings/FirstResponders/3%20%%20Aum%20Shinrikyo_final.pdf.
Drake, C.J.M. Terrorists’ Target Selection. London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1998.
Dwyer, Adrian. “Prudent Pessimism: The Management of Terrorism Threats Against the
Railways in England, Scotland and Wales.” Paper read at Economic Research Center
Conference of Ministers of Transport Round Table: Vandalism, Terrorism and Security
in Urban Public Passenger Transport, 2003.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Terrorism in the United States, 1999. Washington, D.C.: Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 1999.
Federal Emergency Management Agency. Integrating Manmade Hazards into Mitigating
Planning. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003 (a): 3-4.
———. Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks. Washington,
D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003 (b).
———. Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. Washington,
D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003 (c).
Federal Transit Administration. “Transit Safety and Security Statistics.” (2005) Accessed
March 12, 2003, http://transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov/Data/Samis.asp.
———. Security Risk Assessment
Administration, 2003 (a).

Framework.

Washington,

D.C.:

Federal

Transit

———. Top 20 Security Program Action Items for Transit Agencies. Federal Transit
Administration, 2003 (b). Accessed March 12, 2003, www.transitsafety.volpe.dot.giv.Security/Default.asp.
Felson, Marcus. “Redesigning Hell: Preventing Crime and Disorder at the Port Authority Bus
Terminal.” In Preventing Mass Transit Crime, edited by Ronald V. Clarke. Monsey, NY:
Criminal Justice Press, 1996.
Florida Public Transportation Anti-Terrorism Resource Guide. Center for Urban Transportation
Research, University of South Florida, 2001.
Flynn, Stephen E. “Transportation Security: Agenda for the 21st Century.” TR News, 2000.
Gaier, David W. “Security: Keep It in Perspective.”Passenger Transport, 2004.

Mineta Transportation Institute

276

Bibliography

Gordon, Susanne. “Chemical Terrorism Response in Public Facilities.” Transit Policing 10
(1):5-10.
Haimes, Yacov Y. A Risk Assessment Methodology for Critical Transportation Infrastructure.
Richmond, VA: Virginia Department of Transportation and Federal HIghway
Administration, 2002.
Hartgen, David, Gerald Ingalls, and Timothy Owens. Public Fear of Crime and Its Role in Public
Transit Use. Raleigh, NC: University of North Carolina, Center for Interdisciplinary
Transportation Studies, 1993.
Hathaway, William, Jason Baker, and Albert Moussa. Fire Safety Countermeasures for Urban Rail
Vehicles. Cambridge, MA: Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 1992.
Hathaway, William, and Stephanie H. Markos. Recommended Emergency Preparedness Guidelines
for Rail Transit Systems. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1985.
———. Recommended Emergency Preparedness Guidelines for Urban, Rural, and Specialized Transit
Systems. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1991.
Hevesi, Dennis. “Subway Suspect: Trail of Distrust.” The New York Times, December 23, 1994.
Ibrahim, Youssef. “A Wary France Cracks Down on Its Muslims.” The New York Times,
September 7, 1995.
Improving Surface Transportation Security: A Research and Development Strategy. National Research
Council. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999.
Integrating Manmade Hazards into Mitigation Planning. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 2003.
Jacobs, Jane. The Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York: Random House, 1961.
Jenkins, Brian Michael. Protecting Surface Transportation Systems and Patrons from Terrorist
Activities. San Jose, CA: Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface
Transportation Policy Studies, 1997.
———. Protecting Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: An Executive
Overview. San Jose, CA: Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface
Transportation Policy Studies, 2001.
Jenkins, Brian Michael, and Larry Gerston. Protecting Public Surface Transportation Against
Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security Practices. San Jose, CA:

Mineta Transportation Institute

Bibliography

277

Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies,
2001.
LaVigne, Nancy. “Safe Transport: Security by Design on the Washington Metro.” In Preventing
Mass Transit Crime, edited by Ronald V. Clarke. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press,
1997.
———. “Visibility and Vigilance: Metro’s Situational Approach to Preventing Subway
Crime.” In Preventing Mass Transit Crime, edited by Ronald V. Clarke. Monsey, NY:
Criminal Justice Press, 1996.
Loukaitou-Sideris, Anastasia, et al. “The Geography of Transit Crime Documentation and
Evaluation of Crime Incidence on and around the Green Line Stations in Los Angeles.”
Journal of Planning Education and Research 22, 2002.
———. “Measuring the Effects of Built Environment on Bus Stop Crime.” Environment and
Planning B-Planning and Design 28 (2), 2001.
Lynch, G., and S. Atkins. “The Influence of Personal Security Fears on Women’s Travel
Patterns.” Transportation 15, 2001.
Mauri, Ronald A., Nancy A. Cooney, and Garry J. Prowe. Transit Security: A Description of
Problems and Countermeasures. Washington, D.C.: Urban Mass Transit Administration,
1983.
McFadden, Robert D. “Police Say New Evidence Links Suspects to Firebomb.” The New York
Times, December 25, 1994.
Mead, Kenneth R., and Michael G. Gressel. Protecting Building Environments from Airborne
Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks. Cincinnati, OH: National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health, 2002.
Morgan, Daniel F., and H. Norman Abramson. “Improving Surface Transportation Security
Through Research and Development.” TR News, 2000.
Myhre, Marina L., and Fabien Rosso. “Designing for Security in Météor: A Projected New
Metro Line in Paris.” In Preventing Mass Transit Crime, edited by Ronald V. Clarke.
Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1996.
National Capitol Planning Commission. Designing for Security in the Nation’s Capital.
Washington, D.C.: National Capitol Planning Commission, 2001.

Mineta Transportation Institute

278

Bibliography

Newman, Oscar. “Defensible Space: Crime Prevention through Urban Design.” New York,
NY: MacMillan Co., 1972.
Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies. Terrorism
in Surface Transportation: A Symposium. San Jose, CA: Norman Y. Mineta International
Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies, 1996.
O’Connor, Robert. “Terrorists in Transit.” Mass Transit, 1991.
Okumura, Tetsu, et al. “The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack: Disaster Management Part 1:
Community Emergency Response.” Academic Emergency Medicine 5 (6), 1998.
On the Road to Transportation Security: Investigative Research for Infrastructure Assurance (IRIA)
Group. Hanover, NH: Institute for Security Technology Studies, Dartmouth College,
2003.
Pangi, Robin. “Consequence Management in the 1995 Sarin Attacks on the Japanese Subway
System.” In BCSIA Discussion Paper 2002-4, ESDP Discussion Paper 2001-02. John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2002.
Perez-Pena, Richard. “Blast Victims Said to Face Long Struggle.” The New York Times,
December 26, 1994.
———. “Bombing Plot Seen in Notes, Official Says.” The New York Times, January 2, 1995.
Policastro, Anthony, and Susanna Gordon. “The Use of Technology in Preparing Subway
Systems for Chemical/Biological Terrorism.” Paper read at Commuter Rail/Rapid
Transit Conference Proceedings, Toronto, 1999.
Riding, Alan. “Explosion Kills 4 and Injures Many on Train in Paris.” The New York Times,
July 26, 1995.
Savage, Tom. “Lessons Learned by the New York City Transit Authority from Recent Terrorist
Attacks.” Paper read at Terrorism in Surface Transportation Symposium, San Jose, CA,
1996.
Schmidt, William E. “Two Rail Terminals in Central London Hit by IRA Bombs.” The New
York Times, February 19, 1991.
———. “Bombing in London Leaves 28 Injured.” The New York Times, February 29, 1992.
Simons, Marlise. “French Police Search for Train Bombers; Death Toll at 7.” The New York
Times, July 27, 1995.

Mineta Transportation Institute

Bibliography

279

———. “Police Link Algerian Militant Group to Paris Train Bombing.” The New York Times,
July 30, 1995.
Singleton, Royce, Bruce C. Straits, Margaret M. Straits, and Ronald J. McAllister.
“Measurement.” In Approaches to Social Research. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 1988.
Swasinger, William. “Mitigation of Chemical Attacks in Enclosed Public Transportation
Facilities.” Paper read at proceedings of SPIE Enforcement and Security Technology,
1998.
Taylor, Peter. Provos, the IRA and Sinn Fein. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1997.
Tu, Anthony. Chemical Terrorism: Horrors in the Tokyo Subway and Matsumoto City. Ft. Collins,
CO: Alaken Inc. Publishing, 2002.
———. The Facilities Standards for the Public Buildings Service. Public Buildings Service (PBS)
of the General Services Administration, 2003.
United States General Accounting Office. Domestic Terrorism: Preventing Efforts in Selected Federal
Courts and Mass Transit Systems. Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting
Office, 1988.
———. “Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems.” In Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Housing and Transportation. Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, U.S. Senate. Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, 2002
(a).
———. Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security Challenges.
Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 2002 (b).
United States General Services Administration. Balancing Security and Openness: A Thematic
Summary of a Symposium on Security and the Design of Public Buildings. Washington, D.C.:
United States General Services Administration, 1999.
Urban Mass Transportation Administration. Recommended Fire Safety Practices for Rail Transit
Materials Selection. Urban Mass Transportation Administration. http://ntl.bts.gov/
DOCS/396.html.
“Washington Metro Installs Chemical Sensors.” Mass Transit 34, 2002.

Mineta Transportation Institute

280

Bibliography

Weidner, Robert. “Target Hardening at a New York City Subway Station: Decreased Fare
Evasion—At What Price?” In Preventing Mass Transit Crime, edited by Ronald V.
Clarke. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1996.
Weinstock, Matthew. “Transportation Security Effort Called Fragmented, Underfunded.” In
GovExec.com Daily Briefing, Washington, D.C., 2003.
Whent, Peter. “Control of Public Space.” Paper read at 1999 APTA Commuter Rail/Rapid
Transit Conference, Toronto, 1999.
The White House. National Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets.
Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2003 (a).
———. Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation. Washington, D.C.: The White House,
2003 (b).
Whitney, Craig. “Bomb Rips Train Underneath Paris, with 29 Wounded.” The New York
Times, October 18, 1995.
———. “With New Bombings Feared, Soldiers Patrol Paris Streets.” The New York Times,
October 19, 1995.
Yin, Robert K. “Case Study Research Design and Methods.” In Applied Social Research Methods,
3rd ed., vol. 5, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003.

Mineta Transportation Institute

List of Interviews

281

LIST OF INTERVIEWS
Pascal Andre, SNCF Pole Defense, interview by Babak Hedjazi, May 20, 2004, Paris, France.
Jacques Biz, CERTU French Ministry of Transportation: Groupe Technologies des Transports
Collectifs et Services Associés, interview by Babak Hedjazi, May 18, 2004, Paris, France.
François Blasin, CERTU French Ministry of Transportation: Groupe Technologies des Transports
Collectifs et Services Associés, interview by Babak Hedjazi, May 18, 2004, Paris, France.
Javier Garcia Cadiñanos, Director of Security Department, Madrid Metro, interview by Rachel
Factor, September 15, 2004, Madrid, Spain.
Lewis Clopton, Federal Transit Administration Office of Research Management, Director of
Research Management, interview by Camille Fink, January 12, 2004, Washington, D.C.; and
interview by Peter Haas, April 29, 2004, Washington, D.C.
Augustin Gonzales Coronado, Coordinator, RENFE, interview by Rachel Factor, September
14, 2004, Madrid, Spain.
Rhonda Crowley, Federal Transit Administration, Team Leader, Safety and Security Research,
interview by Peter Haas, September 29, 2004, Washington, D.C.
Patrick Dillenseger, Defense Assistant, Regie Autonome des Transports Parisiens, interview by
Babak Hedjazi, May 12, 2004, Paris, France.
Geoff Dunmore, Operational Security Manager, London Underground, interview by Camille
Fink, September 2, 2004, London, England.
Adrian Dwyer, British Transport Police, interview by Camille Fink, September 4, 2004,
London, England.
Bill Fagan, Chief of Security, Federal Railroad Administration, interview by Peter Haas, April
29, 2004, Washington, D.C.
Rick Gerhart, Federal Transit Administration, Senior Security Specialist, interview by Peter
Haas, September 29, 2004, Washington, D.C.
Jose Dionisio Gonzales, Civil Engineer, Studies and Planning Department, CRTM, interview
by Rachel Factor, September 15, 2004, Madrid, Spain.

Mineta Transportation Institute

282

List of Interviews

Martha Gulick, Manager, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, interview by Ellen
Cavanaugh, March 22, 2004, New York.
Polly Hansen, Chief of Police, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, interview by
Camille Fink, January 13, 2004, Washington, D.C.
Makato Himeda, Assistant Supervisor, Technology Section, Tokyo Metro, interview by
Kimiko Shiki, July 6, 2004, Tokyo, Japan.
Greg Hull, Director of Operations, Safety and Security Programs, American Public
Transportation Association, interview by Camille Fink, January 14, 2004, Washington, D.C.
Thom Rhys Jones, Managing Director, Jefferson Sheard Architects, interview by Camille Fink,
September 4, 2004, London, England.
Don Parente, Supervisor, Security Services Division, Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey, interview by Ellen Cavanaugh, March 22, 2004, New York.
Spencer McManus, Head of Security & Policing, London Underground, interview by Camille
Fink, September 2, 2004, London, England.
Graham Marshall, Security Specialist, Network Rail, interview by Camille Fink, August 29,
2004, London, England.
Juan Carlos Piñero Martinez, Industrial Engineer, Security Department, Madrid Metro,
interview by Rachel Factor, September 15, 2004, Madrid, Spain.
Mohamed Mezghani, Director of Programmes and Studies, International Union of Public
Transport (UTIP), interview by Camille Fink, September 20, 2004, Brussels, Belgium.
Jesus Rodriguez Molina, Technical Director, Consorcio Transportes, Madrid, interview by
Rachel Factor, September 15, 2004, Madrid, Spain.
William Morange, Executive Director for Security, Metropolitan Transportation of New York,
interview by Ellen Cavanaugh, June 4, 2004, New York.
John J. O’Connor, Chief of Patrol, Amtrak Police Department, Penn Station, Washington,
D.C., interview by Ellen Cavanaugh, June 1, 2004, New York.
Official from Construction Section, Construction and Maintenance Division, Bureau of
Transportation, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, interview by Kimiko Shiki, July 5, 2004,
Tokyo, Japan.

Mineta Transportation Institute

List of Interviews

283

Official (#1) from General Affairs Section, General Affairs Division, Bureau of Transportation,
Tokyo Metropolitan Government, interview by Kimiko Shiki, July 5, 2004, Tokyo, Japan.
Official (#2) from General Affairs Section, General Affairs Division, Bureau of Transportation,
Tokyo Metropolitan Government, interview by Kimiko Shiki, July 5, 2004, Tokyo, Japan.
Official (#1) from Operation Section, Subway and Streetcar Division, Bureau of
Transportation, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, interview by Kimiko Shiki, July 5, 2004,
Tokyo, Japan.
Official (#2) from Operation Section, Subway and Streetcar Division, Bureau of
Transportation, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, interview by Kimiko Shiki, July 5, 2004,
Tokyo, Japan.
Official from Rolling Stock Planning Section, Rolling Stock and Electricity Division, Bureau
of Transportation, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, interview by Kimiko Shiki, July 5, 2004,
Tokyo, Japan.
Brian O’Malley, Transportation Security Administration, Branch Chief, Mass Transit
Infrastructure Security, interview by Peter Haas, June 8, 2004, Washington, D.C.
Michel Persin, SNCF, Pole Defense, interview by Babak Hedjazi, May 20, 2004, Paris, France.
Michel Poulain, SNCF Defense, interview by Babak Hedjazi, May 20, 2004, Paris, France.
Matthew Rabkin, Volpe Institute, interview by Peter Haas, September 29, 2004, Washington,
D.C.
François Rambaud, CERTU French Ministry of Transportation: Groupe Technologies des
Transports Collectifs et Services Associés, interview by Babak Hedjazi, May 18, 2004, Paris, France.
Manuel L. Rodriguez Simons, Director, Security and Civil Protection, RENFE, interview by
Rachel Factor, September 14, 2004, Madrid, Spain.
Peter Sinden, Security Support Manager, London Underground, interview by Camille Fink,
September 2, 2004, London, England.
Andrea Soehnchen, Project Manager, Voyager Project, interview by Camille Fink, September
20, 2004, Brussels.
John Strutton, Crime & Punishment Partnership Manager, London Underground, interview
by Camille Fink, September 2, 2004, London, England.

Mineta Transportation Institute

284

List of Interviews

Yukio Takagaki, Assistant Section Chief in Safety Section, Tokyo Metro, interview by Kimiko
Shiki, July 6, 2004, Tokyo, Japan.
Don Thompson, Director of Passenger Safety, Transportation Security Administration,
Director of Passenger Safety, interview by Peter Haas, May 11, 2004, Washington, D.C.
Carmen Tornos, Legal Affairs, RENFE, interview by Rachel Factor, September 14, 2004,
Madrid, Spain.
Joaquin Ruano Treviño, Manager, Madrid Region, RENFE, interview by Rachel Factor,
September 14, 2004, Madrid, Spain.
Barrie Wickens, Strategic Security Planning & Audit, Transport for London, interview by
Camille Fink, August 30, 2004, London, England.
Tom Yedinak, Senior Legislative Representative, American Public Transportation Association,
interview by Camille Fink, January 14, 2004, Washington, D.C.

Mineta Transportation Institute

About the Authors

285

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
BRIAN D. TAYLOR, PH.D., AICP
Brian D. Taylor is an associate professor and vice-chair of urban planning, and director of the
Institute of Transportation Studies at the University of California at Los Angeles. His research
centers on both transportation finance and travel demographics. He has examined the politics
of transportation finance, including the influence of finance on the development of
metropolitan freeway systems, and the effect of public transit subsidy programs on both
system performance and social equity. His research on the demographics of travel behavior
have emphasized access-deprived populations, including women, racial-ethnic minorities, the
disabled, and the poor. Dr. Taylor’s work in this area has also explored the relationships
between transportation and urban form, with a focus on commuting and employment access
for low-wage workers.
Prior to coming to UCLA in 1994, he was an assistant professor in the Department of City and
Regional Planning at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and before that, he
served as a transportation analyst with the Metropolitan Transportation Commission in
Oakland, California. Dr. Taylor teaches courses in transportation policy, and planning and
research design.

ANASTASIA LOUKAITOU-SIDERIS, PH.D.
Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris is professor and chair of the Department of Urban Planning at
UCLA. She holds a doctorate in urban planning and master’s degrees in architecture and urban
planning, all from the University of Southern California. Her area of specialization is urban
design, and physical and land use planning. She has published extensively on issues of
downtown development, inner-city revitalization, transit-oriented design and transit safety,
and parks and open spaces. Recent and ongoing projects have been funded by the California
Department of Transportation (Caltrans), California Policy Research Center, the National
Endowment for the Arts, Poverty and Race Research Action Council, the John Randolph and
Dora Haynes Foundation, and the Mineta Transportation Institute.
Dr. Loukaitou-Sideris has served as a consultant to the Transportation Research Board, Federal
Highway Administration, Southern California Association of Governments, Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, South Bay Cities Council of Government, Los Angeles

Mineta Transportation Institute

286

About the Authors

Neighborhood Initiative, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the government of Greece, and
many municipal governments on issues of urban design, land use, and transportation. She is
also the coauthor of Urban Design Downtown: Poetics and Politics of Form, published by the
University of California Press in 1998.

ROBIN LIGGETT, PH.D.
Robin Liggett holds a joint appointment between the Department of Architecture and Urban
Design and the Department of Urban Planning at UCLA, where she teaches courses in
quantitative methods and computer applications. Her research emphasis on the development
of interactive computer graphic aids for design and decision-making has focused on algorithms
for optimal space allocation in the facilities management field, and on methods of parametric
design.
Dr. Liggett has recently collaborated with Dr. Loukaitou-Sideris on a number of studies
investigating the effects of the built environment on transit crime. She received her M.A. and
Ph.D. in operations research from the UCLA Graduate School of Management.

CAMILLE FINK, M.A.
Camille N.Y. Fink is a Ph.D. student in the UCLA Department of Urban Planning. Her
interests include transportation safety and security; transportation equity; race, gender, and
the built environment; and ethnographic methods. Before returning to graduate school, she
worked in radio broadcasting and for a homeless advocacy coalition in the San Francisco Bay
Area. She has a B.A. in sociology from the University of California at Davis, and an M.A. in
urban planning from UCLA.

MARTIN WACHS, PH.D., AICP
Martin Wachs is director of the Institute of Transportation Studies at the University of
California, Berkeley, where he also holds faculty appointments as professor of city and regional
planning, and as Carlson Distinguished Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering. Dr.
Wachs holds a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering from the City University of New York,
and M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in transportation planning from the civil engineering department
at Northwestern University. He was an assistant professor at Northwestern University and the

Mineta Transportation Institute

About the Authors

287

University of Illinois at Chicago. From 1971 through 1996, he was professor of urban
planning and director of the Institute of Transportation Studies at UCLA, where he served
three times as head of the urban planning program. He has served as a visiting professor at
Oxford University, Rutgers University, the University of Iowa, and the Technion.
Dr. Wachs is the author or editor of four books, and has written over 130 published articles on
transportation planning and policy, including the transportation needs of elderly and
handicapped people, fare and subsidy policies in urban transportation, the problem of crime in
public transit systems, and methods for the evaluation of alternative transportation projects.
He has also performed historical studies of the relationship between transportation
investments and urban form in the early part of the twentieth century, and on ethics in
planning and forecasting. Recently, his writings have dealt with the relationship between
transportation, air quality and land use, and transportation finance, as well as transit labor and
contracting issues.
Dr. Wachs served as chairman of the executive committee of the Transportation Research
Board during the year 2000, and was a member of the California Commission on
Transportation Investment, to which he was appointed by Governor Pete Wilson. He is
currently a member of the advisory committee on research and development for Caltrans, and
was the first chair of the advisory panel for the Travel Model Improvement Program of the
United States Department of Transportation.

ELLEN CAVANAGH
Ellen Cavanagh is a graduate student researcher in city and regional planning at the University
of California, Berkeley. As senior advocate at Transportation Alternatives in New York City,
Cavanagh participated in a number of post-9/11 community and interagency reconstruction
task forces. Her research and advocacy in this area centered on the design of perimeter security
for critical infrastructure in locations with heavy pedestrian flows.

CHRISTOPHER CHERRY
Christopher Cherry is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Civil and Environmental
Engineering at the University of California, Berkeley. His research interests include
transportation security, transportation policy and planning, transportation in developing
countries, and intelligent transportation systems. He has a B.S. and M.S. in civil engineering,

Mineta Transportation Institute

288

About the Authors

with an emphasis in transportation, from the University of Arizona. He has worked for several
transportation engineering design consultants throughout his studies.

PETER HAAS, PH.D.
Peter J. Haas is currently education director for the Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI), a
research and education organization located at San José State University (SJSU). Haas earned
his doctorate in the field of public policy and public administration from the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1985, and has taught at the University of North Carolina,
Virginia Tech, and SJSU, where he is also a member of the political science and public
administration program faculty.
Dr. Haas is the author of many publications, including a coauthored textbook on policy
analysis and program evaluation, and a host of professional and scholarly journal articles. He
has directed several research projects on transportation for MTI, including a series of studies of
local transportation tax initiative campaigns that have attracted national attention. He
frequently serves as a panelist at the annual Transportation Cooperative Research Board
program, and has made several presentations at the annual Transportation Research Board
conference in Washington, D.C.
He was recently awarded a senior specialist grant from the Fulbright Foundation to teach and
study in Latvia. As education director for MTI, Dr. Haas administers a statewide program that
prepares transportation professionals for upper-level management and executive positions
throughout the transportation industry.

Mineta Transportation Institute

Publication Peer Review

289

PUBLICATION PEER REVIEW
San José State University, of the California State University system, and the MTI Board of
Trustees have agreed upon a peer view process to ensure that the results presented are based
upon a professionally acceptable research protocol.
Research projects begin with the approval of a scope of work by the sponsoring entities, with
in-process reviews by the MTI Research Director and the project sponsor. Periodic progress
reports are provided to the MTI Research Director and the Research Associates Policy
Oversight Committee (RAPOC). Review of the draft research product is conducted by the
Research Committee of the Board of Trustees and may include invited critiques from other
professionals in the subject field. The review is based on the professional propriety of the
research methodology.

Mineta Transportation Institute

290

Publication Peer Review

Mineta Transportation Institute

MTI Report 04-05
MTI
Designing and Operating Safe and Secure Transit Systems:
Assessing Current Practices in the United States and Abroad

Funded by
U.S. Department of
Transportation and
California Department
of Transportation

Designing and Operating
Safe and Secure Transit
Systems: Assessing
Current Practices in the
United States and Abroad

Report 04-05
November 2005

Mineta
Transportation
Institute
Created by
Congress in 1991

